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This Article considers discontent with liberal toleration as being both too
empty, because it fails to secure respect and appreciation among citizens who
tolerate each other, and too robust, because it precludes government from
engaging in a formative project of helping citizens to live good, self-governing
lives. To meet these criticisms, the Article advances a model of toleration as
respect, as distinguished from a model of empty toleration, drawing on three
rationales for toleration: the anti-compulsion rationale, the jurisdictional
rationale, and the diversity rationale. It defends toleration as respect against
some common criticisms-emanating from feminist, civic republican, and
liberal perfectionist sources-of toleration's supposed constraints upon a
formative project. Toleration as respect not only permits but entails aformative
project by government because it assigns a central value to the fostering of
citizens' capacities for democratic and personal self-government. The Article
takes up internal feminist debates and the debate over same-sex marriage to
raise prudential concerns about perfectionistic calls for government to steer
citizens toward better ways of life and away from worse ones, and to argue for
the comparative strength of a feminist variant of political liberalism. It also
critiques the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence as reflecting, at best,
empty toleration, and rejects notions of empty toleration that justify
discrimination against gay men and lesbians.
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The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional
amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a "'bare... desire to
harm'" homosexuals... but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.
... Quite understandably, [this minority] devote[s] this political power to
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.
- Justice Antonin Scalial
Liberal toleration implies critical distance; when I tolerate the actions of
another, I leave him alone. A feminist politics built upon narrative can replace
the critical distance of "empty tolerance" with empathetic understanding. This
renewed feminist politics should demand more than our passive endurance of
others' differences; it should ask us to engage with others by actively seeking
to understand those differences in a way that resonates with our own
experience.
- Anne C. Dailey2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Empty Toleration or Toleration as Respect?
This Article takes up a series of questions about the relationship among
toleration, autonomy, and governmental promotion of good lives. By these
I Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265, 1283 (1993)
(citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, in F Muffsr LEGAL THEoRY: READINGS IN LAw & GENDER 181, 197
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (referring to "empty tolerance")).
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terms, I intend to connote, respectively, the principle of restraint from coercive
governmental action within a realm of individual liberty of belief and conduct,
the concept of individual self-government or self-direction, and governmental
action intended to persuade, encourage, or steer persons in the direction of
particular ends, values, or decisions. Notwithstanding its venerable roots in
liberal political theory and its translation into American jurisprudence,
toleration remains a subject of considerable contestation and discontent.
Discontent with liberal toleration often goes hand in hand with attraction to
perfectionist conceptions of the responsibility of government as that of shaping
or steering citizens pursuant to a vision of human virtue, goods, or excellence.
Liberal toleration elicits discontent both for being too empty (or thin),
because it does too little, and for being too robust (or thick), because it does too
much. These seemingly contradictory criticisms go to the attitude that toleration
engenders in or requires of citizens, and to the limits that toleration places upon
government's ability to engage in a "formative project" or "formative politics"
of shaping citizens and helping them live good, self-governing lives. 3 Toleration
is too empty, some critics charge, because it requires only that government
leave persons alone with respect to certain beliefs or conduct, not that other
citizens respect or appreciate those persons, their beliefs, or their conduct.
Moreover, its justification is too thin because it rests on autonomy and choice,
not on substantive moral discourse about human goods. The picture of
toleration reflected in Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans illustrates such
emptiness: so long as government refrains from the use of the criminal law
against a disfavored but tolerated minority (such as gay men and lesbians), it
may express citizens' moral disapprobation of and hostility toward that
minority's conduct through such means as the denial of civil rights. 4
At the same time, some critics of liberal toleration charge that it is too
robust because it affords persons too much freedom from government's pursuit
of a formative project of promoting values and helping citizens live good, self-
governing lives. Precisely because prominent liberal conceptions of toleration
(in particular, the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls) seek to go beyond
empty toleration to respect, they lead to too restricted a conception of the
3 For the idea of a "formative politics" or "formative project," see MICHAELJ. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBUC P IosoPHY 6 (1996)
(describing a republican "formative politics" as "a politics that cultivates in citizens the
qualities of character self-government requires"). My joining of the terms "good" and "self-
governing" aims to reflect the fact that, in their demands for a formative project, the
perfectionists whom I consider in this Article generally define good lives in terms of the
capacity for self-government.
4 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying note 1.
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proper business of government. Instead, toleration should permit the
government to pursue perfectionist goals, or even to advance an orthodoxy, so
long as it refrains from coercion. The basic claim of a number of feminist,
liberal, and civic republican perfectionist critics is that leaving persons alone is
not sufficient to secure the capacities, qualities of character, or virtues
necessary for self-government.
These opposing criticisms of toleration stem from competing conceptions of
toleration, which I shall call "empty toleration" and "respect." The core
component in the model of empty toleration is the principle of restraint from
coercive governmental action within a sphere of individual liberty of belief or
conduct. It does not require the tolerator to respect the person, beliefs, or
conduct that are the subject of toleration, and it allows governmental action,
short of coercion, aimed at steering that belief or conduct. The model of respect
shares with empty toleration the core of restraint from coercion, but it aspires to
the goal of respect, and even appreciation, among citizens who tolerate each
other. It does not, as its critics often assume, bar government from seeking to
influence tolerated thought and action by noncoercive means. However, a
matter of some contention is what limits toleration as respect should place upon
government when it seeks not simply to facilitate (i.e., to foster the capacities
for self-government by measures that do not obviously steer or take sides) but
to persuade, or to moralize (i.e., to use measures short of coercion with the
intention of steering citizens toward certain values, choices, and behavior and
away from protected though disfavored values, choices, and behavior). 5
In this Article, I argue that a model of toleration as respect is the more
attractive account of toleration as a matter of both political morality and
constitutional interpretation. I argue that toleration as respect is not vulnerable
to the charges directed at empty toleration. It aims to secure more than pale
civility or grudging toleration by appealing to the protection of such goods as
autonomy, moral independence, and diversity and through seeking to assure
mutual respect and civility among citizens. In response to charges that toleration
as respect is too robust, I argue that it does not serve as a prophylactic bar on
government's pursuit of a formative project to foster citizens' capacities for self-
government and to promote values. Rather, it insists upon reason-giving in the
5 Although some may argue that it is not possible to distinguish between facilitation and
persuasion, I believe that such a distinction is comprehensible and useful. See David A.
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 335
(1991) (describing persuasion as attempting to induce action through a process of appealing to
reason); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 948-50
(1996) (distinguishing education or information campaigns from persuasion, "understood as a
self-conscious effort to alter attitudes and choices rather than simply to offer information").
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deliberative process and upon careful scrutiny of the reasons for which
government acts and of the ends it seeks to pursue. A model of toleration as
respect is not only compatible with, but indeed entails, the idea that fostering
citizens' capacities for self-government requires more than simply leaving
persons alone. These capacities, or moral powers-the capacity for a
conception of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good-correspond
to self-government in the senses of democratic and personal self-government (or
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, respectively). 6
My argument for a model of toleration as respect attempts to find and build
upon common ground between liberalism and feminism on such key issues as
the value of diversity and autonomy (or agency), factors constraining the
development of autonomy, and the authority and responsibility of government
to facilitate and promote the preconditions for autonomy. As such, toleration as
respect represents a viable liberal feminist position. This argument defends
toleration as respect against some of the common criticisms of toleration's
supposed constraints upon a formative project, emanating from feminist, civic
republican, and liberal perfectionist sources. I focus on these three lines of
criticism because each defines the good lives that government should promote
as self-governing lives, which suggests considerable common ground with a
toleration as respect model. At the same time, I argue that there are hard
questions about the promise and the peril of implementing a perfectionist
project-whether feminist, civic republican, or liberal-in a morally pluralistic
society. These questions also implicate the tension between the perfectionist
project and the call to move beyond empty toleration.
B. Elaborating a Model of Toleration as Respect
In Part II, I explore the concept of toleration and demonstrate how the
instability within that concept itself leads to the competing models of empty
toleration and respect, as well as to the criticisms of toleration as too thin and
61 intend by the term deliberative democracy to refer to citizens applying "their capacity
for a conception of justice to deliberating about the justice of basic institutions and social
policies" and about the common good, and by deliberative autonomy to refer to citizens
applying "their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how
to live their own lives." James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L.
Ry. 1, 2 (1995) (advancing a constitutional theory with the two themes of securing the basic
liberties for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy). This two-fold idea of self-
government draws upon John Rawls's political liberalism, which posits two moral powers-
the capacity for a conception of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. See
JOHN RAWIS, PoLrrCAL LIBmmUSM 19 (pap. ed. 1996).
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too thick. I sketch the parameters of the model of toleration as respect. After
canvassing prominent criticisms of toleration in liberal, feminist, and civic
republican perfectionist work, I argue that toleration as respect can meet those
criticisms.
In Parts H through V, to elaborate the model of toleration as respect, I
distinguish and utilize three justifications for toleration: (1) the anti-compulsion
rationale, that is, that compulsion or coercion corrupts belief or choice and
violates autonomy; (2) the jurisdictional rationale, that is, that there is a realm
of personal belief, choice, and conduct that it is not the proper "business" of
government to regulate; and (3) the diversity rationale, that is, that it is
inevitable that people freely exercising their moral powers will choose and
pursue different ways of life and that achieving orthodoxy would require an
objectionable level of governmental coercion. All three of these rationales have
roots in John Locke's classic argument for religious toleration7 as well as John
Smart Mill's famous argument for liberty of thought, conduct, and association, 8
and all find expression in contemporary American constitutional law and
jurisprudence. I focus on toleration as it applies to a right to personal self-
government, or deliberative autonomy, concerning such matters as intimate
association, reproduction, and family.
The three justifications highlight the tension between the competing models
of empty toleration and respect. I offer interpretations of these justifications that
support toleration as respect over empty toleration. The anti-compulsion
rationale potentially offers the strongest argument for confining toleration to
empty toleration. A better reading of its requirements supports toleration as
respect, but even if empty toleration satisfies those requirements, all three
justifications taken together better support toleration as respect. I argue for an
interpretation of the jurisdictional rationale that avoids certain misconceptions of
toleration, leading, on the one hand, to the feminist charge that toleration entails
an abdication of governmental responsibility to secure women's autonomy and
well-being and, on the other, to the claim that toleration, by permitting
governmental moralizing, relegates disfavored minorities (such as gay men and
lesbians) to second-class citizenship. Finally, I argue that the diversity rationale,
which rests upon both the fact and the value of reasonable moral pluralism,
holds the greatest potential to move beyond empty toleration to respect.
I show that all three justifications for toleration are compatible with a
facilitative role for government in fostering citizens' capacities for self-
7 See JOHN LOCKE, A Laru CONCERING TOLERAnON (Patrick Romanell ed., 1955)
(1689).
8 See JoHN STUART MLL, ON LmERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859).
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government and encouraging reflective decisionmaking in matters of
deliberative autonomy. The greater point of controversy is whether a
commitment to toleration as respect permits or precludes government to act by
persuasive, rather than merely facilitative, means. I argue that toleration as
respect comfortably supports governmental persuasion in certain cases, for
example, when it furthers the ends of democratic self-government or promotes
public values. The more difficult question is whether government should, as
perfectionists urge, engage in the business of evaluating the merits of competing
ways of life and steering citizens toward better or more valuable ways of life by
such means as shaping preferences and social norms and encouraging certain
choices over others. In Part V, I use the examples of the conflict over the
morality of same-sex marriage as well as debates within feminism over what
makes for a good life to highlight reasons for caution about the implementation
of such a governmental project in a morally pluralistic society.
In Parts HI and IV, I use a toleration as respect model to critique the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. With respect to the selective funding
cases, I contend that such jurisprudence fails to undertake the requisite scrutiny
of the reasons for which government acts and of the impact of governmental
regulation of abortion upon women's deliberative autonomy. In considering the
Court's upholding of informed consent procedures aimed at persuading women
against abortion, I show that its equation of such persuasion with facilitation of
women's reproductive liberty is deeply problematic. While a toleration as
respect model would support governmental measures to facilitate reflective
decisionmaking, it would be cautious about endorsing the proposition that
government facilitates such decisionmaking when it persuades in favor of one
protected choice rather than another. I argue that the Court's abortion
jurisprudence to date offers an unsatisfactory application of this proposition
because the perfectionist message that government conveys rests on a
problematic gender ideology about women's moral capacity and an inadequate
model of women's reproductive well-being.
In Parts IV and V, I sketch the implications of a toleration as respect model
for the battle over same-sex marriage. Although both proponents and opponents
of same-sex marriage often contend that what is at stake is a move beyond
toleration to respect, I argue that the model of toleration as respect has great
potential to aid in securing full citizenship for gay men and lesbians. Similarly,
I reject the model of empty toleration implicit in Scalia's dissent in Romer v.
Evans and argue that toleration as respect supports a right to same-sex
marriage. In particular, the jurisdictional and diversity rationales for toleration
provide a strong foundation for powerful feminist, liberal, and gay rights
[Vol. 59:19
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arguments that the ban on same-sex marriage enforces an unjust and intolerant
gender orthodoxy. 9 Moreover, such arguments open the door to move beyond
empty toleration to respect and appreciation by arguing that same-sex marriage
may be a transformative model against which to criticize the institution of
marriage.
The burden of this Article is to demonstrate that a toleration as respect
model both offers more than empty toleration and affords ample room for a
formative project. Such a model has considerable common ground with
perfectionist critics of toleration, including the ideal of fostering citizens'
capacities for self-government. By clarifying the contours of what such a model
permits, and where and why it resists perfectionism, I seek to reduce the
discontent with toleration and to suggest that, despite the allure of a
perfectionist approach, a toleration as respect model holds more appeal for a
morally pluralistic polity.
]I. THE ELUSIVE VIRTUE OF TOLERATION:
EMPTY TOLERATION OR RESPECT?
Toleration is an "elusive virtue," even an unstable concept. 10 In this Part, I
show how the instability in the concept of toleration leads to opposing criticisms
of it and competing understandings of its relationship to autonomy and
governmental promotion of good lives. I use the terms "empty toleration" and
"respect" to distinguish two models of toleration, and contend that toleration as
respect is the more attractive model and the better understanding. My focus will
be on the two large questions raised at the beginning of this Article: What does
toleration require of other citizens in terms of attitudes and engagement, and
what limits does toleration place on government's ability to engage in a
formative project of shaping citizens?
A. The Parameters of Toleration as Respect
Tolerance, as contrasted with intolerance, rejects the use of force, or
compulsion, to dictate or suppress certain beliefs, choices, and behaviors. In his
classic essay, A Letter Concerning Toleration,11 John Locke argued for
9 See infra Part V.B. For the idea of an unjust and intolerant gender orthodoxy, I draw
particularly upon DAvID A.J. RIcHARDs, WOMEN, GAYS, AND ThE CoNsnTmoN: TBE
GROUNDS FORFEMINSM AND GAY RIGmS IN CULTURE AND LAW (forthcoming 1998).
10 TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE (David Heyd ed., 1996).
11 See LOcKE, supra note 7.
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religious toleration. Contemporary liberal arguments for toleration trace it to
the search for civil peace against the backdrop of the wars of religion in
Europe.1 2 These arguments generally extend toleration beyond religious beliefs
to a broader principle of restraint from governmental coercion with respect to a
range of decisions and conduct implicating persons' identities and
comprehensive moral doctrines or ways of life, what I shall refer to as a realm
of self-government, or deliberative autonomy. For example, a familiar
formulation of the reason for permitting legal abortion is that, because abortion
is a matter of conscience, it is for individual women, not the government, to
decide.
The philosophical literature indicates that a common definition of toleration
includes two elements: first, an impulse to use force because of disapproval of
certain beliefs, choices, or conduct; and second, the decision, for reasons, to
refrain from acting on that disapproval. 13 Thus, toleration simultaneously
involves both "an impulse to intervene and regulate the lives of others" because
of moral disapproval and "an imperative-either logical or moral-to restrain
that impulse."1 4 These two elements of toleration prefigure two basic criticisms
of it.
The first, attitudinal component of toleration-the impulse to suppress
because of moral disapproval, disgust, or simply discomfort-draws the
criticism that toleration is empty or grudging and fails to require respect or
appreciation among citizens. The second element-the decision to refrain from
governmental intervention to regulate others' lives for reasons-elicits the
criticism that toleration entails too expansive a view of the limits on
government's authority to engage in a perfectionist formative project. But the
model of toleration as respect can meet both of these charges.
1. Toleration Need Not Be "Empty"
Some scholars suggest that, by definition, respect for beliefs, choices, or
conduct goes beyond toleration. Joseph Raz, for example, argues that to be
tolerant is to refrain from taking coercive or punitive action that one believes
one would be justified in taking and that toleration is "a distinctive moral virtue
only if it curbs desires, inclinations and convictions which are thought by the
12 See, e.g., RAWLs, supra note 6, at xxvi-xxvii (locating the historical origin of
political liberalism in the Reformation and its aftermath).
13 See John Horton, Toleration as a Virtue, in TOLERATION: AN ELusIvE VIRTUE, sUpra
note 10, at 28, 28-35; JosEPH RAZ, TBn MoRAxrrY op FREEDOM 401-03 (1986).
14 George P. Fletcher, The Instability of Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE
VIRTUE, supra note 10, at 158, 158.
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tolerant person to be in themselves desirable.' 15 On this view, if citizens simply
decide "for reasons" to forbear from using governmental force against
disapproved belief, choices, or conduct, they exhaust the requirements of
toleration.
The call to move beyond toleration to respect and appreciation presupposes
such an understanding of toleration and directly challenges the first element of
the definition of toleration: the moral disapproval of another person's beliefs or
practices. The goal is to alter the negative valuation, to demonstrate the moral
worth and human good of such beliefs or practices. As found in a range of
prominent civic republican and feminist work, this criticism of toleration and
call for something more has two features. The first is an argument that, because
toleration simply requires that we leave each other alone, it fails to move
citizens to engagement with, understanding of, and ultimately respect for each
other.16 Thus, feminist scholar Anne Dailey calls for a feminist reconstruction
of "empty" liberal toleration, which implies "critical distance" and merely
requires that we leave each other alone, into an "empathetic liberalism": a
"feminist politics" would "demand more than our passive endurance of others'
difference" and "ask us to engage with others by actively seeking to understand
those differences in a way that resonates with our own experience.'1 7 The call
to move beyond empty toleration to respect and empathy reflects an aspiration
also found in other critical and "outsider" work on transcending toleration:
through such engagement, a formerly tolerated but marginalized ethnic or
cultural minority would have the potential to transform citizens' understandings
of the tolerated "Other" and to transform the culture itself.18
Second, such critics argue that toleration is fragile, if not unattainable,
when justified by autonomy rights or the value of choice alone and not through
substantive moral discourse about the good of what is chosen. For example,
civic republican scholar Michael Sandel contends that "it is by no means clear
that social cooperation can be secured on the strength of autonomy rights alone,
absent some measure of agreement on the moral permissibility of the practices
15 RAZ, supra note 13, at 401.
16 See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43, 71,
75-76 (1990) (discussing the contrast between Havelian liberalism and liberal legalism).
17 Dailey, supra note 2, at 1283, 1285.
18 See Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in ETHNICrrY
AND GROUP RIGTrrs 112 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); Larry CaA Backer,
Exposing the Perversions of Liberal Toleration: The Decriminalization of Private Sexual
Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REv.
755,786-96 (1993).
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at issue." 19 He points to the Supreme Court's failure to recognize a right to
homosexual intimate association in Bowers v. Hardwick,20 and faults the
dissents for deploying autonomy arguments alone, rather than arguments about
the good of homosexual intimate association. Even if autonomy arguments for
rights succeed, Sandel argues, they forego the opportunity to move citizens
beyond empty toleration of private, disfavored conduct and negative views
about gay men and lesbians to respect and appreciation of them and the lives
they live.21 Sandel's republican vision of rights would argue for rights based on
the moral worth of the social practices they protect, as well as the contribution
those practices make to republican self-government.22
It might seem that if citizens make this affirmative step from empty
toleration to respect and appreciation, the impulse toward intolerance disappears
and tolerance itself becomes unnecessary. Indeed, this illustrates the instability
of toleration: there is a desire to resolve the concept of tolerance in the direction
of either intolerance or respect (or even indifference which, like respect, would
make toleration unnecessary). 23 To return to Sandel's example, a stance of
tolerating certain nonprocreative sexual conduct, despite moral objections,
could move in the direction of intolerance if such conduct came to be viewed as
so harmful to social order, sexual morality (or the moral fabric of society), and
the institution of marriage as to be beyond the pale of toleration.24 Conversely,
this stance could move in the direction of respect if such conduct came to be
viewed as morally permissible and thus the impulse to regulate it lost its
justification and support. (Or, toleration could resolve itself in the direction of
indifference, if society reached the point where it came to regard matters of
sexual behavior as raising no questions of right and wrong, in which case there
19 SANDEL, supra note 3, at 106; see also West, supra note 16, at 44-47 (arguing that a
responsibility-based justification for rights offers a more secure foundation).
20 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
21 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 103-08 (discussing Bowers).
22 See id. at 25.
23 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 158-59. As Fletcher observes, from the perspective of
the tolerated, tolerance is preferable to intolerance, but it is still less desirable than respect and
acceptance. See id. at 170-71; see also Bernard Williams, An Impossible Virtue? in
TOLERAnON: AN ELUSivE VncTuE, supra note 10, at 18, 20-21 (arguing that skepticism
leads to resolving intolerance in the direction of indifference).
24 As Lord Devlin noted, in the famous jurisprudential debate with H.L.A. Hart over
decriminalizing sodomy, the limits of societal tolerance shift over time, raising the question of
whether law should change to reflect such shifts. See PATnCK DEViUN, THE ENFoRcmNT
oF MORALS 18 (1965); see infra note 180 for discussion.
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also would no longer be any justification for intolerance. 25)
We need not accept such a sharp distinction between toleration and respect.
To be sure, at its most minimal, toleration may be nothing more than a
prudential and "resigned acceptance of difference for the sake of peace," nwdus
vivendi, or agreement to disagree (e.g., religious toleration in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries).26 But it may also embrace a continuum of "more
substantive acceptances of difference," ranging from openness to others, to
curiosity and a willingness to learn, to respect, and even to "enthusiastic
endorsement of difference." 27 For example, Rawls and Dworkin respectively
make liberal arguments for toleration on the basis of "mutual respect" and
"equal respect." 28
The model of toleration as respect does not require or guarantee that
citizens move along the continuum from a grudging agreement to disagree
toward respect or appreciation. Of course, at a minimum, in accepting a
principle that government should refrain from using coercion, citizens implicitly
afford other citizens some threshold level of respect, whatever their attitudes
toward each other. However, governmental noninterference does not preclude
citizens from harboring more positive attitudes toward, or from engaging with,
each other.
Moreover, it is not clear that such positive attitudes are always desirable,
and indeed attitudes closer to empty tolerance have a proper role in some
circumstances. In some cases, citizens may accept the idea that government
should not use coercion to suppress certain choices and conduct, but reasonably
believe that permitted activity is morally objectionable or socially destructive
and thus does not warrant respect and appreciation. 29 It is completely consistent
with a strong defense of rights that citizens may voice to each other their views
25 See Williams, supra note 23, at 21.
2 6 MCHAELWA.ZER, ON TOLERATION 10 (1997).
2 7 1d. at 11.
2 8 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 319; Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality,
in XI THE TANNELEcruREs ON HUMAN VALuES 1, 113-18 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990).29 For example, government might tolerate smoking, but nonsmoking members of
society might manifest their collective disapprobation of smoking through "raising their moral
voice" by shunning, shaming, and criticizing smokers and cigarette manufacturers. See
Am-rAI ETzIoN, Tm Spmrr oF COMMUNrTY 23-53 (1993) (arguing that freedom from
governmental interference does not mean freedom from the moral claims of the community;
urging that communitarians should "raise the moral voice of the community" to encourage
people to do the right thing); Suzanna Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L.
Ray. 963, 988-89 (1987) (arguing that the combination of official tolerance and societal
intolerance allows for the creation of a virtuous citizenry).
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concerning responsible exercise of those rights and may encourage each other
to live good lives; for example, citizens may support a legal right to engage in
hateful racist speech, or to produce or consume pornography, but argue
vigorously that there are good reasons not to engage in such speech or
conduct. 30 Only if we were to accept a justification of rights that so narrowed
the scope of rights that "rights" equated with "rightness" (or goodness)-or that
exercising a right was always the "right thing to do" 31-would toleration
automatically entail respect and appreciation. At the same time, as the debates
over the regulation of hateful racist speech and pornography indicate, allowing
room for a spectrum of attitudes also leaves room for citizens to argue for
shifting the limits of tolerance in either direction as society evolves and
reevaluates prior judgments about the personal and social impact of certain
choices and behaviors. 32
Thus, toleration as respect is not vulnerable to the charges lodged against
empty toleration: it does not imply a "critical distance" between citizens or that,
at best, citizens merely leave each other alone. One core justification for
toleration is rooted in diversity: the minimal form of this argument simply
entails recognition of the fact of diversity in a pluralistic society, but it leaves
room for-while not requiring-a stronger form of the argument, entailing
respect for and appreciation of diversity as a good. Toleration as respect is
compatible with a feminist commitment to listening to the voices of women and
other excluded "outsiders" and to critical engagement among citizens; indeed,
Dailey argues that such a commitment can build on the valuable liberal
principle of respect for diversity. 33
Finally, with regard to the charge that toleration cannot be secured by an
appeal to autonomy rights alone, toleration as respect treats autonomy as a good
worthy of protection. Sandel overstates the dichotomy between the appeal to
choice and to what is chosen. To invoke a familiar idea from constitutional
argument, it is precisely because certain matters are so important or significant
in persons' lives, and to their pursuit of moral goods, that we protect an
"individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect
30 See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKF L.J. 989, 1057-67
(1994); Sherry, supra note 29, at 986-89.
31 In contrast to Sandel, some communitarians acknowledge the "gap" between legal
rights and moral rightness and interpret it as calling for citizens to raise their moral voices to
influence the exercise of legal rights. See ETZoNI, supra note 29, at 192-206, 263; William
A. Galston, Rights Do Not Equal Rightness, 1 RESPONSIVE COMMUNrrY 7, 8 (1991).
32 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 158 (suggesting that "[i]f pornography is harmful to
women the way assault is harmful, there is no case for tolerance").
33 See Dailey, supra note 2, at 1283-85.
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his own, or his family's, destiny. " 34 The justification for toleration as respect
appeals to ideals such as moral independence, the allocation of a realm of
decisional sovereignty-or autonomy-to persons rather than government,
equal citizenship, and both the fact and value of diversity. Toleration as respect
assumes that these ideals themselves reflect human goods that citizens can
recognize as desirable; an appeal to the substantive moral worth of the beliefs
or practices secured by rights would augment, rather than supplant, the appeal
to these ideals. 35 Undeniably, a model of toleration as respect accepts that one
consequence of protecting such ideals, as embodied in rights, is protecting some
unwise, wrong, or morally unworthy choices. By doing so, this model offers
the practical advantage that even when people disagree intractably about the
substantive morality of particular choices, they may reach agreement upon a
principle of toleration that allocates decisional authority to persons, rather than
government. As discussed in Part V, in the context of arguments for same-sex
marriage, this may be a considerable advantage; arguments that reject any
principle of decisional autonomy lack such a default position in the face of
moral conflict.
2. Toleration as Respect Does Not Preclude a Formative Project
Unlike the first criticism of toleration, which targets a definitional element
of it, the second criticism addresses supposed liberal misunderstandings of the
requirements of toleration. The charge is that toleration reflects a decision "for
reasons" not to use force against disfavored ways of life but does not rule out
milder forms of governmental action, such as education or persuasion.
However, robust models of toleration, which conceive toleration as respect,
wrongly preclude government from using such milder forms of action to further
the goal of helping citizens live good, self-governing lives. In effect, the claim
is that too thick a model of governmental restraint leads to too thin a conception
of the proper business of government. Yet, some perfectionists contend,
government's leaving citizens alone does not secure their autonomy in any
meaningful sense, and it even imperils their ability to live good, self-governing
lives.
34 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)); see also Fleming,
supra note 6, at 40-43 (describing deliberative autonomy as limited in scope to significant
basic liberties).
35 See Michael Moore, Sandelian Antiliberalism, 77 CAL. L. REv. 539, 550-51 (1989).
For a critique of Sandel along the lines suggested in the text, see James E. Fleming & Linda
C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 TEx. L. REv. 509, 530-38 (1997).
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Although this criticism of liberal toleration emanates from many quarters, I
focus here on three lines of perfectionist criticism: liberal, feminist, and civic
republican. Unlike some antiliberal views, which would have government
promote good lives in the sense of fostering a specific set of virtues or moral
values, the perfectionists I have in mind define government's task in terms of its
responsibility to foster the capacity for self-government, agency, or autonomy.
For this reason, I contend, the formative project that they seek is, to a
significant degree, compatible with a model of toleration as respect.
a. Liberal Perfectionist Calls for a Formative Project
The criticisms of antiperfectionist liberalism by Raz, who advances a
"pluralistic perfectionist" liberalism, are illustrative. 36 He charges that
antiperfectionist liberalism prophylactically (and wrongly) embraces
governmental neutrality concerning ways of life, ruling out of bounds even
noncoercive use of state power to steer and improve the lives of citizens. Here
he targets Dworkin and Rawls, who have advanced conceptions of equal
respect and mutual respect. Government, Dworkin once contended, does not
treat citizens with equal concern and respect if it allocates resources based on
views about the moral worth of different ways of life, or if it "prefers one
conception [of the good life] to another" because it is more popular or officials
believe it is superior.37 As Dworkin once wrote, liberalism's political morality
interprets equal respect to require "that government must be neutral on what
might be called the question of the good life.' 38 Raz contends that this liberal
"neutrality" wrongly constrains government from pursuing perfectionist goals
because it precludes government from engaging in noncoercive steering to help
citizens make morally valuable choices. 39
Raz rejects the view that "[r]espect for people as responsible moral agents"
requires leaving them wholly free to make their own decisions, because such a
36 See RAZ, supra note 13. For other examples of perfectionist or "comprehensive"
liberal political theory, which distinguishes itself from "political" or neutral liberalism, see
WLTAM A. GALSTON, LmRAL PuilosEs (1991); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism,
Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. Ray. 385 (1996).
3 7 RONALn DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (grounding
requirement in a conception of persons as having the capacity to suffer pain and the capacity
to form and act on a conception of the good).
38 RONA. DwoRmN, A MATrTER OF P INcIPLE 191-92 (1985). But Dworkin has
abandoned this claim concerning the "heart" of liberalism in later work. See id. at 205-13;
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 7 n.2.
39 See RAz, supra note 13, at 110-33.
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view "disregards the dependence of people's tastes and values on social forms,
on conventions, and practices which are the result of human action." 4° Thus,
leaving persons alone does not equate with respecting their autonomy, but may
undermine people's ability to realize valuable conceptions of the good.41 Raz
also challenges Rawls's project of political liberalism, which contends that it is
possible to develop a political conception of justice, in order to establish fair
terms of social cooperation among citizens on the basis of mutual respect and
trust, without government embracing or attempting to secure agreement upon
any comprehensive moral doctrine. 42
Against such theories, Raz advances a pluralistic perfectionist liberalism.
On his view, it is a proper function of government to promote morality, and
personal autonomy, an essential ingredient of the good life, is a central moral
principle that government should promote. 43 Government's obligation to
promote autonomy has two dimensions: (1) the government should "stand back
and let people have the choice as to how to conduct their own lives"; and (2)
"the government must take active steps, where needed, to ensure that people
enjoy the basic capacities (physical and mental) and have the resources to avail
themselves of an adequate range of options available in their society," which
also requires that government create an environment providing individuals with
such options and the opportunities to choose them.44 Government may properly
40Id. at 426.
41 See id. at 162. Drawing upon Raz's idea of persons' dependence upon social forms,
Cass Sunstein would support government engaging in "norm management," or seeking to
change social norms and social meanings when they pose obstacles to autonomy and well-
being. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 908-10.
42 See RAz, supra note 13, at 124-33 (critiquing distinction between the right and the
good and the reliance upon "neutrality" in JoHN RAwis, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and in
Rawls's later work); Joseph P. Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19
Pim. & PuB. AFm. 3 (1990) (criticizing political liberalism for the idea that governments
should be unconcerned with the truth or falsity of doctrines of justice). Rawls defines
"comprehensive moral doctrine" as a moral conception that "includes conceptions of what is
of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of
familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct...."
RAWLS, supra note 6, at 13. One feature of Rawls's distinction between a.political, rather
than comprehensive, conception of justice (and of liberalism) is the idea of the priority of right
over the good, or that certain basic rights and liberties have priority, and that admissible
comprehensive moral doctrines (or ideas of the good) must respect the limits of the political
conception ofjustice. See id. at 173-76.
43See RAz, supra note 13, at 418.
44 Joseph Raz, Liberty and Trust, in NATMUAL LAW, LIBMERAUIM, AND MORAiry 113
(Robert P. George ed., 1996); see RAz, supra note 13, at 418.
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use coercive means such as economic redistribution to foster the codditions of
autonomy, but toleration requires that government eschew the use of coercion
to force persons to live good lives (where no harm to others is concerned),
because coercion invades autonomy. However, it permits government to use
noncoercive measures to encourage "acceptable and valuable projects and
relationships" and to discourage "repugnant" or worthless ones.45
b. Feminist Perfectionist Calls for a Formative Project
Some feminist perfectionists also reject neutrality and call for governmental
responsibility to engage in a formative project. Some, like Raz, embrace
autonomy as a core value that government should promote.46 Others use the
term "agency" rather than autonomy because they believe it focuses more
directly upon such issues as women's and men's unequal power and resources
and the problem of the effects of subordination upon women's capacity for self-
government. 47 This choice of terminology reflects a narrow reading of liberal
conceptions of autonomy as primarily focused on freedom from governmental
constraint, or negative liberty, as well as the claim that liberal toleration,
understood as leaving persons alone in the name of autonomy, does too little to
secure women's actual capacity for meaningful self-government. My own
reading of liberal conceptions of autonomy, upon which I draw for a model of
toleration as respect, is that autonomy connotes both freedom from external
constraint or coercion (e.g., noninterference by government) and the capacity
for meaningful self-direction (which may require governmental action).48
45 See RAz, supra note 13, at 417-18; see also GAISrON, supra note 36, at 222 (arguing
that liberal toleration is consistent with education and persuasion concerning superior ways of
life).
46 See RoBiN WEST, PROGRESsivE CONSrTtmONAUSM 267-68 (1994); Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Toward Feminist Perfectionism: A Radical Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism, 6
UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 1, 47-48 (1995).
47 See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1660
(1997); see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 346 (1995) (identifying the emergence of feminist models
of "partial agency," which juxtapose women's "capacity for self-direction and resistance"
with "often-internalized patriarchal constraint"). The distinction between agency and
autonomy in text reflects conversations with Professors Tracy Higgins and Frank Michelman.
4 8 See STEPBEN MACEDO, LmERAL ViRTuEs (1990); RAz, supra note 13. For a
discussion of this dual aspect of autonomy in the work of Dworkin and Rawls, see infra Parts
IV.CA and V.A, respectively. Elsewhere I have addressed a different feminist critique of
liberal conceptions of autonomy, i.e., that they are too atomistic because they fail to
acknowledge the importance of relationships and connection. See Linda C. McClain,
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In any event, a core feminist claim is that there is a gap between the ideal
of the autonomous liberal self and the reality of women's lives, a gap left
unbridged by government's merely leaving persons alone. Toleration
contributes to this problem, the argument goes, in several ways. First, under
the guise of a commitment to neutrality, liberal disavowal of a formative project
of helping citizens live good lives thwarts the affirmative governmental help
that women need.49 Second, feminists such as Robin West charge that
liberalism too narrowly focuses upon protecting the individual from
governmental coercion, while the greater threats to women's agency and liberty
stem from "private" power rather than state power.50 Liberal toleration
arguments fail to attend to the consequences of unequal power between women
and men in the "private" sphere. Liberal defenses of autonomy assume that
constitutional freedoms such as rights of privacy, intimate association, and
freedom of expression protect the capacity for personal self-government, but
feminists contend that these rights disempower women and impair their capacity
for such self-government: too often, governmental noninterference in precisely
those spheres "substitutes private for public power," leaving women subject to
the private sovereignty of men. 51
Third, these feminists claim that one consequence of living in a patriarchal
society is that women have "inner" or internal constraints on their capacity for
self-government, so that their very desires, preferences, and choices reflect
patriarchal definitions of what a woman is and what she can be, as expressed
through laws, customs, and social rules. 52 When liberal toleration, in the name
of respecting diversity and autonomy, takes women's preferences and choices
'Atomistic Man" Revisited Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1171 (1992). For an influential example of this line of critique, see Jennifer
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. &
FEamNSM 7 (1989).
49 See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1188-89
(1994).
5 0 See WFsr, supra note 46, at 114-21, 162-64; I-Iiggins, supra note 47, at 1671-76.
51 Rhode, supra note 49, at 1187-88; see also WEST, supra note 46, at 45-72 (arguing
that Congress's failure to attack marital rape exemption under the Fourteenth Amendment
subjects women to a private sovereign); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs
and the Bill of "Rights". A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 453, 453-57 (1992)
(arguing that the Bill of Rights does more for men than for women and that its protections
make it more difficult for women to develop as autonomous selves).
52 See Nancy j. Hirschmann, Toward A Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24 PoL. TmoRY
46, 51-57 (1996); see also MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 162 (contending that male dominance
is a "metaphysically nearly perfect" system, defining what a "woman" is by reference to
subordination to men and men's needs).
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as given and as reflecting their exercise of autonomy, it fails to consider that
those preferences reflect the effects of sex inequality, social construction, and
constraint (or, as Catharine MacKinnon put it, the effect of the male foot on
women's throats). 53 As discussed in Part V, Susan Moller Okin's influential
critique of Rawls charges that liberalism's commitment to toleration of diverse
comprehensive moral doctrines conflicts with a feminist commitment to sex
equality because it permits an unequal and unjust division of labor within the
family that impairs women's capacity for self-government.54
How would such feminists reconceive the proper relationship among
toleration, autonomy, and governmental promotion of good lives? One guiding
principle appears to be that, rather than viewing state power as the greatest
threat to autonomy, a feminist formative project would enlist government to
secure the agency, autonomy, and selfhood of women.55 Thus, feminists reject
governmental neutrality to the extent it masks the fact that particular laws serve
patriarchal interests and disadvantage women and other groups with less power;
instead, they urge an antisubordination or anticaste analysis that recognizes that
securing self-government and equality for such groups may require
redistribution of power and resources.56 For example, West advocates a
"progressive constitutionalism," whereby legislators have an obligation under
the Fourteenth Amendment to attack "hierarchies of class, gender, or race" and
forms of illegitimate social power constraining the ability of women, racial
minorities, and gay men and lesbians to live "meaningfully autonomous
53 See CATHARIN A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Ser Discrimination,
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 44-45 (1987).
54 See SUSAN MOLTER OJUN, JusncE, GENDER, AND T=E FAMILY 103-04 (1989)
(critiquing RAWLS, supra note 42); Susan Moiler Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and
Gender, 105 ETfICs 23 (1994) (critiquing RAWLs, supra note 6).
55 See SEYLA BENHABiB, SITUATiNG THE SELF 214 (1992); Higgins, supra note 47, at
1701-03; Yuracko, supra note 46, at 31-48. In commenting on this Article, Professor Sally
Goldfarb suggested that one simple test for appropriate governmental action might be
distinguishing governmental coercion that advances feminist goals from governmental
coercion that does not.
56 See, e.g., CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE Op SEx DISCRIMINATION (1979); CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, TowARD A
FEMINIr THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Hirschmann, supra note 52, at 59; Ruth Colker,
Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003
(1986). Feminists also argue that formal equality does not yield substantive equality. Some
feminists, such as Martha Fineman, argue against equality-understood as gender neutrality-
as a goal and urge alternative approaches focused upon the "unequal 'reality' of many
women's lives." MARTHA ALBERTSON FiNEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALrrY: THE
RHERIC AND REAIT OF DIVORCE REFORM 175 (1991).
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lives." 57 Recognizing that women's preferences may reflect internal constraints
and adaptation to inequality, some feminist perfectionists advocate a role for
government in reshaping social norms and women's preferences to advance
gender equality. 58 Just how these feminist perfectionists would implement this
formative project, and what role toleration would play, are vexing questions, to
which I return in Part V.
c. Civic Republicanism's Formative Project
Sandel argues that our democracy is engulfed by discontent because our
public philosophy-"the political theory implicit in our practice, the
assumptions about citizenship and freedom that inform our public life"-rests
upon a liberal political theory that is impoverished and inadequate to the
challenges of self-government. 59 For liberalism, freedom consists of the
capacity to choose our ends. Accordingly, government should be neutral
toward the moral and religious views that citizens espouse, take existing
preferences as given, and, pursuant to liberal toleration, merely provide a
framework of rights within which citizens may pursue the ends and values that
they choose. Sandel contends that the liberal conception of freedom (rooted in
the "minimalist liberalism" that he ascribes to Rawls and the neutrality that he
attributes to Dworkin) is attractive as a response to the circumstances of moral
pluralism, but flawed, because it gives up and rules out too much-the
republican formative project and ideal of self-government. 60
By contrast, within the civic republican strand of the American
constitutional and political tradition, to be free is to be capable of sharing in
self-government, which involves "deliberating with fellow citizens about the
common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community."61
Because self-government requires certain qualities of character, or civic virtues,
government cannot be neutral but must engage in a formative project to
cultivate such qualities. 62 Sandel distances himself from the substance of
classical republicanism, with its exclusiveness, coerciveness, and
inegalitarianism, and calls for a pluralistic republicanism in a diverse and
57 WFSr, supra note 46, at 275.
58 See Higgins, supra note 47, at 1694-1701.
59 SANDE, supra note 3, at 4-7.
60 See id. at 4-7, 17-24; Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural
Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virwues, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 2-20 (1997).
61 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 5.
62 See id. at 4-7.
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
mobile society, one that need not have a unitary and uncontestable conception
of the common good. Moving beyond the encumbered self (with which he
contrasted the liberal "unencumbered self' in his earlier work), he advocates a
republicanism that can accommodate "multiply-situated selves" with conflicting
loyalties and obligations.63 It is clear that such a pluralistic republicanism would
embrace a commitment to a process of deliberation concerning goods and
moral ideals. It is less clear, however, what the substance of such a pluralistic
republicanism's formative project would be and what goods or virtues it would
foster.64
B. Toleration as Respect and a Formative Project: Interpretive
Dilemmas
Perfectionist criticisms of liberal toleration for unduly constraining
government's formative project focus upon what, in common definitions of
toleration, are unanswered questions: If toleration requires that government
refrain from force with respect to certain matters of belief, choices, and conduct
in pursuing perfectionist ends, does it similarly require that government refrain
from measures short of force to pursue the same ends? Do the- arguments for
refraining from force apply to noncoercive measures such as persuasion or
facilitation? And, if not, what distinguishes coercion from such measures? Does
toleration require that government not only refrain from imposing an orthodoxy
by force, but also refrain from having an orthodoxy at all? And, if not, does
toleration impose any limits upon the reasons for which government may act,
that is, upon the ends or human goods that government may advance?
In Parts ll-V, I address these questions by focusing on three justifications
for toleration and their import for a model of toleration as respect: the anti-
compulsion rationale, the jurisdictional rationale, and the diversity rationale. I
concentrate on these three because they best reflect contemporary
understandings of toleration, as applied to liberties associated with deliberative
autonomy, and best focus the debates over perfectionism. 65 To preview the
63 See MIcHAEL J. SANDEL, LiBERAusm AND Tm Lrm OF JusTcE 21 (1982);
SANDEL, supra note 3, at 318-21.
64 Elsewhere I argue that Sandel fails to deliver the substantive goods for such a
republicanism. See Fleming & McClain, supra note 35 (reviewing SANDEL, supra note 3).65 Undoubtedly, some mixture of justifications, attentive to context, rather than one
overarching justification, offers the best grounding for toleration. The range of justifications
for freedom of speech is illustrative. For example, one prominent argument for freedom of
speech stresses the value of toleration for the tolerator: tolerating extremist speech helps to
develop the more general capacity for the exercise of toleration, or self-restraint. See LEE C.
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argument, all three justifications support the proposition that toleration requires
that government not force or coerce belief or conduct. I defend toleration as a
necessary condition for fostering citizens' ability to live good, self-governing
lives, but share the perfectionist assumption that the governmental
noninterference required by toleration may not be sufficient to secure such self-
government. Toleration as respect permits, indeed entails, a certain sort of
formative project. Accordingly, toleration as respect is not a prophylactic bar
on all use of governmental coercion or regulation of private life, and thus does
not lead to governmental abdication of responsibility to protect persons from
abuses of power in the private sphere. Nor does toleration as respect impose a
categorical bar on governmental persuasion, or moralizing; for it recognizes
that in a modem regulatory state, which routinely undertakes to educate,
inform, and persuade citizens, government properly acts for many reasons and
will use a range of measures to do so. 66 Instead, it requires an inquiry as to the
reasons for which government seeks to employ measures such as persuasion
and the ends it seeks to foster, as well as the likely effect such persuasion would
have on the capacity for self-government. As I will illustrate with the example
of abortion jurisprudence, toleration as respect would favorably distinguish, on
the one hand, government acting to further the capacity for self-government
through encouraging reflective decisionmaking and, on the other, government
steering in favor of a sectarian orthodoxy or contested view of the good life.
In recognizing that government has the responsibility to foster self-
government, and in leaving some room for governmental persuasion to achieve
that end, this model of toleration as respect draws upon the liberal accounts of
Rawls and Dworkin-which allow more room for a formative project than
perfectionist critics grant-and seeks points of convergence with perfectionist
accounts (particularly, feminist perfectionism). As such, toleration as respect
represents a viable liberal feminist position, one that argues for the comparative
strength of a feminist variant of political liberalism over a more perfectionist
position. Despite the allure of perfectionism, I suggest that a toleration as
respect model should be cautious about embracing its call for government
evaluating and preferring some lives over others and seeking to perfect persons'
BOLuNGER, THE TOLERAr SocmTy 33-35 (1986). The other major justifications emphasize
democratic self-government, see CASs R. SUNSrEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLE OF
FRE SPEEcH (1993), or autonomy, see C. EDwrN BAKER, Humr__N LmERTY AND FREEDOM
oF SPEECH (1989). There are also important arguments based on the marketplace of ideas and
worries about the slippery slope when government acts as censor. See Eric M. Freedman, A
Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap, 81 IowA L. Rnv. 883 (1996).
66 For a helpful treatment of government expression in a democracy, see MARK G.
YUDOF, WHEN GovERNmENT SPEAKs (1983).
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lives by altering their preferences, particularly in light of such prudential
concerns as whose perfectionism will supply the content of government's
project and how a deliberative democracy will resolve conflicts over what it
means to live a good, self-governing life.
III. THE ANTI-COMPULSION RATIONALE FOR TOLERATION
The anti-compulsion rationale for toleration reflects the familiar view that
toleration protects against the evil of forced beliefs and conduct. As shown
above, definitions of toleration generally have at their core refraining from
governmental compulsion. In Locke's classic argument for religious toleration,
a central justification for the rejection of force is that "true and saving religion"
is the inward persuasion of the mind; it is "the nature of the understanding," he
contended, that "it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward
force." 67 Accordingly, the proper tools of religious conversion are not fire and
sword, but those of persuasion and example. 68 Locke argued that matters of
religion should be left to the free exercise of conscience and the powers of
reasoning, a vital root for the contemporary principle of respect for liberty of
conscience and the assumption that persons should be permitted the free
exercise of their moral powers. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the joint
opinion articulates the anti-compulsion rationale thus: "beliefs" about such
matters as "one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, of the
mystery of human life ... could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the state." 69 Similarly, Dworkin echoes
classic defenses of toleration in stressing that compelled beliefs or conduct lack
moral worth. As he puts it, no one's life can be improved against the grain of
one's "most profound ethical conviction" that it has not been.70
The anti-compulsion rationale appears to rest upon a model of personhood
according to which forcing or dictating what persons shall think, believe, or do
67 LocKE, supra note 7, at 18.
68 See id. at 18-19, 26.
69 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
7 0 Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 486 (1989); see
Dworkin, supra note 28, at 116-17. In contrast, contemporary defenders of traditional morals
laws make the paternalistic argument that such laws help persons who would otherwise
engage in immoral conduct by seeking to prevent a "crucially important species of harm":
exposure to the "corrupting influences of various forms of vice." ROBERT P. GEORGE,
MAKING MEN MORAL: CIvm LmaETiis AND Puruc MORALrTy 169 (1993). But George also
acknowledges that there are prudential arguments that may temper this use of criminal law.
See id. at 43-44, 167.
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distorts and corrupts belief formation and self-definition. In his famous
argument for liberty of thought, conduct, and association, Mill argued against
the use of force in matters not implicating society's need for self-protection
(i.e., not causing harm to others) by reference to what H.L.A. Hart has called
"a specific conception of the human person and of what is needed for the
exercise and development of distinctive human powers. "71 Mill appealed to the
"interests of man as a progressive being" and contended that "[t]he only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way" (subject to the harm principle), and that "[m]ankind are greater gainers
by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling
each to live as seems good to the rest." 72 So understood, the anti-compulsion
rationale rests upon a normative principle of an entitlement to freedom of
conscience, and in turn, moral independence or autonomy, rooted in respect for
persons' moral powers. A model of toleration as respect embraces this
normative principle.
However, some scholars resist finding any such normative principle in the
anti-compulsion rationale. They argue that Locke's argument against
intolerance did not rest on its violation of a right to moral independence or of
any other rights of the tolerated. 73 Instead, Locke's objection to government's
use of force was the prudential one that force was an irrational means to pursue
the end of religious orthodoxy: belief cannot be forced, precisely because it is
not the product of the will, or of choice, but of the dictates of conscience. 74
Thus, if the anti-compulsion argument is confined to a point about irrationality,
it only restrains government from using means that do not promise to achieve
its ends. If government could use force to secure orthodoxy, then it would no
longer be irrational to attempt to do so; and if measures short of force do not
distort belief, they are not irrational. 75
Confining Locke's point to the irrationality of compulsion is problematic
because it isolates the anti-compulsion argument from another strong premise in
his theory, which I call the jurisdictional argument: a person's religious
salvation is his or her own affair, and not the proper business of government.
71 H.L.A. HART, Introduction, in ESSAYS IN JuRiSPRrDENcE AND PMLOSoPHY 1, 17
(1983).
7 2 MILL, supra note 8, at 12, 14.
7 3 See SUSAN Mamus, TOLERAON AND THE LIm OF LmERAUSM 22-43 (1989).
7 4 See id.; JOHN GvEY, WHAT ARF FREEDOMS FOR? 50 (1996).
75 See Jeremy Waldron, Locke, Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution, in
JUSTfYING TOLIAnON: CONCEPTUAL AND HisromiCAL PasPEcnvs 61, 67-81 (Susan
Mendus ed., 1988).
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Thus, it seems reasonable to infer from Locke's theory some notion of an
entitlement to seek, free of governmental force, one's own salvation, pursuant
to the dictates of conscience (whether or not this is identical to contemporary
conceptions of a right to autonomy). Moreover, the argument that Locke
regarded religious belief as having nothing to do with choice is undercut by the
fact that he spoke of true religion as inner persuasion and contemplated that
people could be led to religious truth through persuasion and exhortation.76 In
contemporary society (no doubt more than in Locke's times), people can and
do, in a meaningful sense, "choose" their religion.77
I believe that the better account of the anti-compulsion rationale, as it
functions in contemporary arguments for toleration, is that it reflects both a
normative principle of respect for autonomy and a prudential rule about means
and ends. Raz, for example, identifies the evil of coercion in its invasion of and
insult to autonomy. Coercion occurs, and thus a person is not autonomous, he
argues, when a person is forced to act against his or her will, subject to the
domination of the will of another.78
A. Distinguishing Compulsion from Persuasion
If the core evil that toleration avoids is compulsion, may government use
means short of compulsion to promote beliefs, choices, or conduct and thus
"take sides" about morality or the good life? Or must government refrain from
any attempt to regulate or influence with respect to those matters? If the anti-
compulsion rationale rests on a normative entitlement of freedom of conscience,
rooted in a conception of personhood, what does honoring that entitlement
entail: that the individual be left alone or simply that she not be compelled?
Does it also entail freedom from persuasion? The short answer is that the anti-
compulsion rationale leaves open the question of the permissibility of
governmental persuasion.
Locke's anti-compulsion rationale appears to be consistent with a
permissible role for governmental persuasion. Locke argued that one's salvation
is one's own affair, but he also emphasized that the proper tools by which to
76 See LOCKE, supra note 7, at 16, 18-19, 34-35.
77 See, e.g., Stephen J. Dubner, Choosing My Religion, N.Y. Tzms, Mar. 31, 1996,
§ 6 (Magazine); Cathy Myrowitz, Converted for Life, BALIMoIE JEWIsH TIMEs, Jan. 31,
1997, at 10. But even if one resists the idea of autonomy because it fails to take into account
either the extent to which obligations and attachments claim us and define us, one can endorse
the idea that compulsion harms the pursuit of a good life. See GARvEY, supra note 74, at 49-
57.
78 See RAZ, supra note 13, at 148-57.
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secure salvation are those of persuasion, not compulsion. He contended that, as
any other man may do, the civil authority may use "teaching, instructing, and
redressing the erroneous by reason" to attempt to draw the heterodox into the
way of truth and salvation; "but it is one thing to persuade, another to
command; one thing to press with arguments, another with penalties." 79 Thus,
Locke appears to say that noncoercive measures by government to secure
salvation are consistent with toleration.
Mill also distinguished force from persuasion, envisioning a range of
noncoercive measures available to "society," including persuasion, to signal
disapproval of certain choices and behaviors and to encourage better ones.80
However, whether Mill approved of such measures when undertaken by
government is less clear. He often distinguishes sharply between acts of
"society" and acts of government, but at other times appears to treat the two as
synonymous. Moreover, his fears of "social tyranny" in matters of thought and
opinion as a greater threat to liberty than political oppression raise questions
both as to whether he supported concerted or collective rather than individual
attempts at persuasion and as to how to draw the line between compulsion and
persuasion. 8'
Thus, the anti-compulsion rationale supports the proposition that
government should refrain from compulsion in certain matters of belief, choice,
and conduct, and seems to support the inference that government may use
measures short of compulsion to shape such belief, choice, and conduct. The
basis for this inference is that the evil of intolerance is the corruption of belief
due to compulsion, but noncoercive governmental action to steer belief does not
commit that evil. Thus, persuasion is not irrational.
To the extent the anti-compulsion rationale rests on an entitlement to
freedom of conscience or autonomy, the assumption is that persuasion, unlike
compulsion, fosters rather than hinders the exercise of that freedom. Indeed, on
Locke's and Mill's accounts, a commitment to freedom of conscience appears
to entail persuasion in the direction of orthodoxy ("true religion" or right belief)
or of better ways of life as an important element in shaping the exercise of such
freedom. This interpretation of the anti-compulsion rationale suggests that
governmental persuasion in matters of personal self-government is compatible
with respect for moral powers and the requirements of personhood if and only
79 LOCKE, supra note 7, at 18-19.
80 See MnL, supra note 8, at 11, 71.
81 See id. at 6-7, 14-15. Mill also states that, in faults concerning only himself, a person
should suffer only the "natural," "spontaneous consequences" of those faults, e.g., other
persons' unfavorable opinions and avoidance of him. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
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if it fosters such self-government. For example, Raz's contemporary account of
toleration holds that respecting autonomy requires that government's
perfectionist policies must refrain from compulsion but may use persuasion and
steering because the latter do not invade or "insult" a person's autonomy but, to
the contrary, are necessary to foster citizens' living good (autonomous) lives. 82
He argues that the autonomy principle "permits and even requires governments
to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones,"
through such means as subsidizing certain activities, rewarding their pursuit,
and discouraging the pursuit of other ends.83 (Although his perfectionist goal is
republican self-government rather than liberal autonomy, Sandel similarly
argues that government's formative project need not be coercive, but may
involve a "gentler kind of tutelage" such as persuasion.84)
B. Three Questions About Governmental Persuasion
To the extent that the anti-compulsion rationale permits governmental
persuasion, at least in the service of self-government, should a model of
toleration as respect embrace such persuasion? To answer this question, it is
necessary to address three questions, which I raise at the outset and then
explore in the context of abortion jurisprudence. First, how are we to
distinguish governmental coercion from persuasion, or moralizing? Second,
even if governmental persuasion in matters of personal self-government is not
coercive, is it inconsistent with toleration as respect because it insults notions of
personhood, human dignity, and moral capacity when government undertakes
to do our moral thinking for us?85 Third, if the anti-compulsion rationale
forbids government from using force to impose or dictate an orthodoxy, does it
suggest any limits upon government using persuasion in the service of such an
82 See RAZ, supra note 13, at 161, 407-20.
83 Id. at 417-18.
84 SANDEL, supra note 3, at 319-20. In this regard, it is puzzling that Sandel points to
the Supreme Court's striking down of a compulsory flag salute in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), see infra notes 102-05 and accompanying
text, as a fateful tan away from the republican formative project toward the liberal
"procedural republic" of choice and fundamental rights. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 54-55. Is a
school flag salute special because it involves the education of children (as opposed to adults),
or is compulsion a vital component of the republican project? But see Sandel, supra note 60,
at 16-17 (discussing Barnette and stating that: "I'm not that enthusiastic about compulsory
flag salutes. I don't think they're very effective, given the purpose").
85 See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REv. 1097, 1149-52 (1989).
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orthodoxy? In other words, does a normative principle of respect for autonomy
and moral powers imply any limiting principles concerning the reasons for
which government may act, even when it eschews direct coercion?
1. Distinguishing Coercion from Persuasion When Government Speaks
It is not possible to offer any bright-line or categorical distinction between
governmental compulsion and persuasion. Between the most obvious cases of
compulsion (a gun to the head) and persuasion (changing one's mind in
response to a good argument) lie many examples raising concerns about subtle
or indirect coercion. 86 Raz suggests that what distinguishes coercive threats
from offers is that threats "reduce the options available to the person to whom
they are addressed," and thus are likely to "change a person's situation
significantly for the worse"; by contrast, offers "never worsen and often
improve" a person's options. 87
One complicating factor is that, as liberals often argue, because the state
has a monopoly upon the legitimate use of coercive power and its "ability to
undertake any activity at all rests on its coercive power," the coercive power of
the state "stands in the background even when it is not overtly deployed." 88
Scholarship on the topic of "when government speaks" also suggests the
difficulty of finding a formal line between governmental coercion and
persuasion, or government speech that denies citizens' autonomy and that
86 Thanks to Professor Abner Greene for these examples. The same linedrawing
problem may arise with facilitation and persuasion. One might argue that government cannot
really act in a "neutral" manner, but always acts to further certain ends, and thus to steer
citizens or modify their behavior in some way. For example, does President Clinton's
advocacy of the v-chip serve to facilitate people's capacity to exercise their own preferences
more perfectly (i.e., it helps parents to prevent their children from viewing violent
representations on television that the parents regard as objectionable)? Or does it represent an
act of moralizing, by which government, in signalling disapproval of sex and violence on
television and the need to shield children from it, seeks to persuade (and even subtly coerce)
parents toward consensus with this view? Thanks to my colleagues Norm Silber and Marshall
Tracht for this example.
87 RAz, supra note 13, at 150. Although Raz and some other perfectionists give Melective
governmental subsidies of favored activity as an example of permissible noncoercive steering
that, presumably, does not violate this distinction between threat and offer, see id. at 161,
417, Sunstein, supra note 5, at 950, I will argue that government's selective funding of
childbirth and not abortion may blur that distinction.
88 Waldron, supra note 85, at 1140-43; see also Gardbaum, supra note 36, at 398
(suggesting caution in granting state broad interventionist mandate).
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which enhances it.89 Attempts to find some limiting principle for governmental
speech, such as treating citizens with equal respect or fostering citizens'
capacity for self-direction, reflect a striking parallel to the debate over the
implications of the anti-compulsion rationale-they share the premise that what
should distinguish persuasion from coercion is its role in aiding self-
government. 90 My point here is not to claim that governmental persuasion is
inherently coercive, but to suggest some reasons for resisting the assumption
that it is obviously noncoercive. In light of these concerns, a toleration as
respect model would focus not so much on linedrawing between persuasion and
compulsion as on the reasons for which government acts.
2. Promotion of Governmental Orthodoxy and Moral "Insult"
Toleration constrains only coercion undertaken for certain reasons and with
certain ends in mind; it is not a complete bar on the use of coercive power.
Toleration bars using the coercive power of government to advance "sectarian"
views or orthodoxies about the good, as contrasted with acting to pursue
general goods or the public welfare. 91 To use Locke's often-cited example,
government may not ban animal sacrifice as an element of religion; however, it
could ban the killing and burning of animals for "civil" or public-regarding
reasons, such as a dangerous shortage of cattle.92 But should toleration similarly
constrain government from acting for "sectarian" purposes or to promote an
orthodoxy if it does not employ force?
Some proponents of liberal neutrality and equal respect respond that the
answer should be yes, particularly when government seeks to go beyond
facilitating the capacity for self-government to "consider what is good and
valuable in life and what is ignoble and depraved when drafting the laws and
89 YUDOF, supra note 66, at 34 (noting that difficulty is due in part to determining the
impact of such factors as the intensity of the speech, its efficacy, and the countervailing effects
of other "messages" from nongovernmental sources).
90 See id. Evaluating when it may be appropriate and desirable for particular branches of
government to act in a persuasive manner may also require working out a conception of
institutional roles and responsibilities. That project is beyond the scope of this Article.
91 See DAviD A.J. RIcHARDs, TOLERATION AND TiE CONSrTbON 242-54 (1986)
(advancing theory of constitutional privacy rooted in primacy of religious toleration).
92 LocKE, supra note 7, at 39-40. A contemporary example of this sorting out of
motives may be seen in the case of Church of the Lukwni Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993), in which the Supreme Court struck down a ban on killing animals even
for religious purposes, ostensibly enacted for public health reasons, but which in effect
targeted the religious practices of the Santeria religion.
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setting the framework for social and personal relationships." 93 In criticizing
Raz's call for governmental steering in favor of morally worthy ways of life
and choices, liberal philosopher Jeremy Waldron argues that Raz gives
inadequate attention to the "insult" involved when "government actually takes it
upon itself to think about such matters in the first place." 94 Waldron's objection
to governmental perfectionism reflects a view that equal respect for persons'
moral powers requires that government not even seek to steer the exercise of
those powers.
As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the anti-compulsion rationale, taken
in isolation, supports Waldron's argument. Resolving the question of the extent
to which toleration as respect requires an entitlement to be free from any
governmental steering concerning the exercise of deliberative autonomy
requires a consideration of how best to understand autonomy, which implicates
consideration of the requirements of the jurisdictional and diversity arguments
for toleration (to which I turn in Parts IV and V). We have seen that common
interpretations of the anti-compulsion rationale assume, contra Waldron, that
persuasion is compatible with respect for moral powers and autonomy. Raz, for
example, defends such persuasion and contends that the intuitive appeal of anti-
perfectionism or neutrality rests on the confused (and erroneous) idea that such
a stance is necessary to prevent people from imposing their ways of life on
others. 95 Additionally, proponents of governmental promotion of an orthodoxy
argue that just as Lockean toleration did not preclude government from having
a preferred view or orthodoxy, but simply from using force to promote it, so
should contemporary principles of toleration allow for noncoercive
governmental promotion of an orthodoxy.96 To the extent such proponents
interpret Lockean toleration as rooted in the irrationality of compulsion, not any
entitlement to autonomy, they would find a bar on persuasion even less
convincing. While there may be, they concede, prudential reasons for tolerating
immoral and bad choices and behaviors, if autonomy is not a sufficient
justification for governmental restraint from compulsion, then, afortiori, it does
not afford a reason for government to refrain from moralizing to help people
93 Waldron, supra note 85, at 1102.
94 Id. at 1149. Waldron also raises the liberal concern about the coercive underpinnings
even of "noncoercive" measures. See id. at 1141-52; see also supra text accompanying note
88.
95 See RAZ, supra note 13, at 161.
96 See Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REy. 305 (1990)
(arguing that expansive liberal understandings of toleration as calling for "neutrality" wrongly
ban a governmental orthodoxy promoted by proper means).
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make morally upright choices. 97
To the extent that arguments for governmental persuasion in the service of
an orthodoxy reject an entitlement to autonomy, they reflect a model of empty
toleration as opposed to a model of toleration as respect. To the extent that the
anti-compulsion rationale, taken in isolation, supports a model of empty
toleration, we should reject that interpretation of toleration and instead fashion a
model of toleration as respect that also draws upon the principles undergirding
the jurisdictional and diversity arguments for toleration, which support a realm
of personal sovereignty. As I discuss in Parts IV and V, the best interpretation
of what those principles imply concerning the requirement of respect for such
personal sovereignty is a matter of contestation. Translating the concept of
toleration to a morally pluralistic society calls into question the appropriateness
of governmental promotion of an orthodoxy concerning good lives. Waldron
offers important reasons for caution about government's deployment of
persuasive measures in the service of such an orthodoxy. I shall argue that
while a model of toleration as respect would be cautious concerning such
deployment, it would not completely bar government from attempting to shape
the exercise of deliberative autonomy. Toleration as respect imposes
requirements of reason-giving in the deliberative process and calls for careful
judicial scrutiny of the reasons for which government acts and the ends it seeks
to further (e.g., whether it advances public values or a sectarian orthodoxy),
and whether they justify the imposition upon rights of autonomy. I now turn to
constitutional law to examine the deployment of the anti-compulsion rationale. I
then consider the abortion funding cases from the standpoint of a model of
toleration as respect, arguing that those cases fail the requirements of such a
model.
C. Compulsion and Persuasion in Constitutional Law
What light does constitutional jurisprudence shed on the contemporary
scope and relevance of the anti-compulsion rationale for toleration and its
implications concerning governmental promotion of an orthodoxy? The anti-
compulsion rationale is an important underpinning of the principle of religious
toleration reflected in the First Amendment. As the Court has explained, "[a]
state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience
97 See GEORGE, supra note 70, at 43-44, 167-88, 228-29. Waldron, who contends that
Locke's argument for toleration rests upon the irrationality of intolerance, see supra note 75
and accompanying text, rests his own liberal argument for autonomy upon a conception of
neutrality and equal respect. See Waldron, supra note 85, at 1097-99, 1133-38.
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which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed."98 The
First Amendment resembles Lockean toleration in its eschewal of governmental
coercion to establish either an official religion or any other religion (the
Establishment Clause), as well as in its prohibition against denying persons civil
rights based on their religious beliefs (the Free Exercise Clause). 99 But it clearly
departs from Lockean toleration to the extent that Locke's model leaves room
for governmental persuasion, or moralizing, in favor of a preferred religion or
a governmental orthodoxy. Constitutional principles require not only that
government "may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise," but also that government may not "otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' 100 For it is
not only outright governmental coercion that threatens and diminishes freedom
of conscience, but also governmental persuasion: the historical lesson behind
the Establishment Clause was recognition that "in the hands of government
what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a
policy to indoctrinate and coerce." 101
But this prophylactic rule against governmental persuasion concerning
religion does not translate into a general prohibition on persuasion in matters of
democratic and personal self-government. In other areas of constitutional
jurisprudence, the distinction between compulsion and persuasion is familiar. In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,10 2 the Court rejected the
notion of governmental officials dictating an orthodoxy through a compulsory
flag salute and expulsion of noncomplying children from school and punishment
of their parents; yet the Court did not question the state's authority to foster the
ends of "national unity" and patriotism "by persuasion and example" (e.g., the
curriculum). 10 3 Indeed, the Court did not expressly rule out the use of a
voluntary flag salute to achieve such ends.104 As Barnette and cases involving
98 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
99 The freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment is broader than that
advocated by Locke, who denied protecting freedom of conscience of Catholics and atheists
(for reasons couched in "civil" terms), see LocKE, supra note 7, at 49-52, because it
"embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 52-53 (1985).
100 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
101 Id. at 591-92.
102 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
103 Id. at 640.
104 See id. at 641 (indicating approval for "patriotic ceremonies [that] are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine"); see also Weisman, 505 U.S. at 638-39
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Barnette "did not even hint that [public school students]
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conflicts between parental rights and the state's authority to educate children
make clear, fundamental constitutional rights of self-determination protect
against governmental use of coercion or criminal sanction, but do not always
translate into a right to governmental neutrality or against governmental
sidetaking through noncoercive means. Thus, punishing parents for directing
their children not to salute the flag or for sending their children to private
schools violates a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children; preferring and promoting patriotism or public over private education
does not. 105
Constitutional substantive due process jurisprudence about rights of
intimate association and procreative autonomy similarly recognizes a line
between compulsion and persuasion. This jurisprudence appeals to the twin
bases for the anti-compulsion rationale: the irrationality of the means employed
by government to secure its ends and the entitlement of individual liberty (as
well as privacy) in these matters because of their importance to personhood.
For example, the Court struck down state bans on distribution of contraceptives
because it was irrational to presume a "scheme of values" whereby the state
sought to deter nonmarital sex through prescribing pregnancy, the risks of
abortion, and unwanted childbirth as punishment for fornication. 106 But the
Court also invoked a right of autonomy, or "the right of the individual ... to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 1°7
could not be compelled to observe respectful silence-indeed, even to stand in respectful
silence-when those who wished to recite it did so"). But some commentators argue that, in
light of Weisman, which invalidated voluntary prayer at a graduation ceremony due to its
coercive potential, even a voluntary pledge of allegiance led by teachers in public schools is
unconstitutional. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L.
REv. 451 (1995).
105 For this interpretation of education cases such as Barnette, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), see Michael W.
McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HA1v. L.
REv. 989, 1034-36 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U.
L. REv. 593, 606-10 (1990).
10 6 See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (citing Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)). As Justice Stevens memorably put it, it would be "as
though a State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of
safety helmets. One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize
such a restriction-as irrational and perverse." Carey, 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
107 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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Nonetheless, in its much-criticized opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,108 the Court
rejected a challenge to Georgia's sodomy law based on its irrationality and
impingement upon an entitlement to autonomy in matters of intimate
association, and upheld governmental intolerance toward "homosexual
sodomy" (and, arguably, toward gay men and lesbians as well) and the
enforcement of a sexual orthodoxy through the criminal law.1 09
Although the contraception cases do not answer the question of the scope of
government's authority to moralize in favor of a preferred conception of sexual
morality or reproduction, defining the individual entitlement to procreative
autonomy as one to freedom from "unwarranted" governmental interference
implies that certain forms of governmental action in service of certain ends are
not unwarranted. Abortion jurisprudence builds on that implication by
upholding governmental persuasion in favor of childbirth over abortion, so long
as it does not constitute an "undue burden" on the "ultimate decision."110 As
such, it is an excellent illustration of the tension between the models of empty
toleration and toleration as respect and of how they offer competing
interpretations of the requirements of the anti-compulsion rationale. At best,
abortion jurisprudence upholding selective funding of childbirth over abortion
reflects a model of empty tolerance; indeed, it may even blur the distinction
between compulsion and persuasion, and thus may reflect an official stance of
intolerance toward abortion. In any event, it fails to satisfy a model of toleration
as respect.
1. The Asymmetry of Empty Toleration: The Abortion Funding Cases
The anti-compulsion rationale functions in the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence as a justification for abortion rights. To begin at the end, the joint
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey states: "At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
108 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
109 The Court held that the Georgia statute had a rational basis in the majority of the
electorate's belief in the immorality of homosexuality and that it impinged upon no
fundamental right, as the Court reductively framed the issue, to engage in "homosexual
sodomy." Id. at 190-96. For a strong critique of the Court's conflation of acts (sodomy) and
identity (homosexuality) in its opinion, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act
and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993). For the import
of the Court's more recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), on Bowers,
see infra text accompanying notes 208-11.
110 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992).
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attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." 111
Compulsory pregnancy and childbearing (and, as a practical matter,
motherhood) would violate not only women's personhood and autonomy, but
also their right to bodily integrity, and would impose upon them constraints,
pain, suffering, and "distress."11 2 However, defining the boundaries of
compulsion and addressing whether measures short of compulsion similarly
violate personhood and bodily integrity have been contentious topics in abortion
jurisprudence, as the selective funding and facilities cases illustrate.
Maher v. Roe, which upheld a state ban on funds for "elective" abortions,
establishes that the state need not be neutral, but may "make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion" (reflecting its legitimate interest in
"protecting potential life") and "implement that judgment by the allocation of
public funds." 113 A core premise is that the right recognized in Roe v. Wade
was an interest in maling a decision about pregnancy free from "unduly
burdensome interference" (e.g., severe criminal sanctions), not a right to be
free from governmental moralizing by means short of compulsion, much less a
right to governmental facilitation of a decision to have an abortion. 1 4 As the
Maher Court put it, "Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State
attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage
actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader."11 5 Harris
v. McRae drew upon Maher to uphold the Hyde Amendment, which forbade
the use of federal funds to pay for abortions of poor women otherwise eligible
for medical treatment under Medicaid (except where continuing pregnancy
threatened the "life of the mother"): the Amendment "places no governmental
obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy," but
uses "unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services" (i.e.,
childbirth) to establish "incentives" that "encourag[e] childbirth except in the
most urgent circumstances." 11 6
111 Id. at 851.
112 See id. at 852; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating that "[m]aternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future"). There is also a
good argument that criminal prohibition is an irrational means to secure a governmental goal
of childbirth over abortion, since many women will resort to illegal abortions, at enormous
cost to their lives and health. See MARK A. GRABER, RETINKNG ABORTION 41-64 (1996)
(detailing prevalence of illegal abortion prior to Roe).
113 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
114 Id. at 473-74; accord Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980).
115 432 U.S. at 476; accord Harris, 448 U.S. at 315. The Maher Court drew upon
Meyer and Pierce in support of the distinction in the text. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 477.
116 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314-15, 325. The original Hyde Amendment did not include
[Vol. 59:19
TOLERATIONAS RESPECT
The abortion funding cases reflect a model of empty toleration both in
terms of the low level of respect they afford to abortion decisions and the
latitude they accord to governmental moralizing. Such empty tolerance is also
asymmetrical. Neither government nor citizens (expressing themselves through
politics) need to treat two mutually exclusive reproductive choices (abortion and
childbirth) as entitled to the same respect or approval or governmental
assistance, nor treat moral objection to abortion as constitutionally irrelevant. 117
As some members of the Court have put it, the abortion right is based not on a
notion that abortion is a "good in itself," but on a conviction that the "evil" of
state coercion-that is, the damage to autonomy and privacy-outweighs the
"evil of abortion."118 A woman's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy
carries with it no constitutional entitlement to the financial resources necessary
to avail herself of the choice; the state has no obligation to "commit any
resources to facilitating abortions" or otherwise to help her exercise her right to
choose, or to foster her capacity for reflective decisionmaking.119 Instead,
government may have and promote an orthodoxy, that is, that childbirth is in
the public interest and preferable to abortion, and may use noncoercive means
to encourage the preferred choice and to disapprove of the disfavored one.
Such noncoercive means include funding childbirth but not abortion for indigent
women dependent upon government for their health care, providing public
hospitals and medical personnel for childbirth but not abortion, and forbidding
exceptions for rape and incest, but Congress included such exceptions in later versions.
117 See Maher, 432 U.S. at 468 (rejecting lower court's conclusion that selective funding
violates the Equal Protection Clause and that implicit in Roe v. Wade was the view that
"abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the
abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with
pregnancy"); cf. Harris, 448 U.S. at 332-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (espousing this view in
arguing that denial of funding for medically necessary abortions violated women's due
process liberty right).
118 Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
797 (1986) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). This negative valuation of the
right to abortion contrasts with the valuation of speech in First Amendment jurisprudence, in
which the assumption is that society is better off with a "robust marketplace of ideas," and
more speech is better than less. See Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental
Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1175, 1225 (1996).
119 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989); accord Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 797-98 (White, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "because Roe v. Wade is not premised on the notion that abortion is
itself desirable... the decision does not command the States to fund or encourage abortion,
or even to approve of it"); Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 (no constitutional entitlement to financial
resources).
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medical personnel in family planning clinics receiving federal funding from
even mentioning abortion.120
By their own terms, the selective funding cases turn on the distinction
between governmental compulsion and persuasion. If selective funding is not
simply persuasion, but tantamount to coercion, then it reflects not an empty
toleration model but intolerance toward abortion. Many scholars and some
dissenters on the Court have argued that the selective funding cases are wrong
because such funding crosses the line between persuasion and compulsion. 121
Unequal subsidies, critics contend, are less offer or subsidy than threat or
penalty,, and thus impose an unconstitutional condition on poor women's
120 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding Title X regulation barring
recipients of Title X funds from engaging in abortion counselling and referral services);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding state refusal to allow
public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding federal Hyde Amendment barring Medicaid reimbursement of most
abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (upholding state regulations barring funding of
abortions not certified as medically necessary); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(upholding state regulation limiting Medicaid benefits to first trimester abortions that are
"medically necessary"); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (upholding bar on use of
publicly financed hospital services for abortions).
121 See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 330-34 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of governmental largesse can discourage the
exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those rights
through criminal and regulatory sanctions"; in effect, government "literally makes an offer
that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse"); AMY GuTMANN & DENNIS THOmSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREvEENT 88 (1996) (arguing that, given the "special financial
circumstances" of Medicaid-eligible women, "the refusal to fund abortions for poor women,
when childbirth is funded, creates an almost irresistible pressure on indigent women to carry a
child to term"); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REv.
2271, 2297-2308 (1990) (critiquing Court's reliance in Harris on subsidy/penalty distinction
and its failure to explain why a refusal to subsidize is legally different from a penalty); Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 1293, 1300-01, 1359-76 (1984) (proposing applying three baselines for
distinguishing subsidy from penalty-history, equality, and prediction-and contending that,
measured by those baselines, the Hyde Amendment reduced women's choices). Some
commentators argue that selective funding leaves a woman no worse off than she would be
without any governmental assistance and that it even improves a woman's options. See
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 89-90 (1988); McConnell, supra note 105, at 1018-19. The
recent film, Citizen Ruth, offers a surprisingly humorous treatment of the impact of financial
incentives on an indigent woman's choice between abortion and childbirth.
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abortion rights.122 While this is a cogent argument, I believe that there are other
important arguments against the asymmetry of this abortion jurisprudence,
which relate to its failure to meet the requirements of toleration as respect.
First, the focus on coercion is too narrow, for it fails to recognize that
governmental measures short of compulsion may also threaten self-government.
My interpretation of the anti-compulsion rationale urges that governmental
persuasion should foster, not hinder, the capacity for self-government. Second,
a careful focus upon the reasons for which government acts, rather than upon a
simple compulsion/persuasion distinction, reveals that the purpose or effect of
selective funding is not to advance a formative project of furthering women's
capacity for self-government or to pursue public values, but to deter the
exercise of a protected right of reproductive autonomy and to promote a
sectarian orthodoxy about reproductive responsibility and women's "natural"
role. Moreover, by targeting poor women for such impermissible moralizing,
government offends principles of equal citizenship and fairness.
2. Toleration as Respect and Scrutiny of Governmental Purposes
In Casey, the joint opinion explained that under the "undue burden" test, a
state regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path" of a pregnant woman seeking abortion (prior to viability) is
invalid. 123 Although Casey's "undue burden" test draws upon the formulation
of an abortion right found in Maher and Harris, it puts a gloss upon this test
that focuses upon a woman's right to personal self-government: "the means
chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."124 Although I criticize Casey
(in Part IV) for its application of this test, it opens the door for the inquiry into
governmental purposes and effects called for by a model of toleration as
respect.
It is often said that the Court will not inquire into legislative motive. 125 Yet
122 See id. In the literature on unconstitutional conditions, which addresses the question
of when governmental imposition of burdens upon or attachment of conditions to the exercise
of constitutional rights is unconstitutional, one common approach is that what distinduishes
impermissible from permissible governmental action is the distinction between subsidy and
penalty, or offer and threat. See Sunstein, supra note 105, at 601-04; Kreimer, supra note
121, at 1300-01, 1359-76.
123 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (emphasis added).
124 Id.; see id. at 874-75 (invoking Maker and Harris in declaring that the undue burden
test was the appropriate test under which to evaluate regulation of abortion).
125 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968). Thus, the argument goes,
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Casey directs that "purpose" is relevant in assessing undue burden and,
ultimately, constitutionality. Indeed, scrutinizing the purposes or ends of
legislation is an unavoidable part of judicial review and, at least in some
contexts, it is appropriate that the Court show heightened concern for flushing
out illicit purposes. 126 In her proposed reformulation of the unconstitutional
conditions inquiry, away from a focus on coercion, Professor Kathleen Sullivan
persuasively calls for strict review of "any government benefit condition whose
primary purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about
exercise of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by
government."' 127 Arguably, if a primary purpose of the Hyde Amendment was
to put pressure upon or frustrate the abortion right, then such heightened
scrutiny is appropriate. 128
Evaluating the purposes of the Hyde Amendment under such a test, and
even under Casey, suggests ample ground for invalidation. After examining the
Hyde Amendment and the Congressional debates, the lower court in Harris
concluded that the "dominant purpose was to prevent exercise of the right to
decide to terminate pregnancy and to prevent the funds of taxpayers who
disapproved of abortion on moral grounds from being used to finance abortions
that were abhorrent to them." 129 Its purpose was to be a second-best assault on
legal abortion, after the failure of the preferred strategy of amending the
Constitution to add a right to life for the unborn and, thus, bar legal abortion.130
Those whose preferred stance on abortion was intolerance sought to "save as
many lives as possible" by stopping as many abortions as possible through
so long as a law could in principle serve a valid purpose, the Court should be reluctant to
invalidate it just because it was actually enacted for an illegitimate reason. See Doff, supra
note 118, at 1234 (discussing O'Brien and other cases).
126 See JOHN HART ELY, DmVocRAcY AND DismusT 136-48 (1980). For Ely's critique
of Maher, see id. at 162*, 246 n.38, 248-49 n.52.
127 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. RFv. 1413,
1499-1500 (1989). For a similar proposal to shift from a focus on coercion to a focus on
reasons, see Sunstein, supra note 105. Both Sullivan and Sunstein argue that one strong
reason for such a shift is because of the problem of identifying the relevant baseline from
which to assess whether a condition is coercive (i.e., more threat than offer). See Sullivan,
supra, at 1422-57; Sunstein, supra note 105, at 601-04.
128 See Doff, supra note 118, at 1235.
129 McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
130 Here I draw on the legislative history summarized in the Annex to the District
Court's opinion in McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 742-844. See also LAURENCE H. TRBE,
ABORnON: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 144-59 (1990) (describing efforts by antiabortion
movement to restrict abortion funding).
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restricting public fumds. 131 When criticized for going after only poor women's
access to abortion, Congressman Hyde replied: "I certainly would like to
prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a
middle-class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle
available is the... Medicaid bill."132
This legislative history strongly indicates that selective funding serves an
impermissible governmental purpose of pressuring the exercise of women's
right to choose abortion. As such, it violates a model of toleration as respect
unless government has sufficient justification for such action-I will argue that
it does not. Selective funding also violates that model because it impermissibly
seeks to advance a sectarian governmental orthodoxy and does not foster
women's responsible self-government.
A helpful starting point for understanding how selective funding advances a
governmental orthodoxy in violation of toleration as respect is Justice Brennan's
argument, in dissent in Harris, that selective funding violated poor women's
privacy rights because it allowed the state to "foist" upon them, a politically
powerless group, a "state-mandated morality." As Brennan put it, such funding
imposes through law "the political majority's judgment of the morally
acceptable and socially desirable preference on a sensitive and intimate decision
that the Constitution entrusts to the individual." 133 Brennan here relies not only
on an anti-compulsion argument, but also on the jurisdictional argument for
toleration as respect: that persons have an entitlement to a realm of personal
self-government, or individual autonomy, free from governmental intrusion.
When government uses selective funding, it alters this balance between
individuals and government by encroaching upon this realm of autonomy to
promote its preferred view. 134 I would contrast such impermissible promotion
of an orthodoxy with the constitutional principle that states may prohibit
abortions after viability. In the latter case, it is arguable that government does
131 See, e.g., McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 752-53, 766 (reporting views of Rep. Hyde).
When the Hyde Amendment and other funding restrictions on abortion come up for renewal
in Congress, proponents often refer to the number of lives saved by such legislation. See,
e.g., 139 CONG. REC. H8523 (daffy ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Rep. Dornan); 139
CONG. REc. S12576-77 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Smith). Prior to the
Hyde Amendment, nearly one third of abortions taking place involved Medicaid funds. See
McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 639 (1980); TRIE, supra note 130, at 151 (stating that prior to 1976
nearly 33 % of all legal abortions were funded by Medicaid).
132 McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 773 (quoting Rep. Hyde).
133 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 See Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1491-93 (arguing that one distributive concern that
her model addresses is preserving autonomous private decisionmaking).
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not advance a sectarian or particular religious view about when life begins, but
instead promotes a public value of respect for life and for the sanctity of life.135
Given the considerable conscientious disagreement among citizens about the
status and moral claims of prenatal life, government's decision selectively to
fund childbirth and not abortion "on the ground that such abortions are not 'in
the public interest' is tantamount to establishing one interpretation of the
sanctity of life as the official creed of the community."1 36 To be sure, a
common justification for selective funding is that it serves the legitimate
governmental interest in preventing taxpayers, in violation of the dictates of
conscience, from being forced to support abortion, which they find morally
abhorrent and evil, through public funds. 137 Supporters of the Hyde
Amendment (whose preferred stance on abortion is generally intolerance and
legal prohibition) argue that to tolerate a right to legal abortion (despite moral
objections) is one thing, but to enlist government (and, ultimately, citizens) in
facilitating, promoting, or endorsing it through the allocation of funds goes
beyond toleration to endorsement and approval. 138
However, the proposition that affording taxpayers a conscientious objection
135 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 914-15 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (characterizing state's interest as humanitarian and
pragmatic, although not grounded in the Constitution); DWORKIN, Ln;E's DOMINION 148-59
(1993) (arguing that government may act to protect the intrinsic value of the sanctity of life).
13 6 DWORIN, supra note 135, at 175-76 (making this point concerning medically
necessary abortions). Because abortion decisions are essentially religious, Dworkin argues,
this raises a "much more serious First Amendment issue than the Court recognized." Id. at
175. Dworkin also suggests that the cases may warrant reconsideration because unequal
funding comes close to compulsion. Id. at 175-76.
137 See McConnell, supra note 105, at 1047; Epstein, supra note 121, at 92-94. The
legislative debates over the Hyde Amendment are replete with this argument about forcing
taxpayers to violate their consciences. See, e.g., McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 691 (describing as
"secondary justification" for restrictions on abortion funding, offered in the debates, "that
taxpayers who reprobated abortion on moral or religious grounds should not have their taxes
used to defray costs of abortions"); id. at 743-844 (reporting repeated invocation of this
argument).
138 See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REC. S12578 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Smith) (arguing that the majority of Americans have reached "uneasy consensus" that
abortion should be legal (although they disapprove of it), but draw the line at paying for other
people's abortions; government sends wrong message by paying); see also McRae, 491 F.
Supp. at 755 (reporting views of Rep. Russo that government should assume a "neutral stance
in this matter-neither interfering with the constitutional rights of the woman, nor
encouraging it through the use of tax dollars"); TRINE, supra note 130, at 153 (reporting
Jimmy Carter's stance that government should be kept out of the decision and not do anything
to encourage abortion).
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to governmental expenditures is a legitimate governmental purpose is subject to
serious question. 139 Moreover, the Hyde Amendment sweeps far more broadly
than necessary to afford such an opt-out. By prohibiting all public funding of
poor women's abortions, it forces all citizens, some of whom may support
public funding for poor women's reproductive health care, to conform with the
moral and religious opposition of a group of citizens to abortion. Although
supporters of selective funding justify it as a second-best strategy to stop
abortion, this justification should not suffice so long as the abortion decision has
constitutional protection as being "central to personal dignity and
autonomy. "14
This governmental orthodoxy reflects both hostility to abortion rights and
sectarian views concerning women's proper role. Feminist and liberal analyses
of the sex equality dimension of the abortion issue illuminate the content of this
impermissible orthodoxy. 14 1 Only women become pregnant and bear the
burdens of pregnancy and, thus, the consequences of restrictive abortion laws.
And it is not nature, but governmental regulation, that "exaggerate[s] the cost
of these burdens" and turns women's reproductive capacity into a source of
disadvantage when the state prohibits or restricts abortion.' 42 Prohibitions on
abortion reflect an attempt to conscript and compel women into this "natural"
role, which reflects less on women's "nature" than on ideology about women's
nature and proper gender roles. As Justice Blackmun's partial concurrence in
Casey observes, this assumption about forcing women into the "'natural' status
and incidents of motherhood" rests upon "a conception of women's role that
139 See TRIBE, supra note 130, at 205-06; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1506 n.391.
140 C. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 175 (1996) (quoting
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), to argue against government's
ability to characterize abortion as a "positive harm").
141 For feminist analyses of the sex equality issue relevant to the argument developed in
text, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv.
261 (1992); see also CAss R. SUNSrEN, THE PARiTI CoNsOrrruoN 257-90, 315-17 (1993)
(advancing anticaste argument rooted in Equal Protection Clause for abortion rights);
LAUREN CE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CoNsrrrroNAL LAW § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988) (drawing on
feminist and liberal arguments to elaborate anticonscription justification for abortion rights).
For a similar argument made from a privacy perspective, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989).
142 Law, supra note 141, at 1016; see SUNSTEI, supra note 141, at 274.
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
has triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause." 143 Arguably, if
government may not enforce this impermissible gender orthodoxy through
criminal sanctions, it may not do so through such measures as selective
funding. 144 And although this is an argument with important Equal Protection
roots, principles of toleration, rooted in Due Process liberty rights of privacy
and deliberative autonomy, should also constrain government's promotion of
this orthodoxy. 145
Selective funding also violates a model of toleration as respect because it
does not foster women's capacity for self-government or reflective
decisionmaking about reproduction. There is no pretense in the Court's defense
of such governmental measures that they foster self-government: facilitating
women's autonomous choice or their reflective decisionmaking is not the point;
discouraging abortions is. To the extent that government advances a
perfectionist vision, or seeks to help women live good lives, it is one in which
promoting childbirth as the right choice trumps any concern for facilitating
pregnant women's own choices. Thus, in Harris, the Court upheld steering
toward childbirth in the face of lower court findings that pregnancy and
childbirth in many cases would pose serious risks to poor women's physical and
mental health and conflict with their own conscientious religious beliefs about
responsible reproductive choice. 146 The point is not to secure preconditions for
autonomy, but to use funds to steer poor pregnant women to act according to
government's preference.' 47 The Court's formalistic and narrow view of free
143 505 U.S. at 928.
144 Sullivan reaches a similar conclusion. See Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1506 n.538.
See also Sunstein, supra note 105, at 614-20 (arguing under anticonscription analysis that
government at least ought to fund abortions in cases of rape and incest).
145 See Rubenfeld, supra note 141, at 788-90 (offering anticonscription, or
antitotalitarian, interpretation of right to privacy). For an argument that we should make both
privacy or autonomy arguments and equal protection arguments in such contexts, see James
E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tax. L. REv. 211,260-75 (1993).
146 See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 668-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see also
Harris, 448 U.S. at 353-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing record below for point that "[i]t
cannot be denied that the harm inflicted upon women in the excluded class is grievous" and
that the funding restrictions did not encourage "normal" childbirth); id. at 345 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (same).
147 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 458-59 (1977) (Marshall, J., also dissenting in
Maher) (arguing that the restrictions rob an indigent pregnant woman of the chance "to
control the direction of her own life"). Nonetheless, there may be an implicit argument that,
because childbirth costs are greater than the costs of an abortion, selectively funding childbirth
may assist indigent women who would otherwise choose or feel pressured to choose abortion
out of concern for the greater expense of childbirth. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-79
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versus coerced choice here contrasts with its solicitude in other contexts for
even "subtle" or indirect coercion, particularly when persons' "autonomy and
well-being are already compromised by poverty [and] lack of access to good
medical care"-as the Court recently characterized persons who might be
pressured to consent to physician-assisted suicide. 148
The Court's reductive notion of women's unfettered choice and its narrow
conception of governmental responsibility in the selective funding cases has
fueled extensive feminist criticism of those cases as illustrative of the limits of
liberal toleration and privacy doctrine. 149 No doubt, the Court's abortion
jurisprudence fails to offer a robust model of governmental responsibility to
facilitate women's reproductive autonomy (which a model of toleration as
respect, informed by feminist analysis, would try to do). But the disrespect for
poor women's autonomy reflected in selective funding and in the Court's
jurisprudence upholding it offends the requirements of toleration as respect. If,
under the anti-compulsion rationale for toleration, persuasion that fosters the
exercise of self-government is the paradigm example of permissible
governmental action, surely selective funding lacks the earmarks of such
persuasion. The history of such restrictions reveals that funding for poor
women's abortions hinders, rather than fosters, their self-government, whether
the effect is, as in some cases, compulsory childbearing, or, as in others,
personal and family hardship undergone to obtain an abortion and increased
health risks due to the delay in obtaining an abortion. 150
(1977); see also McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 783 (reporting that proponents of Hyde Amendment
stated that it would protect poor women from pressure to undergo abortion). But equal
funding of abortion and childbirth would also address this concern.148 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997) (recognizing state interest
in protecting vulnerable groups from being pressured into physician-assisted suicide; rejecting
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide). Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote this
opinion, has voted with the majority in every selective funding and facilities case since his
appointment to the Court. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (recognizing
that "subtle and indirect pressure" resulting from prayer at graduation ceremony "can be as
real as any overt compulsion").
149 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade,
in FEMINISM UNMODMED 93, 93-102 (1987).
150 See James Trussell et al., The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financing for
Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120 (1980) (reporting that "one-fifth of Medicaid-eligible
women who needed abortions were, in their view, forced to undergo compulsory
childbearing"); Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallish, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion
Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PwSP. 170 (1984) (reporting "relatively serious"
consequences in 58% of Medicaid-eligible women and their families, including financial
sacrifices, and delays in obtaining abortions in some women due to time needed to get
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Finally, a toleration as respect model rejects selective funding because it
disproportionately burdens poor women, and thus violates norms of equality
and fairness. The history of the Hyde Amendment reveals that government
singles out poor women for moralizing against abortion because it can: their
dependency affords government greater leverage over them than over other
women. Sullivan argues that one systemic concern underlying unconstitutional
conditions doctrine should be preventing "constitutional caste": government's
intervention such as selective funding may create hierarchies among classes of
rights holders, which may exacerbate background inequalities of wealth and
resources. 151 Notwithstanding public ambivalence about abortion, unequal
subsidization of poor women's medical care, which threatens to make abortion
rights available to nonindigent or wealthy women only, is not an acceptable
means of compromise on the divisive abortion issue. 152 The fact that, because
women of color are disproportionately poor and dependent upon need-based
governmental subsidies, the burden of such unequal subsidization falls heavily
upon them strengthens the case for the pmfairness of this compromise, as does
the history of governmental and societal disregard for and disrespect of the
reproductive autonomy of women of color.' 53 And notwithstanding the negative
Constitution, a consistent theme in legislative and other opposition to the Hyde
Amendment is that principles of equality and fairness impose upon government
a moral, if not also a constitutional, responsibility to make reproductive rights
equally accessible to and meaningful for all women, rich or poor.'5 4
financing); see also 139 CONG. REc. S12585-86 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Boxer) (arguing that funding restrictions have impaired and burdened women's autonomy by
making the abortion choice more costly in terms of short-term financial expense and increased
risks to women's health from later abortions, due to delays related to financial constraints).
But see Deborah Haas-Wilson, Women's Reproductive Choices: The Impact of Medicaid
Fwding Restrictions, 29 FAM PLAN. PEsp. 228, 231 (1997) (concluding that "restrictions on
Medicaid funding have little, if any, effect, on women's reproductive decisions," but noting
that "the use of aggregate abortion rates may hide the effects" of policies targeting poor
women).
151 Sullivan, supra note 127, at 1496-98.
152 See GuTMANN & THOmPSON, supra note 121, at 88-89; TRIBE, supra note 130, at
206. See also Harris, 448 U.S. at 349-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that when such
restrictions apply even to abortions medically necessary for women's health, they violate an
Equal Protection requirement of governmental impartiality in the distribution of governmental
benefits to otherwise qualified individuals and inflict a severe punishment on pregnant
women).
153 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 587 (1993).
154 This theme of equal access and avoiding discrimination is recurrent in legislative
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In this Part, I have examined the implications of the anti-compulsion
rationale and argued for an interpretation of it that supports a model of
toleration as respect. To the extent the rationale, taken in isolation from other
rationales, yields only an empty toleration model, I shall argue that the
jurisdictional and diversity rationales support toleration as respect.
IV. THE JURISDICTIONAL RATIONALE FOR TOLERATION
A second justification for toleration, the jurisdictional rationale, is that
government should refrain from acting or regulating in certain spheres of
conscience and conduct because securing uniformity or orthodoxy in those
spheres is not the proper business of government. But why not? If the anti-
compulsion rationale rests in part on an assumption about proper governmental
means, the jurisdictional rationale appears to rest on an assumption about
proper governmental ends or functions. Moreover, at least in contemporary
formulations, the latter rationale rests on a notion of personal sovereignty or
moral independence from the state with respect to a realm of thought and
action, as well as an assumption that such an allocation of power between
persons and the state is appropriate given the facts of human diversity and
moral pluralism.
In this Part, I develop and endorse the jurisdictional rationale for toleration
as an important foundation for a model of toleration as respect. I argue for an
interpretation of the jurisdictional rationale that avoids two common
misconceptions, which arise from the assumption that it depends upon a sharp
distinction between public and private life.
First, feminist critics reject the jurisdictional rationale to the extent it
appears to rest upon a public/private distinction, leading to governmental
abdication of responsibility for securing women's liberty and equality. I contend
that accepting the jurisdictional rationale does not require such abdication or
such a truncated view of the proper business of government. Second, some
critics of the jurisdictional rationale charge that it leads to empty toleration (as
seen in Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer), which leaves government too much
room to moralize against disfavored ways of life, so long as it refrains from
using force to reach purely private behavior. Using the battle over gay and
lesbian rights as an example, I argue that the jurisdictional rationale better
supports a model of toleration as respect, which requires affording gay men and
debates over the Hyde Amendment. See McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 749-51 (reporting letter by
United States Commission of Civil Rights); id. at 751-844 (reporting numerous examples of
this argument); 139 CONG. REC. H4323 (daily ed. June 30, 1993) (statement of Rep. Lowey);
139 CONG. REC. S12583 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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lesbians equal basic liberties.
Several interpretive questions arise concerning the implications of the
jurisdictional rationale for a formative project. Just how inviolate must the
protected sphere of personal belief and conduct be? If the jurisdictional
argument holds that it is not the proper business of government to coerce
uniformity of thought or conduct, does it similarly imply that it is not
government's proper business to have a preferred view or orthodoxy
concerning such thought and conduct and to promote it even by noncoercive
means? Does the jurisdictional rationale impose more stringent limits upon a
governmental formative project than the anti-compulsion rationale?
As applied in constitutional law, the jurisdictional argument for toleration
sometimes leads to restraint on governmental persuasion and at other times
echoes the anti-compulsion rationale in distinguishing compulsion from
persuasion. I examine the tension within the Court's abortion jurisprudence
over these competing understandings of the implications of the jurisdictional
argument, using the informed consent cases, especially Casey, as an example. I
argue that, at a minimum, toleration as respect would support encouraging
persons to engage in reflective decisionmaking concerning the exercise of
protected liberties, for this fosters, rather than hinders, personal self-
government. I argue that this is a better approach than that upheld by the Casey
joint opinion permitting governmental persuasion, or moralizing, against a
protected choice, under the rubric of facilitating responsible, reflective self-
government. I do not contend that a toleration as respect model could never
embrace governmental persuasion concerning matters of personal self-
government, or that such persuasion could never serve a facilitative role in
fostering agency. But we have not yet seen such a model of persuasion in the
context of abortion regulation; such factors as the problematic content of the
perfectionist vision of responsible reproductive choice that government seeks to
promote, along with public inattention to the preconditions for responsible
reproduction, make the equation of persuasion with facilitation problematic here
in a way that it might not be in other contexts.
A. The Proper Business of Government and the Harm Principle
Locke's formulation of the jurisdictional argument for toleration sharply
distinguished the sphere of religious belief and salvation from the proper
business of government and appealed to a model of impartiality (or neutrality),
at least with respect to religion. The "business of civil government" must be
distinguished from that of religion, and the civil magistrate, "by the impartial
execution of equal laws," must "secure unto all people in general, and to every
one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of these things belonging to
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this life," that is, their civil interests.' 55 Locke argued that the commonwealth
and its civil rights should be open to all, regardless of religion. He condemned
members of one religion who would use the state to persecute others because
this matter "does not at all belong to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, but
entirely to the conscience of every particular man." 156 A person's soul and its
salvation are his or her business. In effect, Locke's jurisdictional argument for
toleration recognized "the inviolability of a separate individual sphere of moral
experience and its expression." 157
One argument advanced by Locke in support of this jurisdictional argument
is that sins are not punished by government because they are not prejudicial to
other persons' rights and do not breach the public peace of societies. 158 So put,
Locke's jurisdictional argument seems to support the inference that government
should refrain from moralizing to secure orthodoxy in matters of belief and
conduct that do not directly harm and therefore concern the polity. As noted in
Part III, Locke appeared to endorse the idea that a public official, like a private
citizen, might employ persuasion in the service of correcting religious errors.
Nonetheless, Locke's conception of the proper business of government may
lend support to interpreting the jurisdictional argument as limiting governmental
moralizing: because people enter into civil society to secure and protect their
possessions and interests, not to find salvation, government's business and its
proper "jurisdiction" concerns security, not citizens' salvation (and, by
implication, their virtue). 159
Contemporary arguments for toleration translate the jurisdictional argument
from the sphere of religious belief, narrowly conceived, to a broader realm or
sphere of decisionmaking about one's way of life, or personal self-government.
Perhaps the most famous precursor for such a jurisdictional argument is Mill's
defense of liberty, in which he proposed a principle that the limit to society's
legitimate power over the individual is self-protection, that is, harm to society,
as distinguished from harm to self.16 The basis for this harm principle was the
appeal to utility, grounded in the interests of human beings understood as
"progressive" beings. On Mill's model of human development, a person, free
155 LOCKE, supra note 7, at 17.
156 Id. at 58.
157 Ingrid Creppel, Locke on Toleration: The Transformation of Constraint, 24 POL.
THEORY 200, 203 (1996).158 See LOCKE, supra note 7, at 43. This argument is a precursor to Mill's harm
principle, discussed infra text accompanying notes 160-61.
159 See id. at 58.
160 SeeMimL, supra note 8, at 10-11.
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from coercive interference, grows and flourishes like a tree, pursuant to his or
her best judgment about the best way of life. 161 Whether and how Mill's
jurisdictional argument similarly extends to government employing measures
short of coercion when the harm principle is not in play is unclear. As noted in
Part HI, he supported society using persuasion in such matters, but offers no
crisp line between persuasion and "social tyranny" and little guidance as to the
permissible boundaries of collective efforts at persuasion, whether by society or
by government.
Neither Locke's nor Mill's formulation of the jurisdictional argument,
taken alone, offers a complete foundation for the contemporary jurisdictional
argument for a model of toleration as respect. Such a model shares with
perfectionist thought a more ambitious conception of the proper business of
government than that espoused by Locke. And although some variant on Mill's
harm principle is an important foundation for the jurisdictional argument,162 it
is not the only one. These historical accounts helpfully suggest that the
jurisdictional argument properly rests upon a mixture of prudential and
normative grounds. The prudential argument is that a stable polity can exist
without governmental use of force to secure uniformity of belief and conduct in
certain spheres and that the exercise of such governmental force would, in fact,
have detrimental consequences for persons and for society. The normative
argument rests upon respect for persons' moral powers, dignity, and equal
moral worth. Setting limits upon governmental exercise of power stems from an
entitlement to a realm of personal sovereignty and the protection of equal basic
liberties necessary to secure persons' status as free and equal citizens and to
foster development and exercise of their moral powers. 163 (The jurisdictional
argument also implicates the diversity rationale for toleration (discussed in Part
V): recognizing this allocation of power between individuals and government is
appropriate because of human diversity and moral pluralism.) But the
jurisdictional rationale does not imply that government has no responsibility to
foster the development of those moral powers.
B. The Jurisdictional Argument in Constitutional Law
[The Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."
161 See id. at 56.
162 For two contemporary examples of liberal theory utilizing a harm principle, see
RAz, supra note 13; RIcHARDs, supra note 91. Perhaps the most elaborate contemporary
application of the harm principle is JOEL FENBERG, THE MORAL LIMr OF THE CRImAL
LAw (four volumes) (1984-1988).
163 See RAwis, supra note 6, at 18-20, 201-03.
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Plessy v. Ferguson .... CIhose words now are understood to state a
commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.
... Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance.
- Justice Anthony Kennedy' 64
1. Defining the Limits of Constitutional Liberty
The jurisdictional argument is a prominent underpinning of the
constitutional principle of the separation of church and state. First Amendment
jurisprudence teaches that, by constitutional design, the preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is "a responsibility and a choice
committed to the private sphere"; government has a duty to respect the "sphere
of inviolable conscience." 165 Government not only must refrain from coercion
in matters of religion, but also should not be in "the business" of carrying on a
religious program for its citizens (even by noncoercive means).' 66
The protection of civil rights of members of society irrespective of their
religious beliefs and practices, through the Free Exercise Clause, resembles
Locke's ideal of government's impartiality. 167 Although generally not couched
in the language of toleration, Equal Protection jurisprudence and anti-
discrimination law also reflect the jurisdictional rationale and an ideal of
impartiality: they protect citizens against invidious discrimination because
164 Romer v. Evans, 116S. Ct. 1620, 1623, 1628 (1996).
165 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-90 (1992).
166 Id. at 588, 589-90.
167 But free exercise is not absolute exercise, and (by analogy to Locke's support for
laws prohibiting, for civic reasons, religious practices) a source of contiuing controversy is
government's proper authority to reach or burden religious exercise through laws of general
application. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (upholding, against free exercise claim, denial of unemployment benefits to
members of Native American Church fired by private employer for use of peyote for
sacramental purposes; ingestion of peyote prohibited under Oregon law). In response to
Smith, inter alia, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1996), which required that, because even laws "neutral"
toward religion may interfere with religious exercise, governments must satisfy a compelling
interest test. The Supreme Court struck down RFRA in City ofBoerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997).
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certain characteristics (including, e.g., religion, race, and sex) are morally
irrelevant to persons' ability to contribute to society and should not be the basis
of disadvantage. 168
As with the anti-compulsion rationale, the jurisdictional rationale
undergirds the Establishment Clause's prophylactic rule against governmental
promotion of and persuasion concerning religion, but does not translate into a
similar rule regarding citizens' exercise of democratic and personal self-
government.' 69 As Barnette and other cases involving the education of children
indicate, government must respect fundamental rights by refraining from such
improper means as coercion, but it has considerable latitude to promote such
ends as patriotism and the values requisite for citizenship and democratic self-
government. 170 Today, government so routinely engages in many functions
aimed at educating, informing, entertaining, warning, and persuading citizens
that it would be "absurd" to adopt the proposition that government speech, per
se, is an "illegitimate enterprise.' 171
Does the jurisdictional argument offer any parameters for the limits to
government's proper authority with reference to persuasion short of compulsion
in matters of personal self-government? The idea of an entitlement to self-
government in the sense of deliberative autonomy is seen in justifications for a
"sphere" or "realm" of constitutionally protected liberty "which the
government may not enter," within which persons may make important
"intimate" or personal decisions free from "unwarranted" governmental
intrusion. 172 The idea that such a realm should be "largely beyond the reach of
government" stems both from the Framers' concern to set limits to
168 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down sex-based
classification in statute concerning military benefits and analogizing sex to race because it
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down miscegenation statute as based on invidious racial
discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause). As Romer's invocation of
impartiality suggests, the battle for gay and lesbian rights involves, to a significant degree, the
proper import of this principle. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623, 1627-29 (1996).
169 See Steve Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rv. 565, 605-06 (1980)
(arguing that an Establishment Clause model for nonreligious speech "would entirely prevent
government persuasion or sponsorship of beliefs" and thus "surely would go too far").
170 See id.; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (stating "[t]hat the State may
do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically,
mentally, and morally is clear").
171 YUDOF, supra note 66, at 38-41. But my project here is not to offer a complete
account of the contours of permissible governmental speech.
172 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-53 (1992) (upholding a
woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy as part of due process liberty).
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governmental power as well as from a normative conception of the
preconditions for human personhood, dignity, self-definition, and "the pursuit
of happiness." 173 Contemporary American constitutional law does not fully
embrace the blunt proposition of the Wolfendon Report (inspired by Mill) that
"[tihere must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which in brief
and crude terms is not the law's business." 174 But the notion of a "right to be
let alone," a root of the constitutional right to privacy, reflects acceptance of
such a jurisdictional argument to a point.' 75
As qualifiers like freedom from "unwarranted" governmental interference
and a realm "largely" beyond the reach of government suggest, this protected
realm of personal sovereignty is not an absolutely inviolable sphere completely
immune from governmental regulation. Rather, delineating the proper business
of government and the balance between personal sovereignty and legitimate
governmental authority is at the core of constitutional theory and
adjudication. 176 Perhaps one reason that it is difficult to translate the
jurisdictional argument from the realm of religion to the broader realm of
"unusually important" decisions is that it is difficult to argue that it is not
government's business how people live because their "sins" have no impact on
society. 177 Mill identified the family as properly within the jurisdiction of
173 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(linking the right to be let alone to requirements of human happiness); see Doff, supra note
118, at 1188 (discussing the Framers).
174 H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in MILL, supra note 8, at 246-47 (quoting
Wolfendon Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution Report); see infra note 180
for discussion.
175 For invocations of the right to be let alone as a foundation of the right of privacy,
see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). On the influence of Mill's On Liberty
upon the identification of a constitutional right to privacy, see MARY ANN GLmNDON, RIGHTS
TALK 47-75 (1991).
176 As the Court has elaborated in substantive due process jurisprudence, when
fundamental rights and the realm of constitutionally protected liberty are at stake, persons
have protection against "unwarranted" interference, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972), or (more recently) "unduly burdensome" governmental regulation, see Casey,
505 U.S. at 874-79, a compelling governmental interest may override this qualified
jurisdictional sovereignty. When fundamental constitutional rights are not at issue, for
example, when government passes social or economic legislation, it may pursue "legitimate"
governmental ends by means rationally related to those ends. See Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).177 Just as Locke defended religious toleration because of the absence of harm to the
commonwealth, Thomas Jefferson expressed such a "no harm" principle in observing that "it
does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no god." RICHARDS,
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURIVAL
government, because parents' breach of their duties threatened their children
and society. 178 Today, juxtaposed with the recognition of fundamental
constitutional rights concerning family life is the idea that government has
proper authority to regulate the family and afford privileged status to the marital
(heterosexual) family precisely because of its fundamental importance to a
stable society and the harm to children and to society when parents fail in the
task of childrearing. 179
Attempts at linedrawing between governmental and personal sovereignty
have been vexed with difficulty. A Millian principle concerning harm to others
may work to a degree and, arguably, has played a role in constitutional
adjudication concerning the scope of privacy. But its force depends upon the
definition of harm and the weight given to arguments about impact upon the
moral climate or ethical environment, for constitutional jurisprudence also
contains a moralistic strand signalling resistance to any simple linedrawing
between public and private behavior that would remove a range of subjects
from government's concern.18 0 For example, Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Poe v. Ulminan speaks of government's proper concern for the "moral
soundness" of its people.' 8 ' Thus, on the one hand, there is a powerful Millian
argument that private, nonconforming consensual sexual conduct (e.g.,
supra note 91, at 112-13.
178 See MILL, supra note 8, at 95-101.
179 See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1888) (stating deep public interest in
marriage because it is the foundation of family and society, civilization, and progress). For
contemporary arguments about government's proper interest in averting the political and
social consequences due to failings of families, see, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 175, at 121-
44; GALSroN, supra note 36, at 282-89.
180 Some classic debates over the proper scope of tolerance concern arguments for
intolerance, even when no direct harm to the rights of others is involved, because of a right of
societal self-protection of its moral code. In the Hart-Devlin debate over the decriminalization
of sodomy, Lord Devlin argued that society suffers harm from deviation from public morality
(e.g., tolerating sodomy and other forms of sexual "immorality" weakens the moral fabric by
threatening traditional sexual morality) and that, in appropriate cases, it may use the criminal
law to enforce such morality. See DEvuN, supra note 24, at 7-25. In reply, Hart granted that,
in some cases, law must enforce morality, but challenged the claim that consensual,
nonconforming sexual behavior threatened to unravel the moral fabric of society: "we have
ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon morality, will not think any better
of murder, cruelty, and dishonesty, merely because some private sexual practice which they
abominate is not punished by the law." Hart, supra note 174, at 250.
181 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argwnent and Liberal Toleration, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521, 526
(1989) (favorably invoking Harlan for his opposition to neutrality).
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homosexual sodomy) does not harm the rights of others and does not (as Hart
put it) threaten to unravel society's moral fabric 182-and, indeed, poses far less
threat to society than, say, inadequate childrearing practices do. On this view,
society's discomfort with or disapproval of such sexual conduct is not a sound
basis for governmental regulation.18 3 And yet, on the other hand, Harlan
included homosexuality as a proper subject of governmental proscription, and
the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick upheld Georgia's sodomy law on the basis
of moral condemnation of homosexuality, notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's
poignant invocation of Hart's argument.184
An argument for toleration and protection of consensual sexual conduct in
the "privacy" of the home is compelling for many persons who believe that
government has no "business" regulating what goes on in the bedroom.
Bowers's exclusion of homosexual intimate association from that protection was
surely wrong for this reason, among others. But the jurisdictional rationale
cannot rest solely on a sharp public/private distinction, as though we could
divide the world into literally distinct spheres: the private-the home, family,
marriage, civil society, and (on some accounts) the market-and the public-
politics and (on other accounts) the market. It gives rise to serious
misunderstandings about the limits that toleration places upon the proper
business of government and it may encourage an interpretation of toleration as
empty toleration.
2. Avoiding Misconceptions About the Jurisdictional Rationale
a. Negative Liberty, Private Coercion, and Disempowered Women
Feminists correctly attack an overly literal, spatial notion of privacy to the
extent it carries the problematic implication that entire spheres of social life are
simply immune from governmental regulation because they are "private" (e.g.,
the family). The idea that government has "no business" interfering with what
goes on in the privacy of men's "castles" and bedrooms, they charge, leads to
governmental abdication of responsibility, in the name of "freedom and self-
determination," for protecting women and children in the home from abusive
exercises of "private" power.185
182 See Hart, supra note 174, at 250.
183 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184 See Poe, 367 U.S. at 545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196,
212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185 MacKinron; supra note 141, at 1311.
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From this cogent critique of the rhetoric of privacy, some feminists reach
the conclusion that this abdication of governmental responsibility is an
entailment of a principle of liberal toleration rooted in a jurisdictional argument
for a sphere of individual decisionmaking. Thus, they argue, when toleration
takes the form of constitutional rights to negative liberty against governmental
interference with "private" life, it leaves women vulnerable to that private
power. 186 But this view is mistaken, at least on a model of toleration as respect,
which does not support an unqualified jurisdictional principle of governmental
noninterference with "private" life. It is undeniable that historical doctrines of
family privacy and of the sanctuary of the marital bedroom have contributed to
the unequal protection of married women in their homes and sanctioned
enormous injustice against women and children within the family, leaving them
unprotected against rape, incest, and physical assault within the family and
without legal rights of bodily integrity.18 7 However, to the extent feminist
critiques of privacy and toleration indict constitutional rights of privacy as
literally sanctioning violence against women under the rubric of privacy, they
are wrong, because constitutional privacy precedents have facilitated, rather
than thwarted, the erosion of these doctrines. 188
The critical point here is that government properly exercises its jurisdiction
to protect persons against harm and to adjudicate among competing rights. 189
To the extent feminist critics attack the Constitution as fundamentally flawed
because it does not require government to take affirmative measures to protect
women against such harms, they target the idea of the "negative Constitution,"
186 This is a prominent theme in West's critique of negative liberty and MacKinnon's
critique of privacy. See WEsT, supra note 46, at 105-28; MacKinnon, supra note 2, at 193-
95; MacKinnon, supra note 141, at 1311-13.
187 For a recent argument about the lingering impact of marital privacy doctrine on the
law's treatment of violence against women, see Reva B. Siegel, "The Ride of Love": Wife
Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
188 See Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (1995) (discussing use of privacy precedents in state law
cases striking marital rape exemptions). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 896-98 (1992) (rejecting common law understandings of marriage and a husband's
prerogatives as incompatible with current understandings of individual liberty; striking spousal
notification requirement in abortion law).
189 For example, Mill expressly excluded from the proper sphere of "liberty" a
husband's unequal power over his wife and condemned the laws permitting such power. See
MILL, supra note 8, at 96-97; JOHN STUART MiLL, The Subjection of Women (1869), in JOHN
STUART MIL & HARRiEr TAYLOR MiLL, ESSAYS ON SEx EQUALITY 137 (Alice S. Rossi ed.,
1970). For Rawls's similar rejection of such private power, see infra text accompanying notes
330-33.
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not toleration or privacy.190 A model of toleration as respect, which assumes a
basic governmental responsibility to facilitate persons' capacity for self-
government, does not entail this idea, but supports interpreting the Constitution
as not only permitting but in some instances requiring such governmental
responsibility.19 Support for a jurisdictional principle of personal sovereignty is
compatible with such an interpretation, as a considerable body of liberal
constitutional scholarship indicates. 192 The equal citizenship of women is not
only a constitutional principle but also a basic public value, which government
should take measures to secure.
A model of toleration as respect, rooted in part in the jurisdictional
rationale, usefully builds on core liberal and feminist principles, such as a
commitment to democratic and personal self-government and to equality.
However, as noted in Part II, some perfectionist feminists part company with
liberals in calling into question the value of toleration itself, or rather its
relevance to what women need. They charge that liberal toleration's focus upon
the threat of coercion by government, or public power, misses the point
because it is private power that poses the greater threat to women's living good,
self-directed lives. Why focus on protection against government when feminists
need government to work for them to advance women's equal citizenship and
well-being?
I believe that the better feminist argument is that the negative liberty, or
freedom from governmental interference, secured by toleration is a necessary
190 See, e.g., WESr, supra note 46, at 105-28. For a defense of privacy or autonomy
against such charges, see Fleming, supra note 6, at 46-48.
191 As the scholarship on the idea of the enforcement of the "Constitution outside the
courts" suggests, legislatures should play a vital role in discharging such responsibility. See,
e.g., SUNSTEiN, supra note 141, at 9-10; WESr, supra note 46. Congress's passage of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994), is a
good example of invoking its constitutional authority to secure women's equal citizenship and
protection from private violence. But see Siegel, supra note 187, at 2174-2205 (arguing that
legacy of family privacy doctrines limits efficacy of VAWA).
192 See Sornuos A. BAuER, THE CoNSrrIruoN OF JuDIci.A PowER (1993); CHAuim
L. BLAcK, JR., A NEW BiRnI OF FREEnoM: HUMAN RIGIrs, NAMm AND UNNAMED
(1997); DAviD AJ. RIcHADS, CONSCIENcE AND THE CoNsrffroN (1993); TRmE, supra
note 141, at §§ 15-1 to 15-21; Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988). Cass Sunstein criticizes the idea of rights to liberty rooted in substantive due process,
and instead argues for the obligation of the legislative branch to enforce equality rights
derived from an anticaste interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See SUNSrEM, supra
note 141. Some scholars would look to the legislatures, rather than the courts, to discharge
these obligations. See id.; Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Noms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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but not a sufficient condition of women's well-being. 193 The feminist claim that
government may and should further women's autonomy is persuasive. A
commitment to toleration as respect supports the use of governmental power to
address coercive private power and the recognition of governmental duties to
advance women's equality and autonomy, for example, through limiting
"liberty" by such means as antidiscrimination laws. 194 But it is simply not
credible to suggest that a jurisdictional principle is almost irrelevant because
governmental power does not pose a significant threat to women's pursuit of
self-governing lives. Feminist investigation of women's lives itself suggests the
need for a two-pronged focus upon both the benign and the harmful aspects of
governmental power. Surely, governmental power does pose a threat to the
reproductive health and well-being of pregnant women who are poor and the
targets of unequal funding for childbirth and abortion; or to lesbians precluded
from marrying and subjected to discrimination in custody determinations and in
public employment by restrictive state and federal laws; or to women on public
assistance subject to harsh restrictions and requirements, reflecting public
sentiments about their reproductive irresponsibility; or to communities of color
living in poor urban environments, whose lives are made worse due to the high
level of arrest and incarceration of men of color in a criminal justice system
prone to institutional racism. 195 One may acknowledge that many sources of
private power impinge upon and constrain women's ability to act as agents in
their own lives and to live good lives without dismissing the specter of coercive
state power as a liberal bogeyman.
193 For this reason, I believe that Robin West's work usefully highlights government's
obligation to foster women's positive liberty, but fails to put sufficient value upon negative
liberty. For examples of the approach to liberty argued for in text, see ANr'A L. ALLEN,
UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOcIETY (1988); Martha Nussbaum,
Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LmERAUSM AND THE GOOD 203 (R. Bruce Douglass et al.
eds., 1990); Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty:
Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407 (1992).
194 This is not to deny that the rhetoric of "toleration," "liberty," and "privacy" features
in efforts to thwart governmental intervention into exercises of private power to bar
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and, more recently, sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Brief for Petitioners, in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (asserting that Colorado's
Amendment 2 advanced legitimate state interests in privacy and religious liberty).
195 On restrictive abortion laws, see supra Part lI.C. For some feminist work on the
issues raised in text, see, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTI=rr & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER
AND LAW (2d ed. forthcoming 1998); WIL=AM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER,
SExuAlrrY, GENDER, AND THm LAW (1997).
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b. Empty Toleration and Second-Class Citizenship
A second misconception arising from an overly literal or spatial
understanding of a public/private justification for the jurisdictional argument is
that it leads to no better than a model of empty toleration, both in the attitudes
such toleration engenders and the latitude it allows for governmental
moralizing. For example, Sandel critiques a version of the jurisdictional
argument for toleration of homosexual intimate association to the extent it rests
upon the private nature of the sexual conduct, regardless of its moral worth. He
contends that tolerating something so long as it is private makes for very
tenuous protection because it suggests that (like obscenity) homosexual intimate
association is base and degrading, permissible only so long as it is hidden. 196
Further, other critics of liberal toleration claim that decriminalizing
nonconforming, consensual sexual conduct (such as homosexual sodomy) on
the rationale that it takes place in the private realm, and thus does no real harm,
has left persons who engage in such conduct in a status of second-class
citizenship. They are permitted to practice "private" sexual acts, but face legal
sanction for any spillover or manifestation of their nonconformist (e.g., gay or
lesbian) identity into the public sphere, thus constraining their ability to shape
the public culture. 197
Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer, which views toleration as fully
compatible with public and private discrimination against gay men and lesbians,
contemplates this sort of empty toleration. Scalia interpreted Colorado's
Amendment 2 (which barred gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from the
protection of antidiscrimination law) as a lawful expression of "moral and social
disapprobation of homosexuality" by "seemingly tolerant Coloradans" who
were "entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct." 198 Some
contemporary arguments in favor of discrimination against gay men and
lesbians and against same-sex marriage argue for this form of "tolerance":
there may be prudential arguments against using the criminal law to condemn
sexual immorality, but society must not let its laws go beyond tolerance to
signal acceptance and condonation of such conduct.199 Otherwise,
decriminalization of formerly proscribed conduct may send a message that
19 6 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 107.
197 See Backer, supra note 18.
198 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 See, e.g., John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REy. 1049, 1049-55 (1994) (discussing the European "standard modem position" of legal
regulation of various sexual conduct).
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immoral behavior is now condoned because it is no longer punished. 200
I vigorously dispute Scalia's assertion that decriminalizing sodomy exhausts
the requirements of toleration, and that governmental discrimination against gay
men and lesbians is consistent with toleration. This is indeed a "perverse" view
of toleration2 1-a model of toleration as respect does not lead to these
consequences. The juri sdictional argument calls for the extension to gay men
and lesbians of the same basic liberties accorded to other citizens, pursuant to
respect for their moral powers and their right to a realm of personal
sovereignty. Denying gay men and lesbians the basic civil right of marriage
refuses to accord to them the decisional sovereignty concerning their intimate
lives and family arrangements reserved to other citizens by the Constitution.
Within the cluster of due process liberty is the freedom to marry, a basic civil
right, one of those "unusually important personal decisions" allocated to the
individual instead of the state. 202
Similar to Scalia, opponents of same-sex marriage maintain that the denial
of the right to marry satisfies the requirements of tolerance, as distinguished
from "acceptance."2 0 3 Denying gay men and lesbians such a right may satisfy a
model of empty toleration (although even that is debatable), 204 but it fails the
requirements of toleration as respect. It fails to afford respect to the equal moral
powers and dignity of gay men and lesbians and denies to them "the right to
name, let alone claim, the intimate life that is the basic human right of all other
persons." 20 5 It precludes their ability to legitimize their intimate relationships
through civil marriage, a relationship regulated and recognized by the state and
200 C. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (describing the "natural," although inaccurate, view that "if the
Constitution guarantees abortion, how can it be bad?").
201 The reference is to the title of Backer's article, supra note 18.
202 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
203For the invocation by opponents of the right to same-sex marriage of the
tolerationl"forced" acceptance distinction, see Gary Bauer, Takeover, Not Tolerance, Is the
Homosexual Agenda, but Marriage Is Not for Sale, PR NEwswiRE, June 24, 1996 (remarks
by president of Family Research Council on the Defense of Marriage Act); 142 CONG. REC.
H7487 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Funderburk) (arguing that the Defense of
Marriage Act protects against government-mandated acceptance of same-sex marriages).
204 It is arguable that the denial of the right to marry fails even an empty toleration
model. The comparison with selective funding of the right of abortion is instructive: here,
government is not simply discouraging one choice (same-sex marriage) by favoring an
alternative choice (heterosexual marriage); it refuses outright to recognize any right of gay
men and lesbians to marry.
205 RicHARDs, supra note 9, at 353.
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a source of many rights, responsibilities, and benefits. 206 In so doing,
government denies them equal access to cultural resources important to the
development and expression of identity and exercise of their moral powers.20 7
Toleration as respect requires that to impinge upon or deny such a right to
a group of citizens, or to burden its exercise, government must satisfy a heavy
burden of justification. Without mentioning Bowers, the Court's more recent
foray into the question of the constitutional rights of gay men and lesbians,
Romer v. Evans, goes some distance toward recognizing this governmental
burden of justification by suggesting that a defense of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation as governmental moralizing to reflect public
disapproval of homosexuality fails as unjustified animus, and a bare desire to
harm.208 In stating that the Constitution does not tolerate making a class of
citizens strangers to the law and that Amendment 2 violated the requirement
that government be impartial, Justice Kennedy in effect made a jurisdictional
argument that sexual orientation is an irrelevant characteristic with respect to
citizens' ability to seek the protection of the law. A conservative or
"minimalist" reading of Romer is that it simply prohibited sweeping, categorical
exclusions against gay men and lesbians and left open the question of the
constitutionality of more narrowly-tailored measures distinguishing between gay
men and lesbians and other citizens. 209 A more far-reaching interpretation of
Romer, which would advance a model of toleration as respect, is that principles
of impartiality and Equal Protection forbid government to legislate the denial of
civil rights and basic rights of conscience based on the private prejudices or
animus of citizens, and that the uncritical invocation of historical and
contemporary moral condemnation of homosexuality reflects such animus
(indeed, an unjust and intolerant gender orthodoxy), rather than principled
reason-giving. 210 As such, Romer, along with the recent Hawaii decisions
striking Hawaii's bar on same-sex marriage, may be significant turning points
206 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58-59 (Haw. 1993).
207 See RICHARIS, supra note 9, at 365-466. For a similar argument made from a
perfectionist liberal framework, see Carlos Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-
Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997).
208 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
209 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 3,
53-71 (1996).
210 See Shahar v. Bowers, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13069, *73 (11th Cir. May 30,
1997) (Kravitch, J., dissenting); Shahar, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS at *85 (Birch, J.,
dissenting); Able v. United States, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9391 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 1997).
For an argument that antigay/lesbian initiatives reflect an unjust gender orthodoxy and are an
invidious form of religious intolerance, see RICHARDS, supra note 9, at 383-410.
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in a history of judicial failure to engage in any but the most conclusory review
of the reasons offered for the denial of basic rights and liberties to gay men and
lesbians. 211
c. Toleration as Respect and the Parameters of the Jurisdictional
Argument
A model of toleration as respect suggests that an alternative way to think of
the jurisdictional argument, which avoids the problems flowing from an overly
sharp public/private distinction, is that it secures a metaphorical space for, and
a presumption of an entitlement to, decisional sovereignty. Dictating certain
types of important personal decisions is simply not the proper business of
government, even if those decisions have public manifestations and
consequences for society. As one liberal constitutional argument puts it, certain
conduct is properly called private "because its centrality to moral independence
requires... that it not be in the sphere of public concern."212 So understood,
the jurisdictional argument defends a realm of personal autonomy and
sovereignty (or deliberative autonomy) with respect to certain significant
decisions and, while there is not an absolute immunity from governmental
regulation, government's burden of justification is higher when such rights are
at issue. Thus, a constitutional democracy affords protection to certain
"unusually important" decisions that relate to a person's conception of and
pursuit of a good life, but it does not follow that government has no jurisdiction
whatsoever to 'regulate "private" life.
Toleration as respect suggests that what delineates government's legitimate
authority from impermissible intrusion into personal sovereignty is the purposes
211 With the exception of the Hawaii decision of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993), every court that has considered a challenge to state marriage statutes construed to
prohibit same-sex marriage has rejected it. One rationale has been a definitional argument:
marriage, implicitly, has always been the union between a man and a woman. A second is an
incapacity argument: because the bearing and rearing of children is a central reason for
government's recognition of marriage, a same-sex couple simply is incapable of participating
in a marriage. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974) (using definitional and
incapacity arguments); E sKiDGE & HUNrER, supra note 195, at 799-805 (identifying and
critiquing use of these arguments in case law). Akin to Bowers, both of these arguments
appeal to millennia of history, moral teaching, and tradition. Under a strict scrutiny test,
Baehr v. Lewin correctly rejected such arguments as "circular, and unpersuasive" and instead
found that a bar on same-sex marriage constituted sex discrimination. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
In Part V, I offer arguments for same-sex marriage, but a full discussion of judicial rejection
of challenges to state laws barring such marriage is beyond the scope of this Article.
2 12 RIcHARDS, supra note 91, at 244.
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for which government acts. It is obvious that government properly acts to
protect persons from violence and sexual assault in the home to honor its
obligation to protect citizens from attacks on their bodily integrity and liberty
and to maintain social order and peace. Similarly, government properly acts to
shape citizens' capacity for democratic self-government and to foster virtues of
citizenship. It is not obvious that personal decisions about what to believe and
how to have sex bear a sufficient link to government's proper ends to justify
regulation. One might argue that here government exceeds its authority, and
acts ultra vires.213
With this conception of the jurisdictional argument undergirding toleration
as respect in mind, I now turn to assess Casey for its treatment of the protection
of a realm of decisionmaking as compatible with governmental persuasion in
favor of one choice rather than another. Casey usefully poses the questions of
just how inviolate the sphere of liberty "promised" by the Constitution is and
for what purposes government may seek to steer citizens' exercise of that
liberty. Looking at the conflicting approaches to informed consent schemes
within the Court's abortion jurisprudence, I address these questions as posing
an interpretive conflict as to the scope of the jurisdictional principle required by
a model of toleration as respect. I criticize Casey as failing to meet a model of
toleration as respect, notwithstanding its rhetoric of fostering women's "wise
exercise" of their reproductive liberty. Using Dworkin's analysis of Casey as a
point of departure, I consider whether toleration as respect could or should
embrace the use of governmental persuasion to foster women's reproductive
autonomy.
C. What Does Toleration as Respect Require?: The Informed Consent
Cases and the Idea of Governmental Moralizing to Facilitate
Women's Reproductive Autonomy
To a point, constitutional abortion jurisprudence embraces the jurisdictional
argument for toleration. The most basic jurisdictional linedrawing between
government and individual women is at the point of viability: the Court has
held, in effect, that it is the proper business of government to regulate abortion,
even to the point of proscription, at viability because of government's
compelling interest in protecting potential life (at this point, arguably a public
value rather than a sectarian value).214 But does an entitlement to be free from
213 1 am grateful to Professor Benjamin Zipursky for helpful discussion of the ideas in
this paragraph.
214 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
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governmental proscription prior to viability carry with it an entitlement to be
free from governmental moralizing against abortion?
The Casey joint opinion espouses the jurisdictional rationale to some extent,
affirming that: "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter." It further states: "The
destiny of the [pregnant] woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 215 Later, the
joint opinion refers to the "urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate
control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of
liberty." 216
However, the jurisdictional model that the joint opinion embraces in Casey
is not one of an inviolate sphere of decisionmaking prior to viability, but one of
shared jurisdiction or sovereignty between a pregnant woman and the
government. So long as the woman is free to make the "ultimate decision"
prior to viability, the government may legitimately share the territory to
facilitate "wise exercise" of reproductive liberty through measures designed to
persuade her in favor of childbirth.2 17 The joint opinion contended that this
conception of decisionmaking properly followed from Roe, and overruled
"progeny" of Roe affording greater inviolability to a woman's decisionmaking
process prior to viability and rejecting governmental steering against abortion
because it invaded that territory. 218 The joint opinion instead insisted on shared
jurisdiction from the commencement of pregnancy, on the logic that it is
government's proper business to advance its "profound" interest in protecting
prenatal life.
Casey grounds governmental authority to place some limits upon women's
liberty in the "unique" nature of abortion and its consequences: abortion
involves the termination of potential life and has consequences for persons other
than the pregnant woman as well as for the fetus. The Court's invocation of the
consequences of an abortion suggest in part a paternalistic argument for
regulation (e.g., negative consequences for the woman who chooses abortion,
whose decision may be poorly informed because she lacks information about
the impact of abortion on the fetus), in part a moral climate argument (e.g.,
consequences for medical personnel who perform abortions and members of
215 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 852 (1992).
216 Id. at 869.
2 17 Id. at 877-78, 887.
218 See id. at 882-83 (overruling in part Thomburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)).
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society who must live with the knowledge that abortions occur), and in part a
harm argument (e.g., "depending upon one's beliefs," the consequences for the
fetus). 219 Mapping this cluster of consequences onto the two recognized
governmental interests, protecting potential life and maternal health, the joint
opinion builds into protecting maternal health a governmental concern for
women's psychological well-being and their making "wise" decisions.
The Casey joint opinion concludes that persuasion in favor of childbirth,
under the guise of informed consent, not only protects potential life but also
fosters women's well-being. Governmental persuasion allegedly helps women
not simply to choose, but to choose well. As a useful point of comparison, in
the selective funding and facilities cases, there was no autonomy-enhancing
justification or any credible argument that such restrictions fostered women's
well-being (nor, as I have argued, could there have been); governmental
sidetaking in favor of childbirth found justification in the government's interest
in protecting potential life. Although Casey draws upon those cases to support
its use of the undue burden standard, it appears to build into that test a
requirement that steering against abortion must not impair women's self-
government-arguably, a step beyond empty toleration toward toleration as
respect. The joint opinion upholds informed consent measures designed to
further government's interest in childbirth on the assumption that they inform,
rather than hinder, women's "free choice": they promote women's
psychological well-being and facilitate the "wise exercise" of their liberty.220
Yet, in equating governmental steering with fostering women's self-
government, Casey contrasts with the strikingly different model of self-
government found in the Court's earlier informed consent jurisprudence.
1. Is There a Right to Be "Insulated"?
Prior to Casey, the Court struck down informed consent schemes to the
extent that, under the guise of informed consent, the state sought to "wedge" its
"message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed consent
dialogue between the woman and her physician" and to induce women to
withhold their consent altogether. 221 The Court envisioned an inviolate sphere
within which women (in consultation with, and as informed by, their
physicians) should be free of governmental moralizing against abortion.
Although the state could properly seek to insure that a woman's choice was
219 Id. at 852.
220 See id. at 877, 887.
221 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760-62; see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 423-24, 444-45.
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informed and made with awareness of all the relevant information, the
physician was not the state's agent, who must give pregnant women a list of
"information" aimed at promoting childbirth (much of it with dubious medical
foundation). 222 The Court in Thonburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists characterized the "decision to terminate a pregnancy" as "an
intensely private one"-"basic to individual dignity and autonomy"-that "may
be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of
the sovereign or other third parties." 22 3 As Justice Stevens construed Roe, that
case rested upon a jurisdictional principle that regards affording individuals "the
right to make decisions that have a profound effect upon their destiny" as more
important than preventing "incorrect decisions."2 24
In contrast to this more inviolate model of decisional sovereignty, the joint
opinion in Casey offered the following conception of the woman's decisional
right:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more
than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn
are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of
the right to choose.... Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state
measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be
upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the
health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an
undue burden. 225
The joint opinion further indicated that the state may encourage a pregnant
woman "to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great
weight" in favor of continuing her pregnancy. 226
222 Such statutes required, e.g., that women be informed of such "information" as
negative psychological and physical consequences of abortion and the status of "the unborn
child" as "a human life from the moment of conception." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760, 762;
Akron, 462 U.S. at 423-24, 444-45.
223 476 U.S. at 766, 772. In Roe v. Wade, the Court located a woman's abortion
decision within the constitutional right of privacy, yet it stressed primarily the privacy of the
physician-patient relationship and the right of the responsible physician, in consultation with
the pregnant patient, to decide whether abortion was the appropriate medical resolution of her
pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973).
224 7honburgh, 476 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, j., concurring).
225 505 U.S. at 877-78.
226 Id. at 872.
[Vol. 59:19
TOLERATIONAS RESPECT
The earlier informed consent cases arguably reflected the judgment that the
best way to protect pregnant women's entitlement to decisional privacy was to
prohibit any steering of the decisionmaking process prior to viability. 227 In
contrast, the Casey joint opinion significantly retreats from the "privacy" of that
process. It opens the door to governmental persuasion justified as-and
conflated with-facilitating the "wise exercise" of women's reproductive
choice. 228 Thus, Casey overruled Thornburgh and similar cases on the
permissible scope of informed consent: in those cases, the Court clearly had
rejected the conflation of persuading with facilitating autonomous
decisionmaking.
Which of these two models of government's proper role in fostering
women's reproductive choice is more persuasive? Which better comports with a
model of toleration as respect? If, as perfectionist critics of toleration argue,
government can do more to foster self-government than simply leave people
alone, does Casey offer an attractive perfectionist vision?
2. Casey's Perfectionist Vision: Abortion as Psychological Peril
For the Casey joint opinion, "informed" choice means, in effect, that the
woman is informed that the state prefers childbirth and has "profound" respect
for the fetus. The Pennsylvania statute required that a pregnant woman who
requests an abortion be informed of the availability of materials describing "the
unborn child," of the existence of agencies that would support a decision for
childbirth over abortion, and of the fact that financial assistance from the father
of the potential child may be available, and then wait twenty-four hours before
implementing a decision to have an abortion.229 Notwithstanding the Court's
lofty reference to encouraging pregnant women to know of "philosophic and
social arguments" in favor of childbirth, nothing in the statute before the Court
remotely resembles or conveys such arguments, without considerable drawing
of inferences (e.g., from anatomical descriptions of the fetus or the names of
227 This judgment seems appropriate given the lack of balance in the schemes before the
Court and the antiabortion impetus behind such schemes. But it is also understandable why
this prophylactic approach drew the charge that the Court ruled out in too categorical a
manner any attempt by government, prior to viability, to foster its interest in potential life by
regulating the decisionmaking process itself.
228 This retreat from the privacy of the decisionmaking process may be seen in the
Court's general avoidance of privacy rhetoric in Casey, in contrast to such cases as
Thornburgh. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GEDER & L.
119, 127-33 (1992).
229 See 505 U.S. at 902-11.
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social service agencies).
The crux of Casey's analysis of informed consent is that such measures
properly seek to ensure that women considering an abortion understand the
"impact on the fetus," which "most women" would deem "relevant, if not
dispositive to the decision." 230 This averts the risk that they may later regret
their decisions as ill-informed and suffer "devastating psychological
consequences," thus protecting women's well-being. 231 Requiring the provision
of information about the fetus is a "reasonable measure to ensure an informed
choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion." 232 The state may simultaneously promote informed choice and steer
in favor of childbirth, or "ensur[e) a decision that is mature and informed, even
when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over
abortion. "233
If we may call this a "perfectionist" vision of fostering women's well-
being, its underlying ideology about women's decisionmaking process is that
women are at risk for serious psychological consequences from abortion
choices because they are ignorant about what abortion is. Without these
informed consent procedures, women might terminate pregnancies because they
do not understand the anatomical characteristics of the fetus or that abortion has
the consequence of terminating fetal life. Despite considerable expenditure of
governmental resources to establish this model of abortion as, contrasted with
childbirth, fraught with physical and psychological peril for women, this model
lacks a solid foundation.234 To the contrary, most studies suggest that the
majority of women mainly feel "relief' after an abortion, and that, although
they often experience such feelings as loss, ambivalence, and regret at the time
230 Id. at 882.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 883.
233 Id. at 882-83.
2 34 Indeed, on the belief that women were not being informed of the health effects of
abortion, President Reagan directed Surgeon General Everett Koop (who was openly opposed
to abortion) to report on such effects. Koop concluded that he could not file a report "that
could withstand scientific and statistical scrutiny" and that the psychological effects resulting
from abortion are "minuscule from a public health perspective." Koop asserted that he
personally had counseled women with "severe psychological problems after an abortion," but
that studies were flawed and inconclusive and would not support a scientific report. In
Congress, Koop was closely questioned about his characterization of over 270 studies on the
health effects of abortion as "flawed." See Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion,
Hearing Before the Human Resources and Intergovernmental Subcomm., 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., Mar. 16, 1989 (including Report and testimony of Koop).
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(e.g., if the circumstances were different, they would have chosen childbirth),
few would reverse their decision; they experience abortion even as a positive
decision, an exercise of moral responsibility. 235
This perfectionist vision rests on an insupportable model of "abortion as
trauma" or psychological peril for women. It also does not reflect a balanced
approach to the question of what reproductive decisions foster women's well-
being. For example, missing is any attempt to inform women concerning the
potentially traumatic or perilous effects on their well-being and the life of their
future child if they continue unwanted pregnancies and raise unwanted children,
or of the consequences of giving up a child for adoption.236 And far from being
uniformly pronatalist, much public opinion and public policy disfavors and
penalizes childbirth when women-as many women seeking abortion are-are
young, unmarried, and without substantial financial resources. They are
branded as immoral and socially irresponsible and their "fatherless" families
labeled both a symptom and cause of social pathology.237 If the goal is
facilitating "wise exercise" of reproductive liberty, why not present a more
balanced account of the complex moral and social issues?
235 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of
Petitioners, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), at 21 (citing studies); CAROL
GLuGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicF 70-105 (1982); PATRCIA LUNNEBORG, ABORTION: A
Posmve DECISION (1992); KATHLEEN MCDONNELL, NoT AN EASY CHOICE (1984);
ROSALND PErCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN's CHoICE 371-79 (rev. ed. 1990).
Undeniably, some women do report negative psychological consequences after an abortion,
but they are likely to have had great ambivalence about their decision at the time, or to have
suffered emotional and other problems prior to the abortion. See Jane E. Brody, Study
Disputes Abortion Trawna, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1997, at C8 (describing highly religious
Catholic women who get abortions). For a dramatic collection of narratives about the
consequences of abortion, see DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SIENT No MORE
(1987) (recounting stories of members of Women Exploited by Abortion).
236 For example, the Surgeon General's Report, see supra note 234, noted the existence
of "well-conducted studies" documenting that children born of an unwanted pregnancy "are
more likely to experience detrimental psychosocial development, emotional adjustment
problems, and a poorer quality of life than are children bom to women who desired or
otherwise accepted their pregnancies." Id. at 221.
2 37 See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455-57 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that selective funding "brutally coerce[s] poor women to bear children whom society will
scorn for every day of their lives"); Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 396-408 (1996) (discussing conflicts between antiabortion policies and
condemnation of "irresponsible" reproduction and "fatherless" families in welfare reform).
On the labelling of single mothers as deviant and a cause of pathology due to the absence of
the father, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FNLAN, THE NEuTEmRD MOTHER, THE SExuAL
FAMiLY, AND ORT TwEmnE CENTuaY TP.AGms (1995).
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Of course, the Casey joint opinion does not defend governmental
persuasion solely on the basis of its role in furthering women's health; it also
upholds governmental steering because it furthers the government's interest in
protecting prenatal life. Thus, an alternative interpretation of the joint opinion's
model is that women, not for reasons of their own psychological health, but in
the name of encouraging "responsibility," should be required to study fetal
development and consider arguments against abortion, on the rationale that
choosing to remain uninformed is an evasion of responsibility to the fetus and
the community.238 On this interpretation, a right to make the "ultimate"
decision does not confer a right to be "insulated" from society's opposition to
abortion.
Does this governmental persuasion, justified as furthering either pregnant
women's health or the state's interest in prenatal life, satisfy the requirements of
either empty toleration or toleration as respect? As a threshold matter, if the
governmental steering approved in Casey is tantamount to coercion in its effect,
then it would fail the requirements even of empty toleration. There is a
plausible argument (embraced by Justices Blacknun and Stevens in Casey) that
the twenty-four-hour waiting period would be coercive in some circumstances
(particularly for poor women, rural women who travelled long distances, and
women who would have difficulty explaining their whereabouts) in which it had
the practical effect of delaying or preventing abortion.239 However, while it
noted the "troubling" findings below about the burden of these measures on
some women, the joint opinion found that they did not satisfy the undue burden
standard. Although it left the door open for future as-applied challenges on such
grounds, generally such informed consent procedures have survived scrutiny
under the "undue burden" standard. 240
238 See Robin West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on
Professor Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HAsuNGs L.J. 961 (1994) (interpreting Casey
as a move toward requiring women's reflection on their responsibilities); see also MARY ANN
GiENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE iN WEs7mEx LAw (1987) (arguing that European
abortion law, as contrasted with American abortion law (prior to Casey), stresses women's
responsibility to the fetus and the community).
2 39 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 920-21 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (invoking findings of district court as to "severity of the
burden" on many women); id. at 937-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part) (characterizing statute as "compelled information" and invoking district court findings
concerning "especially significant burdens" on rural and other women); Jane Maslow Cohen,
A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Deliberative Autonomy and Abortion, 3 CoLuM. J. GENDER & L.
175, 236-43 (1992) (discussing coercive aspects of the statute).
240 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87. The Court declined to review an unsuccessful
challenge to Mississippi's informed consent law. See Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
[Vol. 59:19
TOLERATIONAS RESPECT
Assuming arguendo that such measures fit the empty toleration model,
what about toleration as respect? I assess the merits of two answers to this
question: Justice Stevens's conception of equal respect, reflective of the Court's
earlier, more inviolate model of decisional autonomy, and Dworkin's model of
government fostering "responsibility" in decisions about abortion, which
appears to permit persuasion against abortion.
3. Stevens's Model of Deliberative Autonomy and Equal Respect
In his partial dissent in Casey, Justice Stevens offers an equal respect model
of the requirements of toleration, which enlists both the idea of moral insult and
a principle of sex equality. He contends that the scheme before the Court in
Casey, by requiring women to reconsider their decision at a point after they
have already indicated a choice of abortion, denies them "equal respect."
Instead, the statute reflects either "outmoded and unacceptable assumptions
about the decisionmaking capacity of women" or the "illegitimate premise" that
"the decision to terminate a pregnancy is presumptively wrong." 241 By forcing
a woman who, "in the privacy of her thoughts and conscience," has decided to
have an abortion to reconsider "simply because the State believes she has come
to the wrong conclusion" is a denial of the "equal dignity" which is part of
constitutional liberty. 242
Justice Stevens's analysis suggests that a toleration as respect model should
reject one-sided informed consent requirements because they rest upon an
impermissible gender ideology or orthodoxy. As some feminist scholars
elaborate, the fact that government employs persuasion to steer the exercise of
women's deliberative autonomy concerning reproduction, when it does not
generally campaign to convince citizens that "the exercise of a right is a
wrong," strengthens the argument that such an ideology is at work,243 as does
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 102 (1992). For other cases upholding informed consent laws
under Casey's test, see, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir.
1994) (upholding North Dakota statute against facial challenge and concluding that factual
record was insufficient to demonstrate undue burden); Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt,
844 F. Supp. 1482, 1488-90 (D. Utah 1994) (upholding Utah statute against facial challenge).
241 505 U.S. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). For an
elaboration of the history of such assumptions, see Cohen, supra note 239.
242 505 U.S. at 919-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
243 See Cohen, supra note 239, at 222-31, 234-35 (discussing noninterference with
voting, religion, marriage, and, to a lesser degree, the right to bear arms). However, recent
legislative efforts to encourage greater responsibility in entering into and exiting marriage
suggest growing interest in using noncoercive governmental means to steer the exercise of
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the joint opinion's embrace of the abortion as psychological peril model.
Stevens's jurisdictional argument for toleration suggests that protecting
women's decisional authority to make "such traumatic and yet empowering
decisions"-an element of "basic human dignity"-is a principle or moral value
more important than ensuring that they make what government considers to be
the "right" choice, that is, childbirth. 244 In contrast, the joint opinion protects
the right to make the "ultimate" decision, but places greater value on women
factoring in government's preference (thus fostering their "wise" choice), than
on affording them an inviolate decisional process.
At the same time, Stevens's model of equal respect does not require a
wholly inviolate sphere: government need not be neutral as between childbirth
and abortion, but may promote its preference for childbirth by selectively
funding it, creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and espousing the
virtues of family.245 Stevens dissented in Harris, because the restriction applied
to medically necessary abortions, but not in Maher, which upheld funding
restrictions for elective abortions. How could he simultaneously uphold an
image of a sacrosanct decisionmaking process while allowing unequal subsidies
aimed at shaping that process? For Stevens, the crucial point appears to be a
procedural one: government may moralize against abortion in a number of
ways, but "[d]ecisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject into a
woman's most personal deliberations its own views of what is best." 246 This
suggests that Stevens and some other members of the Court have been more
likely to see unwarranted interference when it is "internal" to or "injected into"
informed consent itself, than when it takes the form of an "external" constraint
such as lack of funding, for which government supposedly has no
responsibility. If so, this suggests the inadequate model of autonomy at work in
the Court's abortion jurisprudence, even among some justices who strongly
embrace a jurisdictional argument for autonomy.247
rights. See Ham Estroff Marano, Rescuing Marriages Before They Begin, N.Y. TIMEs, May
28, 1997, at C9; Kevin Sack, Louisiana Approves Measure to ighten Marriage Bonds, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 24, 1997, at Al.
244 See 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
245 See id.
246 Id. Stevens distinguishes, as permissible, government taking steps to ensure that a
woman's choice is "thoughtful and informed." Id.
247 It is also possible that what is at work is a commitment to the idea of the negative
Constitution expressed in Maher and Harris, or the idea that constitutional rights do not imply
affirmative governmental obligations either to facilitate exercise of them or to do so
evenhandedly. Unlike Justice Stevens, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall consistently
opposed selective funding and slanted informed consent schemes. To the extent that the
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Justice Stevens's model offers cogent reasons for resisting Casey's equation
of facilitating responsible decisionmaking with persuasion against a protected
choice. To the extent that Stevens's conception of equal respect finds some
selective funding permissible, it departs from the model of toleration as respect.
But another objection is that his championing of the lone individual deciding in
defiance of the sovereign leaves women too much alone. If government, as
perfectionists contend, can do more to foster autonomy than merely leaving
persons alone, what might such an autonomy-enhancing jurisprudence look
like? Dworkin's model of toleration argues against selective funding and in
favor of governmental persuasion that fosters reflective decisionmaking. Is this
a better model?
4. Does Equal Respect Rule out Governmental Moralizing ?:
Dworkin s Model of Toleration of "Procreative Autonomy"
As discussed above, Dworkin is a frequent target of perfectionist criticism:
by espousing liberal "neutrality," with its requirement of equal concern and
respect, he would unduly constrain government from pursuing perfectionist
goals. Equal respect might seem to require that government attempt, in a
"neutral" fashion, simply to ensure that persons have the capacity to form and
act upon their own conceptions of the good; it should not steer choice, but must
accord equal respect to every choice, even ones that it deems wrong and
morally unworthy. To the extent that governmental persuasion against abortion
reflects the majority's value judgment that childbirth is preferable to abortion,
one might expect Dworkin's analysis of informed consent to resemble that of
Justice Stevens, rather than that of the joint opinion in Casey.
Dworkin's more recent work, including his analysis of abortion, suggests
that this reading of the requirements of equal concern and respect is too strong.
The reading is correct to the extent that Dworkin argues that government may
and should act to facilitate democratic and personal self-government. In this
respect, his critics are wrong that his liberalism allows no room for a formative
project. In his recent book, Freedom's Law, Dworkin writes:
A genuine political community must be a community of independent
moral agents. It must not dictate what its citizens think about matters of
political or ethical judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances
that encourage them to arrive at beliefs on these matters through their own
internal contradiction between the funding and the informed consent cases derives from
shifting majorities on and the changing composition of the Court, Casey resolved the
contradiction by bringing the informed consent cases into harmony with the funding cases.
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reflective and finally individual conviction.248
This passage suggests that a commitment to equal concern and respect does not
preclude government engaging in a formative project. To the contrary,
Dworkin identifies governmental responsibility to undertake a formative project
to facilitate independent moral agency, or autonomous, reflective
decisionmaking.
In contrast to his earlier emphasis upon liberal neutrality, Dworkin's model
of liberalism emphasizes a central principle or value of ethical individualism, or
the idea that persons have the right and nondelegable responsibility to decide
for themselves what it means to accept the challenge of living their lives
well.249 Such a model treats reflective self-government, understood as ethical
agency and moral independence, as a good that government should foster. The
ideal is not simply autonomy in the minimal sense of government leaving
persons alone, but rather in a richer sense of government fostering reflective
and deliberative self-government, or the ability to "choose well." 250 As such, it
is a useful example of how a toleration as respect model entails a formative
project.
At a minimum, Dworkin's abstract formulation of government's
responsibility appears to evince a procedural concern: the political process, for
example, should be structured to encourage participation by citizens as active
agents in a collective debate. 251 Yet the duty to facilitate moral agency could
also extend to more substantive obligations to secure preconditions for
democratic and personal self-government and to facilitate the development of
persons' capacities and moral powers.252 As Dworkin's own work suggests,
such a duty could encompass such measures as providing good quality public
education and opportunities for higher education, funding the arts, supporting
affirmative action, and redistributing wealth to provide equality of resources as
2 4 8 RON.D DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw 26 (1996).
249 See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 16-22, 55-57 (elaborating "challenge model" of
ethics as basis of liberalism).
250 See Nussbaum, supra note 193 (arguing for the importance of a governmental role in
moving citizens "across the threshold into capability to choose well").
251 See Ronald Dworkin, The Roots of Justice 47-48 (unpublished manuscript dated
Aug. 28, 1997, presented in Colloquium on Law, Philosophy, & Social Theory, New York
University School of Law, on file with author).
252 For other examples of liberal theories that posit governmental responsibility to shape
citizens' capacities for self-government, premised in part on a conception of equal respect, see
YuuoF, supra note 66, at 20-37; Gardbaum, supra note 36, at 413.
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a matter ofjustice.253
Does government's responsibility to encourage reflective agency extend to
its promotion of some exercises of such agency over others? Dworkin's model
of ethical individualism embraces the anti-compulsion rationale for toleration: it
protects the right of individuals to be free from government dictating an
orthodoxy and infringing upon their responsibility to decide, "finally," for
themselves matters of personal ethics and values. Ethical individualism also
rests upon a jurisdictional rationale: because individuals are independent moral
agents with the responsibility to live their lives well, they are the proper locus
of decisionmaldng. But the claim that beliefs should be a matter of "finally
individual" conviction signals a rejection of an entitlement to a wholly inviolate
decisional sphere, within which government may make no effort to structure or
shape decisionmaking.
What is notable in Dworkin's recent argument concerning the relevance of
liberal toleration to abortion and euthanasia is his exploration of how
government may seek to structure the decisionmaking process to encourage
"responsibility" and to protect what he calls "intrinsic values" and the ethical
environment (or moral climate).2 54 Dworkin grounds the right to abortion on a
moral and constitutional right to procreative autonomy rooted in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. He argues that the Court in Roe correctly concluded
that fetuses are not constitutional persons, and that we would better understand
the public controversy over abortion as not about the personhood of fetuses, but
instead about how best to respect the intrinsic value of the sanctity of life (or,
253 Dworkin argues that liberal equality, if not constitutional principles, require most of
these preconditions. See DwoRmN, supra note 38, at 221-33, 293-331 (defending
governmental funding of the arts and affirmative action); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?
Parts I and 2, 10 PHiL. & PuB. ArF. 185, 283 (1981) (elaborating economic theory ofjustice
calling for wealth redistribution); Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y. REv.
Booxs, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20 (arguing for collective provision of some level of health care).
Dworkin argues that, although his theory of liberalism requires substantial redistribution of
wealth, his interpretation of the Constitution would not support reading it as stipulating a
degree of economic equality as a constitutional right. DwoRicm, supra note 248, at 36. In so
facilitating, government obviously promotes some values (such as liberal principles of
equality, diversity, and moral independence) and exercises some selection. On the example of
governmental funding of the arts, see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can
Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1350 (1991).
254 Dworkin argues that government's authority to protect the sanctity of life is
"detached," rather than "derivative." That is, it does not derive from the rights of particular
persons (such as a right to life), but from sanctity's intrinsic value apart from such rights (alin
to human concern for and governmental protection of the environment and endangered
species, and promotion of the arts). See DwORmN, supra note 135, at 11-14, 78-94.
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life's inviolable or sacred value).255 Dworkin's case for toleration rests on the
claim that citizens have conscientious disagreement about whether sanctity is
best respected in particular circumstances by choosing abortion or by
continuing a pregnancy, and that these are essentially "religious" decisions.
256
Individuals have the moral right and responsibility to decide for themselves
about the meaning of the sanctity of life.
Accordingly, our constitutional tradition of religious toleration as well as
Due Process liberty require that government may not coerce ethical choice
about procreation and that the ultimate decision must be left to the individual.
He argues that government may not insist upon "conformity," that is, forcing
individuals to conform with government's view of the best interpretation of
what sanctity requires. However, nothing in the Constitution forbids
government from properly insisting upon "responsibility" in decisionmaking,
that is, encouraging people to accept that sanctity is a contestable value and to
decide reflectively and thoughtfully about what it means.257 Thus, Dworkin
interprets the Casey joint opinion's argument that women do not have a
constitutional right to be "insulated" from others in making the abortion
decision, so long as they are the ultimate decisionmakers, as clearly defining the
state's interest in regulating abortion as that of encouraging responsibility.258
Dworkin's identification of a proper governmental interest in encouraging
responsibility seems both cogent and wholly compatible with the model of
toleration as respect that I propose. Government can do more than simply leave
people alone, and fostering reflective decisionmaking through making people
aware that important, contested values are at stake seems consonant with
respect for their moral powers. But Dworkin's analysis of Casey suggests that
he also supports a more robust state role than facilitation, a hybrid of the
coercive one he rejects and the facilitative one he accepts: the state decides
through the political process which interpretation of a contestable value is the
right one and then encourages-rather than coerces-everyone to reach the
state's conclusion. The crucial point is that government may not force women
to "make the decision that the majority, as represented by the legislature,
prefers"; short of that, however, "the state may reasonably think . . . that a
women tempted to abortion should be at least aware of arguments against it that
others in the community believe important and persuasive." 259 Thus, he praises
255 See id. at 9-28, 109-17.
256 See id. at 154-59.
257 See id. at 151-54.
258 See DWORKIN, supra note 248, at 121.
259 Id.
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the joint opinion for its statement that the state can encourage women to know
that there are "philosophic and social arguments" against abortion.260
Dworkin's account of toleration suggests that equal respect does not rule
out moralizing if it is reasonably likely to encourage reflective and responsible
decisionmaking. But it would seem more consistent with Dworkin's concern for
protecting "finally individual" conviction concerning the best interpretation of a
"contestable" value to confine government's role to encouraging persons to see
that sanctity is a "contestable" value. If government is taking sides, at least to
the extent of exposing pregnant women to arguments against abortion, in what
Dworkin considers is an essentially religious dispute, does this run afoul of the
requirement that officials not prefer one conception of the good life to another,
as well as of the constitutional proscription against even noncoercive
governmental persuasion concerning religion?261 Why would equal concern and
respect not be better satisfied by government encouraging citizens to be aware
of a range of perspectives concerning a decision for childbirth as well as for
abortion?
Three reasons appear to explain Dworkin's support for governmental
persuasion and not simply facilitation. First, his account of liberalism holds that
citizens can and should "campaign [in politics] for the good," but that principles
of liberal equality and toleration require that they eschew the tools of coercion
and punishment. 262 Dworkin regards it as an insult to human dignity-and to
ethical individualism-when government forces a pregnant woman to decide in
conformity with an "official interpretation" (i.e., orthodoxy) of the intrinsic
value of life,263 but, like Raz, appears to reject Waldron's charge that even
noncoercive steering is a moral "insult." Dworkin's distinction between
compulsion and persuasion suggests common ground with perfectionist critics
such as Raz, who also assume that persuasive governmental action will enhance
and foster, rather than diminish, autonomy.
Dworkin attempts to ensure that governmental persuasion enhances, rather
than hinders, ethical agency and autonomy by proposing factors to consider in
distinguishing measures that encourage responsibility from those that coerce.
The measures "could reasonably be expected to make a woman's deliberation
about abortion more reflective and responsible"; they will not prevent some
women who have decided responsibly to have an abortion from acting on that
260 DwoRKIN, supra note 135, at 153.
261 For a similar criticism, see Tom Stacy, Reconciling Reason and Religion: On
Dworkin and Religious Freedom, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 60-61 (1994).
262 DwommN, supra note 135, at 115.
263 Id. at 159.
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decision; and less restrictive means are not available.264 If these criteria are
satisfied (and Dworkin concludes that they probably were not with respect to
the statute at issue in Casey265), then persuasion in one direction is a form of
facilitation.
Second, facilitating women's reproductive autonomy is not government's
only legitimate interest, or proper business, in the abortion issue. Abortion,
Dworkin claims, lies at the "intersection of two sometimes competing
traditions" in America's political heritage, requiring reconciliation: "the
tradition of personal freedom" and "government responsibility for guarding the
public moral space in which all citizens live." 266 This leads to a model of
shared jurisdiction between the individual and government: the right of personal
sovereignty to make the "ultimate" decision intersects with governmental
authority to protect intrinsic values and the moral environment. Abortion may
be morally justified in certain circumstances, but, Dworkin argues, because it
involves the termination of life, it always (for both liberals and conservatives)
raises a serious moral issue. The moral climate suffers if citizens perceive that
other citizens do not take such decisions seriously.267
Third, Dworkin seeks to move the abortion controversy beyond pale
civility, or empty toleration, to toleration as respect. His gambit is that if
citizens came to understand that they differ about a shared value, and if they
came to believe that through such legislative measures as governmental
persuasion in favor of childbirth women decide reflectively about the
requirements of this value, then such a move would be possible. Thus, citizens
should care about the decisions that other citizens make implicating the sanctity
of life, and may use the tools of government to encourage reflective
decisionmaling, but must accept the principle that, in the end, citizens are
entitled to decide for themselves. 268
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, Dworkin may be right that
nothing in the Constitution precludes states from pursuing the goal of
"responsibility," including doing so by means of persuasion. As we have seen,
constitutional jurisprudence (at least outside the context of religious belief)
distinguishes governmental persuasion and sidetaldng from outright
compulsion. Whether Dworkin's inclusion of persuasion within the concept of
governmental facilitation of moral agency is an attractive interpretation of
264 See id. at 172-74.
265 Id. at 173-74.
2 66 Id. at 150.
2 67 Id. at 30-67, 167.
268 See id. at 9-11, 166-68.
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toleration as respect is another question. Certainly, measured against the model
of empty toleration dominant in much abortion jurisprudence, his model has
considerable appeal. He calls into question selective funding and insists that
governmental persuasion (contrary to the scheme in Casey) must actually be in
the service of reflective decisionmaking. Moreover, his positing of a
governmental responsibility to provide "circumstances" that encourage
reflective, individual self-determination could support an argument for
governmental provision of material and social preconditions for such
responsible reproductive self-determination. For all of these reasons, it is an
admirable attempt to model how government might simultaneously pursue a
public value, such as respect for life, and respect individual autonomy or
agency.
A toleration as respect model can readily endorse Dworkin's call for
governmental responsibility to encourage reflective decisionmaking as
consistent with a commitment to a jurisdictional principle of respect for
deliberative autonomy. But it would hesitate to embrace the idea that
government encourages reflective decisionmaking by persuading against the
exercise of a protected choice. To be sure, it is difficult to sort out whether the
principle of facilitating autonomy through persuading in favor of one choice is
objectionable as a matter of principle or due to its application in the abortion
context. Taken in the abstract, the proposition that governmental persuasion
could help people live self-governing lives by facilitating "wise exercise" of
their rights and reflection on their responsibilities is plausible-especially if it
came with a set of requirements reasonably ensuring that it would do so. But
we have not yet seen an adequate model of such persuasion in constitutional
abortion jurisprudence.
Obviously, one could argue that women who seek abortions do not need
persuasion in favor of abortion; to the contrary, to the extent they have not
considered the other side, one-sided persuasion in favor of childbirth may
enhance their decisionmaking process. 269 But if the goal is reflective
decisionmaking, and if abortion may be a morally justifiable and responsible
choice, a more balanced presentation of the parameters of responsible
reproductive choice could serve that goal and avoid overt governmental
sidetaking. And while there is clear public support for "persuasive" informed
269 For example, Mill contended that no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge
"except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the
same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active
controversy with opponents." MILL, supra note 8, at 44.
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consent schemes, 270 it may be that a balanced counselling scheme could also
serve the purpose of yielding greater respect for women's decisions. Yet, for
those persons who believe that abortion is always the wrong decision, even a
Casey-type scheme of persuasion will likely fail to garner respect for women's
decisions (much less their legal right to abortion).271
Dworkin's argument points to the need for a toleration as respect model to
articulate a vision of the human goods and public values that government should
promote as part of fostering reflective reproductive self-determination.
Although I cannot fully develop the application of toleration as respect to
reproduction here, feminist analysis of the preconditions for and the parameters
of responsible sexual and procreative choice should inform it. In addition to the
value of respect for life, government should advance such public values as, for
example, the equal citizenship of women, reproductive health of its citizens,
and social reproduction (i.e., the importance of bearing and nurturing children
and preparing them for citizenship). 272
Toleration as respect would not understand reproductive rights as solely
negative liberties, imposing no affirmative obligations on government, but
would aim at reproductive health as a component of positive liberty, including
but not limited to abortion.273 It would elaborate a notion of governmental
responsibility to establish the material and social preconditions for women's
equal citizenship, including attention to problems such as sexual violence, other
threats to women's bodily integrity, and women's poverty. At present, public
2 70 See Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion, but Wants Limits,
Poll Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al (reporting shift in public opinion from general
acceptance of abortion to a "permit but discourage model").
271 An instructive example may be the small but vocal group Feminists for Life of
America. They urge other groups opposed to legal abortion to recognize that women's
abortion decisions are not easy or for reasons of "convenience," but they nonetheless oppose
legal abortion, arguing that the solution is to "eliminate the crisis, not the child." See I nda
C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the
Name of Feminism, in FEmww NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDs 159-88 (Susan Ostrov
Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994).
272 For example, Rawls suggests that a balance of such important political values as due
respect for life, the equality of women, and orderly social reproduction would yield at least a
limited right to abortion. See RAwLs, supra note 6, at 243 n.32.
273 See PETCHE , supra note 235, at 388-401; see also RUTH COLKER, ABORTION
AND DIALOGUE xvi (1992) (advocating moving abortion debate to discussion of "effective and
respectful reproductive health strategies"); Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws,
Women of Color, and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCrVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s 15-38
(Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1988) (describing necessary components of a program
to meet the reproductive health needs of poor women and women of color).
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policy emphatically does not foster women's reproductive well-being. The
protection of "potential life" and encouragement of women's "responsibility"
does not translate into acceptance of collective responsibility and a strong
commitment of resources to foster the equal citizenship of women as mothers
and the well-being of families.274 There is a "wide gap" between "our political
rhetoric about 'family values' and our public policies" when it comes to "truly
valuing families." 275 For example, government restricts funds, facilities, and
even access to medical information to steer indigent pregnant women, many of
whom are not married, toward childbirth. Yet far from supporting childbirth
and childrearing by single mothers, government diagnoses "illegitimacy" and
single-parent families as a social pathology, and seeks to deter any financial
"incentives" toward such "irresponsible" reproduction by excluding such
families from various governmental benefits. 276
A toleration as respect model's preferred approach to informed consent
would be balanced counseling encouraging responsible self-determination-
more akin to Dworkin's idea of encouraging citizens to reflect upon the best
application of a contested value to their lives-rather than governmental
steering toward one choice over another.277 To be sure, the task of agreeing
upon the relevant public values and deciding upon their proper application to
abortion is daunting (and perhaps impossible), given the persistent moral
conflict over abortion and what constitutes morally and socially responsible
274 See, e.g., West, supra note 238, at 964-67 (arguing that Casey's attempt to
recognize women's reproductive responsibility lacks model of mutual responsibility, whereby
government accepts responsibility to secure women's equal citizenship (invoking Rawls's
model of justice)).
2 75 DEBORAi L. RHODE, SPEAKNG OF SEX: THE DENTAL OF GENIDER INEQuArrY 213
(1997).
27 6 See McClain, supra note 237, at 396-408; FnmviAN, supra note 237, at 101-25.
Women of color suffer disproportionately from this labelling and these public policies. See
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare,
72 DENy. U. L. REv. 931, 944-45 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit
Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1159, 1174-85 (1995). Another example of the limits of current public policy is the approach
to the complex topics of teen sexuality and teen motherhood. For instructive critiques of such
policy, see KRIN LUKER, Dunious CoNcEnoNs: THE PoLrcs OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY
(1996); ThE Poumcs oF PREGNANCY: ADOLscENT SuxuAln'Y AND PuBuc POucY
(Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993).
277 For example, one feminist theorist suggests requiring health care providers to offer
voluntary counselling sessions concerning relevant ethical issues for all pregnant women and
their partners, whether they plan to continue or terminate their pregnancies. See Ruth L.
Colker, Feminism, Theology, andAbortion, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1067 (1989).
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reproductive choice.278 A related challenge would be deciding upon the range
of views concerning childbirth and abortion that government should present to
encourage reflective decisionmaking. This degree of moral conflict, along with
the current contradictions in public policy concerning responsible reproduction,
suggest reasons to be cautious about embracing governmental persuasion in the
service of women's reproductive autonomy in the absence of a more complete
and coherent set of public values and public policies that government should
promote. A consideration of the import of the diversity rationale for toleration
yields further reason for caution concerning the embrace of governmental
persuasion in the service of personal self-government.
V. THE DivERsrrY RATIONALE
The model of toleration as respect also draws upon a third justification for
toleration, the diversity rationale: persons exercising their moral powers will
inevitably have different, or diverse, beliefs and ways of life; therefore using
government to secure uniformity is inappropriate and unduly oppressive. For
example, in his argument for religious toleration, Locke contended: "It is not
the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration
to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has
provoked all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon
account of religion."2 79 Mill rested his defense of liberty in part on the
assumption that human beings were diverse in their nature and needed diverse
circumstances within which to develop and flourish. He contended that each
person generally knows best what will make her or his life go well, and society
usually acts wrongly when it acts to direct that life's course.280 In contemporary
arguments for toleration, the diversity rationale translates from religion,
278 See GuTmANN & THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 74 (critiquing Rawls's attempt to
resolve abortion conflict by appeal to political values and arguing that abortion is paradigm of
deliberative disagreement, on which consensus may remain elusive); RAWLS, supra note 6, at
lv-lvi & n.31 (acknowledging that, despite his argument that a reasonable balance of political
values might yield a right to abortion, the disputed abortion question may lead to a "stand-
off"); Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2485-95
(1997) (disputing Rawis's appeal to political values and arguing for need to appeal to
comprehensive doctrines). On the difficulty, if not impossibility, of compromise, see, for
example, TRmE, supra note 130; Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and
Impossible, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 921. On conscientious disagreement over the morality of
abortion in various circumstances, see DWORKIN, supra note 135, at 30-67.
279 LocKE, supra note 7, at 57. But see MENDUS, supra note 73, at 37-39 (arguing that
Locke's argument did not rest on the value of diversity).
280 See MILL, supra note 8, at 53-69.
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narrowly conceived, to the broader concept of toleration of different
comprehensive moral doctrines or ways of life. A common assumption in such
arguments is that toleration is appropriate because a stable polity can exist
notwithstanding such diversity. For example, the diversity rationale features as
a justification for constitutional rights, as is evident from Bamette's statement
that "we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to
be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the
social organization." 281
The diversity rationale has prudential and normative underpinnings, both of
which are important to a model of toleration as respect. For example, one could
make a prudential argument for toleration that derives from acceptance of the
idea that "diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines" is a permanent feature of a democratic public culture in which
persons freely exercise their moral powers (what Rawls calls the "fact of
reasonable pluralism"). 282 Because achieving uniformity is not possible without
"intolerable" oppressive state power ("the fact of oppression"), toleration is
appropriate. 283 Rawls posits that a stable polity is possible without an orthodoxy
about the good life, or a unified comprehensive moral doctrine. The normative
arguments are two-fold. First, similar to the jurisdictional rationale, the
diversity rationale assumes an entitlement to self-government, or a realm of
personal sovereignty. Second, as Rawls puts it, the fact of diversity is "not an
unfortunate condition of human life," 284 but is a positive good for society.
Similarly, Mill appealed not only to the fact of the diversity of human nature,
but also to the value to society of different "experiments of living."285
In this Part, I argue that the diversity rationale for toleration offers great
promise for moving beyond empty toleration to toleration as respect. It is not
necessary to accept the robust form of the argument, that is, that pluralism is a
positive good, to accept the diversity argument. At a minimum, it may simply
reflect a prudential modus vivendi, or a "resigned acceptance of difference for
the sake of peace." 286 Indeed, someone might long to use state power to
281 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943). A more
recent example is P/anned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992), in which the joint
opinion spoke of "reasonable people" having "different opinions" concerning contraception
and abortion and of its responsibility not to impose the "moral code" of the members of the
Court upon society, but to uphold the liberty of all.
282 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 36.
283 Id. at 37.
284 Id. at 36, 144.
285 MILL, supra note 8, at 54.
286 WALZER, supra note 26, at 10.
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achieve adherence to her view of the good, but refrain because of the risk of
instead achieving the gulag (or, as Barnette put it, "the unanimity of the
graveyard"). 287 But the robust form of the diversity argument allows for the
possibility of a continuum of "more substantive acceptances [of difference],"
ranging from openness to others, to curiosity and a willingness to learn, to
respect, and even to "enthusiastic endorsement of difference." 288 Toleration,
therefore, allows for engagement and transformation. Toleration as respect
fosters that engagement through such ideals as mutual respect and civility as a
guiding framework for how citizens should engage in the political sphere.
The diversity argument for toleration as respect does not preclude a
formative project. Rawls's strategy of toleration in the face of reasonable moral
pluralism draws perfectionist criticism for its supposed inattention to, and even
preclusion of, a formative project. I argue that political liberalism's approach to
how government might engage in a formative project is an instructive guide to
developing the model of toleration as respect, which would meld feminist and
liberal commitments. In particular, I consider feminist criticisms of Rawls's
commitment to toleration as posing an obstacle to women's equality and suggest
that the gap between a political liberal and a feminist approach is narrower than
such criticisms assume. Examining debates within feminism over a formative
project, I raise a number of concerns about the viability of a perfectionist
project engaging in steering among ways of life in a pluralistic society and
suggest the comparative strength of an approach more akin to political
liberalism.
I also use the current debate over same-sex marriage to illustrate these
concerns, and to point to the comparative strength of a toleration as respect
model to undergird arguments for same-sex marriage. Here I challenge a
287 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. at 641. Thanks to my colleague
Mark Movsesian for this observation about the gulag.
288 WALZER, supra note 26, at 10, 11. Although my focus here is on pluralism of
comprehensive moral doctrines, or ways of life, the same potential for movement between the
fact and value of diversity applies to other types of diversity. A common understanding of the
United States is that it is a pluralistic society harboring many forms of diversity, including
ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity. The diagnosis of intolerance as a major social
problem is a staple of public discourse, as is the call to respect and even appreciate difference
and diversity. See, e.g., Jim Cames, Us and Them: A History of Intolerance in America
(1995) (publication of Southern Poverty Law Center's ongoing education project, Teaching
Tolerance); Rick Allen, Some Local Faces Join the "Gorgeous Mosaic", WASH. PosT, Apr.
23, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2191892 (reporting on art project inspired by coining of term
"gorgeous mosaic," by former Governor Mario Cuomo and former New York City Mayor
David Dinkins, to describe New York's cultural diversity). A serious issue that I do not
address here is the tension between a commitment to pluralism and the ideal of national unity.
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common assumption among some scholars and advocates of gay and lesbian
rights that to secure the right of marriage, it is necessary to move beyond liberal
toleration rhetoric to perfectionist, substantive moral argument.289 Instead, I
suggest that the diversity rationale for toleration supports the argument that
barring same-sex marriage enforces an intolerant gender orthodoxy. Moreover,
by raising the possibility of cultural transformation, it offers the promise of
moving beyond empty toleration.
A. The Diversity Argument in Political Liberalism
Rawls argues that government should not embrace any comprehensive
moral doctrine, whether the liberalism of Mill or Kant, the civic republicanism
of Hannah Arendt, or moral conservatism. Similarly, government should not
attempt to secure agreement upon an orthodoxy concerning the best way of life
or to discover and impose the "whole truth" in politics. He speaks of this as the
application of religious toleration to philosophy: it is left to citizens themselves
to settle the questions of religion, philosophy, and morality in accord with
views that they freely affirm.29° Instead, in light of the "fact of reasonable
pluralism" and "the fact of oppression," we should seek agreement upon a
political conception of justice, which is to establish fair terms of social
cooperation among citizens on the basis of mutual respect and trust. The basis
of social unity should not be a comprehensive moral doctrine that could not be
endorsed generally by citizens, but principles of constitutional government that
all citizens, whatever their comprehensive views, can reasonably be expected to
endorse.291
The impetus for toleration is peaceful coexistence in the face of diversity
(as contrasted with civil war), but political liberalism aims at more than a
grudging modus vivendi. It posits that persons, from within their diverse
comprehensive moral doctrines, can reach an overlapping consensus, which
undergirds and sustains a political conception of justice.292 It aims to go beyond
a modus vivendi through honoring such duties as civility and mutual respect.
289 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 99-108; Chai Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality,
and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 243 (1996) (drawing on Sandel);
Ball, supra note 207, at 1919-43 (drawing on Raz); cf. Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical
Construction of Rights, 72 NEB. L. REv. 723, 724 (1993) (calling for gay rights proponents to
move discourse from rhetoric of disapprobation, to tolerance, and finally to affirmation), cited
in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 10, 154.
291 See id. at xx, 10-15, 99, 206.
292 See id. at xxxx-xl, 146-47.
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1. Mutual Respect as a Way Beyond Empty Toleration
A toleration as respect model may usefully draw on political liberalism's
requirements of such duties as civility, mutual respect, and reciprocity. Rawls's
framework goes beyond empty toleration in several ways. First, political
liberalism aims to secure citizens' capacity for democratic and personal self-
government through according to them a set of basic liberties; citizens show
mutual respect for each other in publicly affirming such liberties.293 Second,
citizens, pursuant to the duty of civility, engage in reason-giving and attempt to
understand each other's perspectives. 294 For example, Amy Gulmann's and
Dennis Thompson's model of deliberative democracy, drawing on Rawls,
distinguishes mere toleration from mutual respect because, while both are "a
form of agreeing to disagree," mutual respect demands more: "It requires a
favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with
whom one disagrees." 295 On this model, such constructive engagement may
reduce the areas of moral disagreement in politics by reaching accommodation
that is acceptable to citizens from within their various perspectives. 296
Requiring that citizens give reasons for their positions on public policies
that can be accepted by others who do not share their comprehensive doctrines
is one way of fostering such accommodation and renouncing the quest for
comprehensiveness. For example, an appeal to the authority of the Bible as a
reason to exclude sexual orientation from antidiscrimination law or to bar same-
sex marriage would fail this test.297 But in a pluralistic society, it is likely that,
despite such engagement, there will remain areas of genuine "deliberative
disagreement," in which citizens "continue to differ about basic moral
principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually justifiable." 298
Third, citizens within political liberalism show mutual respect by not using
the political process to impose their comprehensive moral views on other
citizens. Rather, they abide by an ideal of reciprocity, and desire "for its own
293 See RAwLs, supra note 6, at 319.
294 See id. at 217.
295 GUTMArN & THOMNSON, supra note 121, at 79.
296 See id. Just as political liberalism supposes that citizens with diverse comprehensive
moral doctrines can reach an overlapping consensus on principles of justice to structure the
polity, so too there is an appeal to overlapping consensus in deliberating about and agreeing
upon specific policies. See RAwI.s, supra note 6, at 14-15, 144-54, 213-18.
297 Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 56-57 (discussing biblical
opposition to miscegenation).
298 Id. at 73. Gutmann and Thompson regard abortion as a likely example of such
genmine deliberative disagreement. See supra text accompanying note 278.
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sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others
on terms all can accept." 299 These aspects of Rawls's account derive from an
assumption that because reasonable moral pluralism is inevitable in a
democratic culture in which persons are free to exercise their moral powers,
and not to be regretted, political liberalism's distinction between the political
and the comprehensive is appropriate. Gutmann and Thompson state: "In a
pluralist society, comprehensive moral conceptions neither can nor would win
the assent of reasonable citizens. A deliberative perspective for such societies
must reject the unqualified quest for agreement because it must renounce the
claim to comprehensiveness. 300
Political liberalism's approach to moral pluralism fails to satisfy
perfectionist critics who charge that linedrawing between the comprehensive
and the political is neither a feasible nor an attractive response to pluralism. For
example, Sandel launches two criticisms going in different directions. First, if
there is "reasonable moral pluralism" concerning comprehensive moral
doctrines, there may also be diversity concerning conceptions of justice, which
would make securing agreement in politics more difficult than Rawls posits.
Second, if political liberalism assumes that citizens, despite diverse
comprehensive moral views, can reach agreement that certain principles of
justice are more reasonable than others, then why not assume that citizens can
and should similarly reason that certain comprehensive moral doctrines are
more reasonable than others, so that government need not be neutral among
them? 301
There is no simple answer to Sandel's first criticism, other than to say that
history offers evidence that it is in fact easier to secure ag-. ement upon a
political framework of basic liberties than upon a shared conception of the
good.302 As to the second criticism, Sandel's own republicanism suggests the
difficulty of reaching such agreement on conceptions of the good, making his
republican project vulnerable to the criticism that it is unattainable. To a
surprising degree, Sandel's pluralistic republicanism parallels political
liberalism in recognizing diversity and moral pluralism as inevitable features of
contemporary American society and in renouncing the quest for a unitary
common good. 303 Although he claims that his republicanism will better satisfy
299 RAwLs, supra note 6, at 50.
300 GurmANN & THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 92.
301 See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. RaV. 1765, 1783-86
(1994) (reviewing RAWi s, supra note 6).
302 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 133-72.
303 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 318-21.
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citizens' longings for moral argument in the political arena than political
liberalism, he concedes that it offers no guarantees of agreement or even of
appreciation for the moral and religious convictions of others. 304
2. Does Political Liberalism's Commitment to Toleration Rule out a
"Formative Project" of Promoting Self-Government?
A reasonable inference from political liberalism's rejection of the quest for
a unitary comprehensive moral view is that governmental moralizing in the
service of a particular way of life is inappropriate and oppressive. 30 5 Indeed,
the very notion of governmental moralizing concerning the good may sound
odd within a Rawlsian framework. But does the renunciation of a government-
fostered comprehensive moral doctrine mean that government may not play any
role in shaping citizens and promoting values? Sandel certainly thinks so, and
criticizes Rawls's "minimalist" liberalism as barring a formative project.306
Similarly, perfectionist liberal critics such as Raz depart from Rawls because of
his supposed requirement of "neutrality" and narrow conception of
government's role in shaping citizens and promoting values.307 They charge
that government should promote the well-being of its citizens; government must
represent and promote some values (such as autonomy).30 8
Feminist critics fault political liberalism for its supposed inattention to the
preconditions for women's self-government as well as the supposed limits that it
places upon using government to advance feminist goals. In particular, a
number of feminists endorse Susan Moller Okin's well-known critique of
Rawls's theory of justice for its inattention to the problem of injustice within the
family.309 Okin charges that the unjust division of labor within the family-
whereby women bear primary responsibility for household labor and
childcare-impairs women's capacities as citizens and their abilities to pursue
304 See Sandel, supra note 301, at 1794.
305 For example, although Rawls generally does not speak in terms of "neutrality"
(which he considers an "unfortunate, misleading term"), his account of liberalism does
embrace what he calls neutrality of aim: that society should not design basic institutions to
favor any particular comprehensive doctrine. See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 191-94.
3 06 See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 4-7.
307 See GASroN, supra note 36, at 140-62; RAz, supra note 13, at 124-33.
308 See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 36, at 404-16 (arguing against political liberalism
and for comprehensive liberalism).
309 See OKIN, supra note 54; Okin, supra note 54. For examples of Okin's influence,
see Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L.
REy. 1860 (1994); Yuracko, supra note 46.
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their conceptions of the good (exacerbated by, e.g., employment discrimination
encouraging women to invest in childrearing rather than market labor) and may
thwart the development in children of a sense of justice and of the capacities
necessary for the exercise of their moral powers. 310 Rawls's theory, Okln
further claims, puts liberal toleration squarely in conflict with sex equality, for
it requires toleration of comprehensive moral doctrines (such as those of some
religious fundamentalists) that espouse or require such a sexist division of labor
between women and men. 311
Is Rawls's political liberalism vulnerable to these various criticisms? The
gap between Rawls and his critics as to government's authority to pursue a
formative project fostering citizens' capacities for self-government is not as
great as it might appear. A model of toleration as respect would usefully build
upon the common ground between political liberalism and its perfectionist
critics.
First, Rawls's political liberalism recognizes a proper role for government
in helping to develop the moral powers, or moral capacities of citizens, to
prepare them for self-governing citizenship. Rawls posits two moral powers
pertaining to self-government in the senses of deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy: the capacity for a conception of justice and the capacity
for a conception of the good.312 According persons a set of basic rights,
liberties, and opportunities, and means such as income and wealth helps them to
develop and exercise these moral powers, by providing them with the "primary
goods" that citizens need to be free and equal. 313 Political liberalism's
conception of a "good" political society is one in which citizens can develop
and exercise such moral powers and have the social bases of "mutual self-
respect." 314 Thus, government has a responsibility to facilitate the ability of
citizens to live good lives, however they may define such lives.
A primary mechanism that political liberalism supports-as do a wide range
of liberals, civic republicans, and deliberative democrats-is compulsory
310 See id. at 35-39; OIN, supra note 54, at 97-101. For a thoughtful evaluation of this
feminist criticism, see S.A. Lloyd, Situating a Feminist Criticism of John Rawls's Political
Liberalism, 28 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 1319 (1995). Rawls's response to Okin's criticism is
addressed in text infra accompanying notes 330-36.
311 See Okmn, supra note 54, at 28.
312 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 19. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for my
usage of the terms "deliberative democracy" and "deliberative autonomy."
313 See id. at 178-81, 325, 331-34.
314 Id. at 202-03. Feminist legal scholar Drucilla Cornell enlists Raws's emphasis upon
the primary good of self-respect in her proposed redefinition of sexual harassment law. See
DRUCILLA CORNEL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN 168-227 (1995).
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education of children to prepare them for citizenship. To honor the
requirements of toleration, Rawls seeks to avoid inculcating children in a
comprehensive, rather than a political, liberal conception; for example, to
respect the rights of persons whose religions reject the modem world and such
values as individuality and autonomy. Nonetheless, Rawls states that education
should prepare children to be "fully cooperating members of society," able to
understand and participate in the public culture, and should "encourage the
political virtues" (such as social cooperation). 315 It should educate them as to
their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, "they know that liberty
of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime. "316
Of course, the goal of a democratic education that simultaneously prepares
children to live in a diverse, morally pluralistic society, in which toleration is a
virtue, and attempts to respect the rights of parents to instruct their children in a
particular way of life that rejects such "modem" values as toleration is difficult
(and perhaps unattainable). 317 That education concerning liberal virtues and
rights to freedom of conscience may have a withering effect on illiberal
doctrines is undeniable. 318 Rawls's strategy may be too modest for those who
argue that preparation for self-government must include developing the capacity
for critical reflection about ways of life, including one's own.319 At the same
time, this strategy is too overreaching for those who contend that education in
such liberal virtues as diversity, tolerance, and freedom to choose one's way of
life enforces "secular humanism" and has a corrosive effect on the world views
of persons with fundamentalist religious convictions, who reject such liberal
values as critical reflection upon ways of life. 320 Resolving this controversy is
not my aim: the point is that political liberalism recognizes governmental
responsibility to develop citizens' moral capacities.
With respect to adults, political liberalism attempts to foster citizens'
capacities for self-government through meeting citizens' needs and securing
315 RAwLs, supra note 6, at 199.
316 Id.
317 For an argument that teaching tolerance is intolerant because it threatens the
fundamentalists' way of life, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me
Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 581 (1993).
318 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 199-200; MACEDiO, supra note 48, at 253,268-69.
3 19 See AMY GuMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); Suzanna Sherry,
Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CI. L. REv. 131 (1995).
32 0 See GALSrON, supra note 36, at 251-55; Stolzenberg, supra note 317. For a defense
of liberal education against this sort of criticism, see STEmEN MACEDO, Du rY AND
Dsrausr (forthcoming 1998).
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basic liberties pertaining to democratic and personal self-government. To make
these liberties meaningful, government should undertake an array of facilitative
measures, such as supporting education and the arts, insuring fair or equal
opportunity, engaging in economic redistribution, and fostering political
participation. 321 Thus, while the goal is not comprehensive liberal autonomy,
but political autonomy, there is much government can and should do under the
rubric of fostering citizenship and the development and exercise of the two
moral powers. Indeed, it is arguable that what truly separates perfectionism that
stresses self-government and political liberalism is how the argument for such
governmental responsibility is made: perfectionists appeal to furthering human
goods, while political liberals appeal to fostering citizenship. 322
Second, while it would be odd to use the term "governmental moralizing"
concerning the good from within a political liberal framework, political
liberalism would support governmental persuasion in the form of promoting
political (or public) values such as the equal citizenship of women and
discouraging beliefs or conduct that undermine such values. Contrary to
Sandel's stark dichotomy between liberalism and republicanism, Rawls claims
that political liberalism and classical republicanism are compatible with respect
to the idea that citizens must have political virtues and be willing to take part in
public life.323 Rawls allows that society may affirm the superiority of certain
forms of moral character and affirm moral virtues linked to justice as fairness,
for example, the virtues of tolerance, civility, reciprocity, and cooperation. 324
The key distinction with respect to appropriate and inappropriate governmental
persuasion is between promoting virtues (or values) characterizing the ideal of
the good citizen and promoting virtues characterizing ways of life belonging to
particular comprehensive moral doctrines.325 Put another way, subject to this
limit, political liberalism would allow government engaging in "norm
management," or seeking to shape social meanings, to encourage compliance
with law, acceptance of the principles of justice and political virtues, and
3 2 1 Frank Michelman's Rawlsian arguments for constitutional welfare rights are one
example. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of
Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
962(1973).
3 22 See Will Kymlicka, Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends or
Enemies?, in DEBATiNG DEMOCRACY's DIscoNTEN (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr.
eds., forthcoming 1998).
323 See RAWLs, supra note 6, at 205.
324 See id. at 194.
325 See id. at 194-95.
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development of citizens' capacities for self-government.326
Although political liberalism is not coextensive with feminist perfectionism,
a considerable number of feminist goals can be pursued within a political liberal
framework through the appeal to the political value of equal citizenship. For a
model of toleration as respect, the crucial point is that it is possible to seek to
secure the equal citizenship of women and foster women's self-government
without explicitly embracing perfectionism. Within a political liberal
framework, government need not be "neutral" as between the equality of
women and the subordination of women. Liberal toleration does not extend to
"unreasonable" comprehensive moral doctrines, for example, those that seek to
use government to deny or violate the basic rights and liberties of women or
other groups of citizens. 327 Government may use coercion to secure women's
equal citizenship and basic liberties. Thus, antidiscrimination laws such as Title
VII appropriately reach "private" power by limiting freedom of employers and
employees to discriminate for the sake of securing the equality of citizens, just
as the Violence Against Women Act properly protects women against "private"
violence. 328 Government could engage in "norm management" to enlist public
support for the political value of the equal citizenship of women, such as
campaigns against domestic violence or employment discrimination. Further,
invoking Rawls's statement that "[t]he same equality of the Declaration of
Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be invoked to
condemn the inequality and oppression of women," Okin suggests that political
liberalism could-and should-embrace an anticaste or antisubordination
principle to advance the substantive equality of women.329
326 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 907-10. Beyond such easy examples as antilittering or
recycling campaigns, see id. at 904-07, government could discourage religious and racial
discrimination to foster toleration (in a manner consistent with protections of freedom of
conscience and speech), just as it could campaign against drug addiction and alcoholism
because of their destructive effects on the capacity for citizenship. See RAWLS, supra note 6,
at 195 (referring to racial and religious toleration). Thanks to John Rawls for suggesting the
drug example in conversation.
327 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 151, 187, 193.
328 See The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994).
Thus, it would be possible to argue for restrictions on pornography if they were necessary to
secure the equal basic liberties of women. The vision of governmental "neutrality" that Judge
Easterbrook articulates in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), whereby government must treat the equality of
women as just another point of view, is not required by political liberalism. Similarly, a
Rawlsian approach to hate speech might differ from the Court's approach in R.A. V. v. City of
St. Paid, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
329 Okin, supra note 54, at 25, 39-43 (quoting and discussing RAWLS, supra note 6, at
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A third and related point is that the principle that government should not
prefer and promote one comprehensive moral doctrine over others does not
mean that government may not regulate the basic institutions of society in which
"personal" or "private" life is lived. Although political liberalism does not
require that the principles of political justice directly regulate the internal life of
families, they do impose constraints upon the family. Responding to Okin in a
recent writing, Rawls grants that his account of liberalism in A Theory of
Justice paid insufficient attention to the question of justice within the family, but
clarifies that "[I]f the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt
from justice, then there is no such thing" within political liberalism: "The equal
rights of women and the basic rights of their children as future citizens are
inalienable and protect them wherever they are." 330 The argument for
toleration of reasonable moral pluralism does not embrace a principle that
redressing private violence and subordination are not the proper business of
government.
Moreover, Rawls appears to grant Okin's criticism that injustice within the
family could impair not only women's equal citizenship but the capacity of
children to develop their moral powers and to be fully cooperating members of
society. He invokes Mill's condemnation of the family as a "school for male
despotism," which inculcated antidemocratic habits of thought, feeling, and
conduct. 331 So too, today, Rawls argues, if injustices within the family
"undermine children's capacity to acquire the political virtues required of future
citizens in a viable democratic society," then "the principles of justice enjoining
a reasonable constitutional democratic society can plainly be invoked to reform
the family." 332 In particular, Rawls targets the "long and historic injustice" that
women have borne and continue to bear in shouldering "an unjust share of the
task of raising, nurturing and caring for their children," and notes that, when
divorce laws further disadvantage women, bearing this burden makes them
"highly vulnerable. ,333
Political liberalism's commitment to toleration and such basic liberties as
freedom of conscience requires that government cannot mandate the equal
division of labor in the family or forbid a gendered division of labor. Instead,
political liberalism would aim at a "social condition" in which the "involuntary
xxix).
330 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CmI. L. REV. 765, 791
(1997).
331 Id. at 790 (discussing MILL, supra note 8, at 283-98).
332 Id. at 790-91.
333 Id. at 790.
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division of labor" in the family must be "reduced to zero," but would permit
any remaining "voluntary" division of labor (e.g., employment discrimination
in the workplace, which may contribute to women's "preferences" in the
household division of labor by making a gendered division seem the "rational"
and less costly thing to do, should be forbidden). 334 Such political values as the
equality of women and basic rights of children require that government protect
women and children against private violence and abuse in the home. Arguably,
adequate child care, flex time, and family leave should be required.335 And, if a
"basic... cause of women's inequality is their greater share in the bearing,
nurturing, and caring for children in the traditional division of labor within the
family, steps need to be taken either to equalize their share, or to compensate
them for it" (e.g., upon divorce, giving wives an equal share in a husband's
income earned during marriage). 336 And although government may not
mandate the equal division of labor in the household, presumably public schools
could use educational materials showing girls and boys in roles challenging the
traditional gendered division of labor in the family, to the extent that such
modelling could serve to "eliminate 'differences in their basic liberties and
opportunities. 337
However, with the adoption of these and other necessary measures (which
resemble feminist proposals), political liberalism would permit "voluntary"
divisions of labor, for example, adopted by people on the basis of their
comprehensive moral doctrines in a society in which workplace discrimination
against women and other forms of disadvantage do not steer women toward
such division. Would a gap remain between Rawls's attempt to secure women's
equal citizenship and a feminist program to secure justice within the family?
Okin, who advocates an ideal of a genderless family, undoubtedly would
embrace the goal of reducing the involuntary division of labor, but might
contend that Rawls's commitment to toleration of "voluntary" divisions
conflicts with women's equality, because of the threat that certain
comprehensive moral doctrines pose to women's self-conception and to
children's development. 338
3 34 Id. at 791-92.
335 See Lloyd, supra note 310, at 1331-32.
336 Rawls, supra note 330, at 792-93. Many feminists would also support measures
designed to treat housework done by wives as wage work or taxable income, on the theory
that such measures would recognize its value.
3 37 GUMIANN & THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 63-67 (defending, against a
fundamentalist Christian challenge, a reading exercise picturing a boy cooking while a girl
reads to him).
338 See Okn, supra note 54, at 29-39; see also loyd, supra note 310, at 1322-38
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If Okin is correct, this would pose a serious problem for Rawls's stance of
toleration and would provide support for adopting a more "comprehensive"
feminist standard for justice within the family.339 But, as Okin acknowledges,
resolving this feminist challenge to toleration depends in part upon evaluating
difficult empirical questions. 340 For example, does exposure to gender injustice
within the family cause women to adapt their preferences, so that they
internalize and accept such injustice as the normal or natural course of affairs,
thus raising the question of the "voluntariness" of their acceptance? Or does it
(as both the history of feminism and women's personal histories often suggest)
provoke a keen awareness of the need for gender justice?341 An important
variable is the formative role of other institutions of civil society and the public
culture: the impact of family hierarchy may be quite different in a society that
reinforces such hierarchy than in a (political liberal/feminist) society that is
committed to the basic rights, liberties, and equal opportunities of women and
men.
342
At the same time, political liberalism's commitment to toleration of diverse
family forms that reflect reasonable moral pluralism, and its eschewal of
government mandating particular family forms or internal structures, may make
it appealing to feminists, gay rights advocates, and others who seek more
inclusive definitions of family. Political liberalism takes a functional approach
to the family and to the rights of gay men and lesbians to be parents: "[N]o
particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is
required by a political conception of justice so long as the family is arranged to
fulfill [its] tasks effectively and doesn't run afoul of other political values. 343
(elaborating Okin's criticism).
339 See Lloyd, supra note 310, at 1332-38.
340 See Okn, supra note 54, at 38 n.32.
341 See id.; Lloyd, supra note 310, at 1336-38.
342 Okin gives the example of women in Druze Arab families in Israel, who could not
resist the power of the male family head over their activities and decisions, which they
regarded as unfair, "because of the sanctions-including being thrown out of the house,
beaten, or divorced-that disobedience was likely to invoke." Okin, supra note 54, at 36-37.
But a political liberal society would prohibit such "sanctions" as violence and divorce laws
that unjustly disadvantage women.
343 Raws, supra note 330, at 788 n.60. Within political liberalism, the family is part of
the basic structure of society, because "one of its main roles is to be the basis of the orderly
production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to the next." Id. at
788. But here I would caution that, in the case of single parent families, in which poverty is a
major variable affecting the well-being of children, a functional approach that uncritically
accepted the existing status quo of economic distribution might fail to consider appropriate
questions of collective responsibility. See FnM m, supra note 237, at 101-25, 226-36;
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Rawls continues: "[A] central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable
and effective way the raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral
development and education into the wider culture" through, for example,
providing children with a sense of justice and the political virtues that support
political and social institutions.344
Political liberalism's approach, indeed, is similar to that taken in the recent
Hawaii case of Baehr v. Miike.345 The court held that because the state failed to
demonstrate that its compelling interest in the optimal development of children
required that families consist of married, biological (or at least heterosexual)
parents, excluding gay men and lesbians from marriage was unconstitutional. 346
Gay and lesbian parents, the state's own experts testified, can be "as fit and
loving parents, as non-gay men and women and different-sex couples." 347
Thus, in contrast to prior state court opinions finding that, because raising
children is a primary purpose of marriage, gay men and lesbians were
incapable of entering into it, the Hawaii court found a significant resemblance
between same-sex families and heterosexual families.348 The Baehr court's
analysis resembles a toleration as respect model in its approach to justification
and reason-giving: evaluation of the state's asserted interest in the optimal
development of children took place, not through a no-holds-barred airing of
competing comprehensive moral doctrines, biases, and prejudices of citizens
concerning gay and lesbian parents, but through a focused inquiry into the
actual competencies of such parents. To the extent the court overtly embraced
moral values, they were of pluralism and diversity: the common, or political,
value is that of a nurturant relationship between parent and child, but there is a
"diversity in the structure and configuration of families" that provides this
relationship. 349
In sum, the distinction between the political and the comprehensive in
Rawls's political liberalism does not bar government from undertaking a
formative project of helping members of society attain the preconditions for
self-government, nor does it tie government's hands from addressing "private"
sources of injustice threatening such self-government. A toleration as respect
model could usefully build on Rawls's framework and upon the considerable
McClain, supra note 237, at 408-19.
344 Id. at 788.
345 No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
346 See id. at *18, *22.
347 Id. at *17.
348 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
349 Baehr, 1996 WL 694235 at *17.
[Vol. 59:19
TOLERA TYONAS RESPECT
common ground among civic republicans, feminists, and political and
perfectionist liberals to argue for the responsibility of government to help
persons develop their moral capacities for self-government and, to that extent,
live good lives. Moreover, Rawls's relative silence on just what government
may and should do to further these ends does not preclude a toleration as
respect model from elaborating a fuller account of such governmental duty by
melding feminist principles with a political liberal framework (as Okin's
invocation of an anticaste principle and her own liberal feminist work
suggests). 350
Political liberalism's renunciation of a comprehensive moral doctrine as the
basis for social cooperation may be too modest for perfectionists who have a
more ambitious conception of government's responsibility to secure agency and
autonomy. But political liberalism's very modesty reflects a strategy, adopted in
response to the challenge of moral pluralism, for establishing a stable polity that
includes groups and individuals who differ deeply on what it means to live a
good life. Similarly, the ideals of reciprocity and mutual respect aim to secure
more than empty or grudging toleration in a morally pluralistic society. If
perfectionists believe that it is better to battle and win in the political arena for
their "whole truth" (notwithstanding the competing moral perspectives of the
losers in the battle) as a blueprint for what it means to live a good life, then
political liberalism's agenda is insufficiently ambitious for them. But do
perfectionists offer a viable alternative that takes seriously respect for persons'
moral powers and for reasonable moral pluralism? Is perfectionism compatible
with the impulse to move beyond empty toleration to respect?
B. The Implications of the Diversity Rationale for Government's
Formative Project
1. Perfectionism in the Face of Moral Pluralism
Civic republican, feminist, and liberal perfectionists all accept, to some
degree, the fact as well as the value of diversity. But in contrast to Rawls's
eschewal of government promoting the virtues of one comprehensive moral
doctrine over another, they support government fostering good lives through
350 See, e.g., OJIN, supra note 54, at 101-09 (advocating feminist potential of Rawls's
difference principle); Susan Moller Old, Gender Inequality and Cultural Differences, 22
POL. THEORY 5 (1994) (doing same in context of international development and women's
status); see also CORNELL, supra note 314, at 8-20, 167-237 (enlisting and reworking
Rawls's concepts of public reason, reasonableness, and the good of self-respect to argue for
redefining sexual harassment).
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favoring certain ways of life over others. For example, perfectionist liberals
argue that the liberal commitment to human autonomy (or agency) and diversity
requires that government refrain from compulsion to do so, not that it refrain
from making moral distinctions and educating and persuading in the direction of
superior ways of life. 351
But perfectionists generally do not offer an account of the institutional
arrangements needed to carry out government's perfectionist project. 352 Nor do
they offer much guidance on how to resolve a number of difficult questions
concerning the pursuit of a formative project in a diverse polity, which include
such concerns as whose perfectionism is to inform government's project and
how to resolve conflicts over the content of a good life. Here I use the debate
over same-sex marriage and debates within feminist theory to highlight some of
those questions. I conclude that a model of toleration as respect should not
embrace such a perfectionist project without a resolution of such questions and
a clearer picture of its practical institutional application. I also suggest how a
toleration as respect model, shaped by the diversity rationale, might offer
comparative strengths over a more explicitly perfectionist model.
a. Whose Perfectionism?: The Example of Same-Sex Marriage
Let us take as a point of departure the perfectionist proposition that the
recognition of pluralism and a concomitant commitment to toleration should not
preclude government from helping citizens live good, self-governing lives by
steering them toward better and away from worse choices. Raz, for example,
posits a governmental obligation to provide citizens with an adequate range of
options so that they can make morally worthy choices.353 But whose
perfectionism should supply the content of what it means to live a good life and
what range of options would facilitate that goal?
Compare the following calls for a perfectionistic politics, both inspired by
Raz:
We should strive for a perfectionist moral pluralism that does not prescribe one
351 See GAiSrON, supra note 36, at 222; RAZ, supra note 13, at 400-29.
352 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 13, at 427-29 (stating that The Morality of Freedom does
not concern the appropriate institutional framework for his pluralistic perfectionism); SANDEL,
supra note 3, at 317-51 (concluding with some speculations about how to revitalize the civic
strand of freedom); Higgins, supra note 47, at 1700-03 (calling for, but not elaborating,
feminist model of politics entailing governmental responsibility for shaping norms and for
applying standard of gender justice).
353 See RAZ, supra note 13, at 205-06.
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set of values and activities as necessary for the good life, but recognizes that
certain conceptions of the good are demeaning and harmful and should be
socially discouraged or curtailed. 354
[A] sound perfectionism recognizes both that human flourishing is advanced by
having a broad array of morally valuable choices and that a diversity of evil
choices contributes nothing of practical value to human beings. 355
The first call comes from a radical feminist perfectionist, and the second
from a conservative natural law perfectionist. But is government to embrace a
feminist perfectionism, calling for such goods as self-love (i.e., for women
valuing themselves as much as they value others) and having an "autonomous
conception" of one's own life and goals "not formed under threat or
coercion"?356 Or is it to further a natural law vision of pluralistic perfectionism,
which affirms persons' right to make "morally upright" choices reflecting the
exercise of "practical reasonableness" and the goods of "authenticity" and
"integrity"? 357
If there could be agreement upon such goods as "autonomy,"
"authenticity," and "integrity," who is to define their content and what range of
options best secures them? The example of same-sex marriage is instructive.
First, "integrity" is often mentioned in feminist work as a goal, but few
feminists (I assume) would concur in its deployment by some prominent natural
law scholars to condemn same-sex intimate association (and all other sexual acts
lacking procreative intent) as immoral because they damage personal
integrity. 358
Second, should government afford gay men and lesbians the right to marry
because doing so provides them options for exercising their autonomy to make
morally worthy choices, and thus to live good lives? Or should it discourage or
even "curtail" such marriages because they fail to secure morally valuable
354 Yuracko, supra note 46, at 48.
355 GEORGE, supra note 70, at 191.
356 yuraeko, supra note 46, at 47.
357 GEORGE, supra note 70, at 176-77.
358 See Finnis, supra note 199, at 1063-70; George, supra note 278, at 2497-98. For a
sound critique, see Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO.
L.J 261 (1995). "Authenticity" is also a goal in some feminist writing, but again, feminist
conceptions are likely to differ from more conservative ones. See, e.g., Ruth Colker,
Feminism, Sexuality, and Self A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U.
L. REv. 217 (1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MAcKNNoN, FEmisM UNMODIFD
(1987)).
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goods and reflect "demeaning and harmful" conceptions of the good? Using the
example of marriage, Raz observes that individuals depend upon cultural
reinforcement in order to make valuable choices. He notes that if monogamy is
the only morally valuable form of marriage, then it requires cultural
reinforcement, support, and recognition.359 Further, societies that do not permit
same-sex marriage and thus do not recognize it as a collective good deny gay
men and lesbians the option of participating in and benefitting from the existing
social framework. 360 The pluralistic perfectionism advocated by natural law
scholar Robert George draws from Raz a societal duty to support and recognize
the institution of monogamous marriage.361 Government has an obligation to
make marriage available to people "capable of fulfilling its requirements," but
he contends that gay men and lesbians lack the capacity to realize the values or
goods of marriage (procreative sex and friendship), and therefore that
government does not treat them unequally when it denies them this option.362 In
contrast, gay rights scholar Carlos Ball enlists Raz to argue for government's
obligation to foster the autonomy of gay men and lesbians by extending the
option of marriage to them and allowing them to realize the substantive moral
goods of marriage. 363
How, and with what criteria, is a perfectionist government to resolve this
conflict over the proper range of options to afford citizens? After all, arguments
that government should discourage or prohibit repugnant, immoral, and
offensive social practices served to justify antimiscegenation laws, segregation,
bans on birth control and abortion, and the punishment of fornication and
sodomy, and continue to buttress opposition to same-sex marriage. 364 Raz
offers little guidance as to what criteria to use in assessing such arguments and
notes that government faces many practical problems in properly distinguishing
among ways of life based on their worth. 365 If one accepts, as Raz does, the
idea of moral pluralism and that there are incommensurable human goods, the
359 See RAz, supra note 13, at 162.
360 See id. at 205-06.
361 See GEORGE, supra note 70, at 163-66.
362 George, supra note 278, at 2501.
363 Ball, supra note 207, at 1883-95; see also Feldblum, supra note 289, at 331-35
(arguing for the morality of gay love).
364 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (striking down
miscegenation law premised on ideology of white supremacy and appeals to divine
proscription on mixing races). On moral objections to same-sex marriage, see Finnis, supra
note 199.
365 See RAz, supra note 13, at 412, 427-28.
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task seems formidable. 366
For similar reasons, Sandel's call to justify rights based upon the moral
worth of the social practices that they protect, rather than the value of choice
itself, seems likely to lead to unresolvable moral conflict rather than a more
secure foundation for, say, same-sex marriage. Sandel may overestimate the
power of analogy about moral goods to move citizens from grudging toleration
to respect and appreciation, especially without any clear criteria for what counts
as a moral argument and how judges, legislators, and citizens should evaluate
such arguments. How are we to evaluate arguments that same-sex marriage and
families allow the realization of substantive moral goods as against arguments
that such unions and families are immoral, harmful to the participants, and
threaten the institution of marriage? Sandel seeks to open the "naked public
square" to persons' substantive moral and religious convictions, but he gives
little guidance about how to guard against the triumph of "intolerant
moralisms." 367
b. The Parameters of a Toleration as Respect Argument for Same-Sex
Marriage
In contrast, toleration as respect insists upon the equal basic liberties of
citizens and imposes on the deliberative process the requirements of reason-
giving and such duties as mutual respect and civility. As discussed above, the
recent Hawaii case of Baehr v. Miike offers one helpful example of the
requirement of reason-giving. The court carefully evaluated the state's
assertions concerning the capacities of same-sex parents and rejected its
unsubstantiated claims that same-sex marriage adversely affected or prejudiced
the institution of marriage and society, stating that "a mere feeling of distaste or
even revulsion" due to offense to majority values "cannot justify inherently
discriminatory legislation" against a protected class.368 By embracing political
366 See id. at 395-99, 401-07. Indeed, he predicts that the practical inability of
government to discharge its duty to foster autonomy will lead to a "much more extensive
freedom from governmental action" (or negative liberty) than his doctrine of autonomy-based
freedom requires, with a result that persons will lack freedom in the robust sense that he
advocates. Id. at 428.
367 See Sandel, supra note 301, at 1794.
368 Baehr v. Miike, CIY. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 307, 355-56 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Here, the basis for such protection was sex,
i.e., the sex of the persons seeking to marry. The State of Hawaii articulated such interests as
preserving the traditional definition of marriage and the threat posed by same-sex marriage,.
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liberalism's bar on citizens' attempting to enforce their comprehensive moral
doctrines in politics and to appeal to positions that cannot reasonably be
accepted by others who do not share those doctrines, toleration as respect
would reject as unreasonable the appeal to Biblical condemnations, just as it
would reject arguments against same-sex marriage based upon sectarian
ideologies confining the goods of marriage to procreative sexuality. 369
Moreover, toleration as respect guards against state enforcement of
orthodoxy, and prohibiting such marriages rests upon an unjust orthodoxy
about gender roles and sexuality. An argument arising from toleration and the
diversity rationale could fortify feminist and gay rights scholarship condemning
the ban on same-sex marriage as a form of sex discrimination. 370 Such scholars
argue that defining marriage as between a man and a woman reflects a gender
ideology about proper male and female roles. The history of marriage reveals
an institution premised upon a hierarchical relationship of male authority,
prerogatives, and powers over the person and property of the female, whose
very role as wife carried duties of obedience and service. Gay and lesbian
relationships threaten this gender ideology because they "deny the traditional
belief and prescription that stable relations require the hierarchy and reciprocity
of male/female polarity." 371 They also deviate from a gender role ideology that
male desire should be directed only at females, and vice versa, similarly
threatening the naturalness and inevitability of heterosexuality. Such theorists
find (as did the Hawaii court) a powerful analogy in Loving v. Virginia, in
which the Court struck down Virginia's antimiscegenation law because it lacked
any basis other than furthering a governmental orthodoxy of white
but the court concluded that the state presented "meager" evidence on this and on any adverse
effects of same-sex marriage on the institution of traditional marriage. Id. at *17.
369 1 refer to the natural law arguments made by John Finais and Robert George,
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 358 & 362. For a critique of such arguments as
sectarian and failing to meet the criteria of public reasonableness, see RIcHARDS, supra note
9, at 444-47; Macedo, supra note 358, at 278-98. But see George, supra note 278, at 2495-
2501 (arguing that natural law view of the goods of marriage does appeal to reasons that other
citizens can affirm). The Court's contraception cases contradict such a narrow understanding
of marital sexuality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court's prior contraception precedents support the right of
consenting adults to engage in "nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider
offensive or immoral").
370 For such sex discrimination arguments, see ANDREw KOPPELMAN,
ANTDmISCRIMINAnON LAW AND SOcIAL EQUAITY (1996); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and
the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. Rnv. 187 (1988).
371 Law, supra note 370, at 218.
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supremacy. 372
Building on these analyses, a toleration as respect model adds the argument
that the prohibition of same-sex marriage imposes an intolerant, unjust, and
sectarian governmental orthodoxy about gender. In recent work, liberal
constitutional scholar David Richards offers an illuminating example of such an
argument. He labels political homophobia a "constitutionally illegitimate
expression of religious intolerance" that is suspect under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments and argues for same-sex marriage as part of the basic
human right to conscience and to respect for the dignity, moral agency, and
moral independence of gay men and lesbians.373 Such a right can be denied
only on compelling grounds of public reason, not sectarian views. Analogizing
to the basic denial of human rights to African Americans and women, he uses
the compelling image of "moral slavery" to describe the harm inflicted upon
gay men and lesbians by society's imposition of an "unjust cultural orthodoxy"
concerning proper gender roles. 374 He argues for an interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment that forbids such moral slavery of a whole class of
persons on illegitimate grounds, and for an analogous interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment that would lead to the protection of rights of
conscience, intimate life, and the like for such persons. 375 Using the concept of
the "paradox of intolerance," Richards argues that, throughout American
history, society has imposed such an unjust orthodoxy (or what feminist
scholars call "compulsory heterosexuality" 376), reflecting sectarian views,
precisely at the point at which debate about gender roles, sexuality, and such
institutions as marriage is most needed. 377 Here Richards's analysis usefully
builds upon scholarship calling into question the sort of reductive and
372 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61-63 (Haw. 1993) (discussing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); KOPPELM AN, supra note 370, at 153-58 (analogizing
antiiniscegenation laws to laws barring same-sex marriage). The Hawaii court concluded that
Hawaii impermissibly denied same-sex couples the right to marry merely because of the sex
of one member of the couple; i.e., if a woman had sought to marry a man, instead of a
woman, she would have been permitted to do so. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59-67.
373 See RICHARDS, supra note 9, at 357, 359-60.
374 See id. at 352-53.
375 See id. at 354; see also PEGGY DAvIs, NEGiEC STORIES: THE CoNSIrUTION
AND FAMILY VALUES 226-41 (1997) (drawing upon the Fourteenth Amendment's antislavery
history to advance autonomy principle relating to rights of family that would support same-sex
marriage).
37 6 See Adrienne Rich, Compul/ory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in POWERS
OF DESIRE 177 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
377 See RICHARDS, supra note 9, at 448-52, 459-66.
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monolithic treatment of history and tradition concerning sexuality found in
Bowers and suggesting a history of greater diversity of forms of intimate
association and family. 378
A toleration as respect model contends that allowing same-sex marriage
recognizes the diversity among persons concerning their conceptions of the
good and the intimate relationships they seek to secure. 379 At a minimum,
permitting same-sex marriage accepts the fact of diversity and properly affords
to gay men and lesbians the cultural resources to engage in the exercise of their
moral powers. But doing so also allows room to move from the fact to the
value of diversity. Recognizing the right to same-sex marriage allows for
discourse and engagement among citizens about society's sexual practices and
the meaning and goods of marriage. Gay rights and feminist scholars stress that
such cultural transformation can extend to a critique of dominant orthodoxies
about gender, family, and sexuality, and even to a reconceptualization of the
existing institution of heterosexual marriage. 380 The examples of gay and
37 8 See WLim N. ESKRIDGE, JR., Tim CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996).
379 See Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and
Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567, 585-
87 (1994-1995). One intra-community critique of the quest for same-sex marriage is that it is
not a "path to liberation" for gay men and lesbians, but "runs contrary to two of the primary
goals of the lesbian and gay movement: the affirmation of gay identity and culture and the
validation of many forms of relationships." Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a
Path to Liberation?, in LmsBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 20, 21 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992).
Privileging marriage above all other forms of gay and lesbian relationships would also thwart
the goals of "providing tree alternatives to marriage and of radically reordering society's view
of family." Id. at 26. For similar arguments, see Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We
Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not 'Dismantle the Legal Structure
of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). Here I do not seek to resolve
this debate, but I should say that I do think that affording gay men and lesbians the right to
marry is a vital step in achieving legal and social equality and respect, and is consistent with a
commitment to diversity. It would allow the many gay men and lesbians who wish to marry
as part of their life plan to do so, and open the door to cultural transformation of society's
perception of gay and lesbian identity and of marriage itself. See Wolfson, supra, at 585-87.
380 See RcHARDs, supra note 9, at 346-54 (drawing analogies between the
transformative potential within abolitionist feminism and the historical struggle for gay and
lesbian rights). Cf. Jane Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a
Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684 (1997) (book review) (observing that a theme
in recent gay and lesbian work is the vital role of cultural transformation and the importance
of reflecting gay and lesbian difference and diversity); Backer, supra note 18, at 788-802
(contending that the movement of gay men and lesbians beyond empty toleration depends
upon their ability to enter "directly into the dialogue with the dominant society" and to take
control of their image and identity).
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lesbian marriages hold the potential "to expose and denaturalize the historical
construction of gender at the heart of marriage" and to point to a new
understanding of marriage not rooted in gender-based hierarchy and inequality
empowering men over women. 381
All of these theorists stressing cultural transformation hold out the prospect
of moral evolution. The diversity rationale opens the door for movement along
the spectrum of toleration toward respect and appreciation, yet does not require
acceptance of difference as a positive good. The fundamental point is that
protection of a realm of personal sovereignty is appropriate in the face of
reasonable moral pluralism. And this may be a comparative advantage over
more perfectionist models that require consensus as to the moral goods of same-
sex marriage. Sandel may be right that it is difficult to secure public support for
constitutional freedoms on the strength of the appeal to autonomy alone. Yet, to
jettison autonomy arguments entirely, rather than to supplement them with
arguments based on substantive moral goods, may prove an even more difficult
strategy for securing such freedoms. 382 There is still tremendous resistance to
extending toleration and full citizenship to gay men and lesbians and great
ignorance and fear about their lives and practices. 383 In the face of such
resistance, requiring that a right rest upon society's acceptance of the moral
worth of homosexual intimate association-with no recourse to such principles
as an entitlement to personal sovereignty or the appeal to the good of toleration
in a diverse society-seems perilous and risks leaving gay men and lesbians
without such rights. It also puts Sandel's analogical argument at risk of taking
an inherently conservative path, so that rights are denied unless same-sex
marriage is closely analogous to heterosexual marriage, which would
381 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. &
SEXUALTY: REv. LEsIAN & GAY LEGAL Issms 9, 17-18 (1991); Robin West, Integrity and
Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1313,
1329-34 (1997).
382 As I have argued above, Sandel overstates the dichotomy in liberal toleration
arguments between the good of choice and the good of what is chosen. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (linking the importance of
choice in intimte association to the fact that sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship
of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality") (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)); RICHARDS,
supra note 9, at 438-53 (invoking the basic right of all persons to intimate life and to bringing
ethical convictions to bear on matters of love and care, of which the right to marry is an
inortant institutional expression).
383 See generally ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFIrR ALL (1998) (reporting negative
judgments and lack of tolerance of homosexuals in survey of otherwise tolerant suburban
middle-class Americans).
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emphasize sameness at the expense of recognition of diversity and of any notion
of a distinctive and valuable gay and lesbian identity and culture.
2. Problems of Recognizing and Securing Autonomy
a. Problems of Perfectionism and Democratic Process: The Example of
Internal Feminist Debates
Another cluster of problems concerning the implementation of a
perfectionist project concerns questions of process and legitimacy. In this
Article, I focus on three strands of perfectionism-civic republican, feminist,
and liberal-that share a commitment to the value of self-government as a
useful proxy for living a good life. But even among these three, there is
considerable divergence as to the role of autonomy in such a life and how
government is to secure such autonomy. For example, Sandel focuses almost
exclusively upon democratic self-government and appears to reject the liberal
value of autonomy in the sense of personal self-government, or deliberative
autonomy. But beyond these three strmads of perfectionist thought, how is
government to adjudicate between, on the one hand, those voices who espouse
ideals of autonomy, self-determination, and agency and, on the other, those
who reject the value of autonomy as a component of a good life and (as do
some moral conservatives) instead espouse the ideal of being bound by the
obligations of religious faith, virtue, and community?384
Second, how is government to secure autonomy? Is the goal autonomy as
such, or autonomy only insofar as it allows the realization of morally worthy
choices? For example, Raz regards autonomy as a central moral value that
government has a responsibility to facilitate. As statements like "autonomy
means that a good life is a life which is a free creation" suggest, the main
content of his liberal perfectionist project appears to be autonomy as a proxy for
a good life; yet he also argues that autonomy has value "only if it is directed at
the good" and that autonomy to make worthless choices has no value that the
government should protect.385 Although he argues that respect for autonomy
requires government to refrain from compulsion to deter those choices, some
conservative perfectionists have drawn from Raz the idea that freedom should
384 See Bruce Frohnen, Sandel's Liberal Self, in DEBATiNG DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT, supra note 322 (arguing that Sandel, like liberals, has a model of the self that is
hostile to those views of common good that look to God and tradition for norms and
behavior).
385 See RAZ, supra note 13, at 411-12. Discussion with Professor Frank Michelman
was helpful on this point.
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consist merely in the right to do right, or to make morally upright choices.386
Third, even assuming that there could be acceptance of the proposition that
government should help persons live "meaningfully free and autonomous
lives," to what extent does government's responsibility to foster autonomy
require it to honor or reject citizens' own views of what makes for a
"meaningfully free and autonomous life"?387 How is government to determine
the preconditions for living such lives and whether particular ways of life are
more or less free and autonomous-by the legislative process of investigation,
factfinding, and the like? How is government to reconcile the competing views
of what it means to live a "meaningfully free and autonomous life"-by
majority vote? And what weight is to be given to moralistic arguments that
certain conceptions of the good are unworthy and to paternalistic arguments that
certain constituencies simply do not know their own best interests?
Certain debates within feminism over how best to interpret women's
experience and to promote women's well-being may shed light on this problem.
A vexing question within feminism is what it means to speak on behalf of
women and how feminists may simultaneously honor the obligations to propose
an agenda to advance the well-being of women and to listen to women. Of
course, there are points of agreement among feminists and among women as to
what makes women's lives go well (e.g., protection against employment
discrimination and violence and freedom from poverty); but on numerous
substantive issues there are robust and contentious debates among feminists and
among women (e.g., sexuality, pornography, motherhood and how to organize
family and market labor, and the existence and import of differences between
women and men).388
As feminist perfectionist Tracy Higgins suggests, this tension within
feminism between the commitments to transforming or perfecting women's
lives through politics and to listening to women's accounts of their experiences
386 See GEORGE, supra note 70, at 173-88 (critiquing tension in Raz as to the value of
autonomy and challenging conclusion that it requires refraining from morals laws).
387 See WESr, supra note 46, at 267.
388 On the family, compare Om, supra note 54, at 170-86 (calling for a gender-neutral
model of family in which mother and father do not have gender-specialized roles) with
FNEMAN, supra note 237, at 226-36 (calling for a "re-visioning" of the family as a mother-
child dyad and for state subsidies of mothers' caretaking work). On the so-called "sex wars"
among feminists, see Abrams, supra note 47. As the divisive pornography issue suggests,
feminists also differ on when to enlist the tools of government to advance feminist goals and
when is it better to battle on a cultural level. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's
Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1097 (1994).
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and interests mirrors the tension between democracy and fundamental rights.389
That is, both feminism and democracy must address the issue of dissent,
whether from a feminist agenda (or orthodoxy) or from democratic outcomes
that threaten core commitments to equality (and, I would add, liberty). Yet,
understandably, feminism offers no easy resolution to this dilemma, because
even a commitment to a deliberative model of politics does not guarantee
consensus. 390 How would a perfectionist politics address this tension?
Assuming perfectionists could find procedures to settle upon an agenda, what
preconditions for democratic self-government would they insist upon to
establish as legitimate the outcome of such procedures (even if they lose the
battle)? Will there, for example, be a right of dissent and a role for toleration?
A further complication arises because feminists argue that sex inequality
and systemic subordination have distorting effects on women's preference
formation and choices. 391 This raises what we might call (borrowing from
MacKinnon) the "difference versus dominance" problem.392 It is inaccurate,
some feminists charge, to speak of women's choices as the expression of their
voice or their autonomy. Rather than taking women's preferences as given, or
accepting the outcome of the democratic process, feminist perfectionists urge
that government should address the underlying constraints on women's
agency-posed by both private and public power-as well as take an active role
in shaping women's preferences and social norms to help women overcome the
effects of internalized oppression. 393  West, for example, advocates
government's obligation to attack the damage wrought by "abusive social
power and the damaging hierarchies of race, gender, and class," 394 which
undoubtedly would include the distorting effects on preferences and choices.
389 See Higgins, supra note 47, at 1686-87.
390 See id. at 1686-89.
391 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. For additional feminist work
recognizing the problem of sex inequality and subordination in shaping preferences, see, e.g.,
Oldn, supra note 350, at 13-14; Vieki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in ltle VII Cases Raising the
Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARv. L. REa. 1749 (1990). The influential work of Amartya
Sen addresses this problem in the context of developing or poorer countries. See AMARTYA
SEN, CoMMoDrnEs AND CAPABmES (1985); Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women
Are Missing, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Dec. 20, 1990, at 61.
392 See MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 32.
393 See Higgins, supra note 47, at 1700. Moreover, feminists charge that the state
already plays an active role in legitimating, suppressing, or redirecting women's preferences.
See Rhode, supra note 49, at 1188-89.
394 WEST, supra note 46, at 267.
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Although prominent in radical feminist thought, the argument that
subordination and inequality distort women's moral capacities, desires, and
identity is not alien to liberal or liberal feminist thought.395 Nor does a
commitment to liberalism or liberal feminism preclude "group-based" solutions
to attack gender hierarchy and its consequences and to foster self-
development. 396 For example, liberal-republican constitutional scholar Cass
Sunstein suggests that a constitutional democracy might override existing
preferences when they may be nonautonomous (e.g., in cases of excessive
limitations on opportunities or unjust background conditions) and that
government should address obstacles posed to autonomy and well-being by
certain social norms, social meanings, and social roles by taking action to
change them.397
Arguably, the problem of the distorting effects of inequality and
subordination upon the self points to the need for a perfectionist formative
project to secure self-government, but it also raises worries that we may not
know whether government is trampling upon autonomy or fulfilling it.
Perfectionists who acknowledge that governmental "norm management" poses
a threat to autonomy or agency and that rights should operate as a constraint on
such a governmental role offer few details about how to deal with the threat.398
For example, Sunstein argues that if women agree that the meaning of "being a
woman" is bad for women and limits their exercise of autonomy, but individual
women alone cannot change that meaning, government should attempt to do
so.399 But how, exactly, would this work when women conflict over what the
meaning should be? Consider again the feminist critique of Rawls's political
liberalism for tolerating households in which women and men have a
395 See JEAN GRMISHAW, PHHOSOpHY AND FEMNUST TMING 104-38 (1986); ML,
supra note 189, at 148-49, 172-73; Cynthia V. Ward, The Radical Feminist Defense of
Individualism, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 871, 881-93 (1995); see also WILL KYMUCKA,
LIBERAUsM, COMMUNITY, AND CuLTURE 91-94 (1989) (endorsing Okin's critique of Rawls
and arguing that women and minorities have been unjustly excluded from the processes by
which their identities and social roles were defined and that the solution is to empower women
and minorities to be able to make their own definitions of their roles and identity).
3 96 See Ward, supra note 395, at 893-99; see also supra text accompanying notes 329 &
350 for discussion of political liberalism's potential to embrace an anticaste or
antisubordination principle with respect to women.
397 See SUNSTEN, supra note 141, at 163-94; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 908-10.
398 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 965-67 (stating that rights operate as constraints on
norm management, but failing to offer "a full account of these limits"); see also Higgins,
supra note 47, at 1700 (stating that the question of "how and under what circumstances" the
state should exercise the "power to shape norms.... has no easy answer").
399 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 963-65.
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"voluntary" hierarchical division of authority and labor. 400 If women in such
marriages testify as to their contentment with their family arrangements, how
would these women's voices count in formulating governmental policies
concerning what would best foster such women's capacity to live self-governing
lives?
Feminist work suggests the complexity of the task of elaborating a
conception of meaningful agency, or autonomy, and of what role government
should play in its attainment. First, many feminists critique the dominance
feminism exemplified by MacKinnon for collapsing female identity into
victimhood and leaving no room for women to act as agents, albeit amidst
constraints.40 1 They point to the need for what Kathryn Abrams calls a model
of "partial agency," which acknowledges both women's "capacity for self-
direction and resistance" and "often-internalized patriarchal constraint. "40 2
Second, postmodern feminists call into question the apparent feminist quest for
unconstrained agency or for an autonomous self to the extent it fails to
recognize that everyone is always acted upon and shaped by society, or by the
process of social construction.40 3 To such postmodernists, both the feminist
quest for an authentic, nonsubordinated self and the liberal ideal of autonomy
appear naive and even quaint.
As an initial matter, a toleration as respect model would counter this
postmodernist critique with the observation that a liberal conception of
autonomy does not require a model of the self as immune from the process of
social construction. 40 4 Further, it would share the views of those feminists (such
as Seyla Benhabib) who argue that a strong version of postmodernism, which
includes the death of the idea of the autonomous, self-reflective subject, capable
of acting on principles, "undermines the feminist commitment to women's
40 See supra text accompanying note 330-42.
401 See Abrams, supra note 47 (discussing a range of feminist critiques of dominance
feminism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581 (1990) (offering a critique of MacKinnon from a perspective of Black women's
experiences).
402 See Abrams, supra note 47, at 346.
403 For postinodem feminist work exploring the problem of locating women's identity
and agency within a social construction framework, see JuDrrH BUTL , GENDER TRouBLE
(1990); FEMISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990); Katherine Franke,
Cunning Stunts: From Hegemony to Desire, 20 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHmNGE 549 (1993-
1994) (reviewing MADONNA, SEX (1992)).
404 For liberal work recognizing the formative role of institutions of civil society and the
social and cultural environment, see, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 6, at 14; RAZ, supra note 13,
at 308-20; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 908-29.
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agency and sense of selfhood." 4° 5 Rather, as Benhabib argues, "the situated
and gendered subject is heteronomously determined but still strives toward
autonomy.'4°6
This debate within feminism complicates the perfectionist project of
choosing among more or less "meaningfully autonomous" lives. It may,
indeed, suggest the wisdom of a governmental program (akin to a feminist
variant of political liberalism that would undergird toleration as respect) that
would focus upon fostering autonomy by securing basic liberties and equal
citizenship and providing resources to develop persons' moral powers (or, as
postmodernists might put it, engaging in self-construction), rather than upon
taling sides among ways of life. Such a program could take into account the
feminist claim that, while everyone is subject to the forces of social
construction, "some groups of people systemically and structurally have more
power to do the constructing than others"; therefore, freedom requires
according material and cultural resources to groups with less power (such as
women and racial and ethnic minorities) to enhance their ability to participate in
the processes of self-construction. 40 7 Toleration as respect would not assume
that preferences or choices are free or autonomous in the absence of the
preconditions for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. But with
such preconditions in place, toleration as respect would support the use of norm
management to a point (e.g., to foster support for the political value of
women's equal citizenship), but its respect for diversity and the exercise of
moral powers would counsel caution concerning governmental steering or norm
management concerning competing conceptions of good ways of life.
b. Reconciling the Perfectionist Project with the Call to Move Beyond
Empty Toleration
Finally, a perfectionist politics potentially conflicts with the call to move
beyond empty toleration to respect and to empathetic engagement with and
appreciation of the other. Again, internal feminist debates are instructive. If the
impulse to diagnose the distorting effects on the self due to domination raises
the "difference versus dominance" problem, the feminist call for respect for the
"other" raises the "difference versus deviance" problem. A central theme in
much feminist work is appreciation of diversity and difference and a
405 BENHABm, supra note 55, at 229.
406 Id. at 214.
407 See Hirschmann, supra note 52, at 59. Conversation with Professor Katherine
Franke was helpful on this point.
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commitment to listening to women and other "outsiders." By listening to such
perspectives, and by according them respect, if not special legitimacy or
authority, feminists open the possibility of revising one's perspective of persons
or practices (regarded by society as marginal and deviant) in light of such
persons' voices.4°8 As other critical scholarship elaborates the charge against
empty toleration, when citizens are free merely to leave each other alone-
rather than to engage with each other-there are psychic and other costs for
minority groups, who often do not have an opportunity to inform and transform
the dominant culture:
Insofar as the majority culture forms the background framework within which
sense is made of public deliberations about the terms and conditions of political
life and institutional arrangements, to be simply tolerated as the strange Other
is not to have one's culture and "horizons of significance" inform the
constitution of public institutions and the development of publicvalues.... To
treat individuals with "equal respect" entails, at least partly, respecting their
traditions and cultures, the forms of life which give depth and coherence to
their identities. And to treat those forms of life with respect means to engage
them, not simply to tolerate them as strange and alien.. *. To have reciprocal
empathy is to first attempt to understand the Other, but there cannot be
understanding the Other if one is not prepared to engage the Other in a
dialogue.409
As this call for equal respect suggests, the possibility of transforming a
person's (and a culture's) understanding of the moral worth of another person's
way of life is part of the promise of moving beyond empty toleration to respect.
I contend that this possibility is part of the strength of the diversity rationale for
toleration as respect, as the same-sex marriage example suggests. But when we
take seriously the call for active engagement by citizens to understand each
other, this opens the door for shifting or conflicting assessments of what it
means to live a good life and complicates government's perfectionist task of
distinguishing between morally worthy and unworthy lives. For example, rather
than citizens using government to discourage certain ways of life or social
practices (e.g., committed same-sex relationships), perhaps they should instead
408 See Dailey, supra note 2, at 1283-85; Man J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989);
Mar J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1763, 1764-68 (1990); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAIlNG ALL THE DuiFEmENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990).
409 Addis, supra note 18, at 121 (footnote omitted).
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move in the direction of learning to respect and even appreciate those ways of
life that differ from their own. It is instructive to recall Mill's argument for
liberty on the rationale that society might benefit from "experiments of
living." 410
I do not mean to suggest that an agenda of respect for diversity allows no
room for critical evaluation of lives for the distorting effects of inequality and
subordination diagnosed by feminism. A toleration as respect model has a
commitment to equal citizenship and to fostering the development and exercise
of moral powers and the capacities for self-government, and must take seriously
the problem of the impairment of such capacities. Respect and appreciation of
diversity may be a less appropriate response to lives reflecting such impairment,
due to external and internal constraints on agency, than a governmental attack
on the sources of such impairment. The questions of interpretation and of
appropriate governmental policy are complex. My point is that perfectionists
who advocate governmental steering to foster self-government and recognize
the value of pluralism need to provide a clearer picture of how a commitment to
that value would inform their formative project.
I have highlighted the debate over same-sex marriage and internal feminist
debates as a way to raise more general concerns about the perfectionist call to
foster good lives through governmental steering in a morally pluralistic society.
These concerns go to the battle over whose perfectionism wins, how
government is to recognize and secure "meaningful" autonomy, and the tension
between such perfectionist projects and the call to move beyond empty
toleration to respect and appreciation. In light of these concerns, a toleration as
respect model that takes the fact and value of diversity seriously would resist
this dimension of perfectionism pending a clearer picture of how a perfectionist
politics would address such concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued for a model of toleration as respect. I have
considered charges that toleration is both too empty and too robust and have
shown that toleration as respect can meet these criticisms. Toleration as respect,
rather than empty toleration, is the better interpretation of the import of three
prominent rationales for toleration: the anti-compulsion rationale, the
410 MILL, supra note 8, at 54. Similarly, H.L.A. Hart held out the prospect, in a legal
regime of toleration, that the example of persons whose lives, "like the lives of many
homosexuals, are noble ones and in all other ways exemplary," would lead to the shifting of
the limits of tolerance and, in effect, peaceful change in social norms. Hart, supra note 174,
at 250-51.
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jurisdictional rationale, and the diversity rationale. Toleration as respect aims at
more than empty toleration, or pale civility, between citizens through appealing
to such principles as respect for a realm of personal self-government and for
diversity and through such requirements as mutual respect and reason-giving
among citizens. Although toleration may be a disappointing virtue because it
seems to hold back from a deeper social unity and cannot guarantee that citizens
will move all the way to appreciation of each other, it plays a necessary and
vital role in securing democratic and personal self-government in a morally
pluralistic society.
Yet toleration as respect does not translate into the proposition that
government leaving persons alone is sufficient to secure self-government.
Notwithstanding perfectionist discontent with toleration, toleration as respect
embraces the valuable perfectionist claim that government should undertake a
formative project to foster the capacities necessary for citizens to live good,
self-governing lives. In this Article, I have addressed a number of salient
interpretative questions concerning the proper parameters of such a project,
particularly as to the proper role of governmental persuasion. By way of
illustration, I have offered a critique of abortion jurisprudence and the denial of
the right to marry to gay men and lesbians from the vantage point of toleration
as respect, suggesting a model of careful scrutiny of the reasons for which
government acts and the effect of such action upon the capacity for self-
government. Although such jurisprudence to date largely reflects empty
toleration, at best, and intolerance, at worst, I have suggested that more recent
cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Romer v. Evans show the
potential to move toward a model of toleration as respect.
I have attempted to narrow the gap between perfectionism and toleration as
respect by developing toleration as respect as a viable melding of key liberal
and feminist principles concerning the primacy of autonomy (or agency) and
respect for diversity. I have shown common ground as to government's
formative project and suggested the strengths of toleration as respect where
liberal and feminist perfectionism diverge from it.
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